Although as coaches we (should) always consider progressions into our session plans, are we always thinking these through as much as we should? Could we use a systematic approach to make sure we are meeting the players’ needs?

The importance of differentiating between difficulty and complexity

When coaches discuss progressions in their training sessions, they often think of it as “how can we make this game more difficult for the players?”, but rarely “how can we make this game more complex?”. What might seem like a simple semantic question is actually essential to get what we really want out of a session.

Simply put, difficulty is the amount of effort the players must use to compete in a game while complexity is the level of thinking required from them ¹. It is therefore clear that the stimulation is different whether a task is difficult or complex.

As a tool for mathematics teachers, John Hattie suggests a difficulty and complexity matrix ² that can help teachers to assigned appropriate learning tasks to their students. It is a simple coordinate graph, with the horizontal axis representing the level of difficulty, and the vertical axis the level of complexity.

The matrix identifies four main relationships between difficulty and complexity. A fluency task will be learnt and then executed automatically, therefore being quite easy (low difficulty) and simple (low complexity). A stamina task can be viewed as a problem requiring to complete an addition of fluency tasks, hence increasing the amount of effort needed, and therefore the level of difficulty, while remaining simple. It can also be determined by the number of people able to solve the problem i.e. if only a few people are to solve this equation, it can be deemed as difficult. Strategic thinking intervenes in the context of a contextual problem i.e. a problem-solving situation that can be solved by using the appropriate knowledge. Finally, the expertise level requires the student to use his knowledge in a new way to come with an unique and personal answer.

Although the above examples are based on mathematics, we can try to apply this matrix to football.

To begin, we can differentiate the execution process in the lower half of the matrix, from the decision process in the upper half. The difference between the two is the cognitive load required to perform a task. Executing even a very difficult technical movement doesn’t necessarily requires a high level of thinking.

We can then split the matrix in four quadrants as per John Hattie’s.

The bottom-left will be the initial stage where a player learns a new technique, with very low to no cognitive stimuli, to focus exclusively on the execution. The player can then progress on the difficulty scale towards the mastery of the technique. Obviously, not all players will be able to reach mastery, and some will peak before this stage.

Problem-solving will be the point where high complexity and low difficulty meet. This is the part where players are in situations testing their understanding of the game. The amount of effort required to succeed is low, but the level of thinking is very high. Finally, when complexity and difficulty meet, the player will need to be creative to solve the problems he’s facing. Creativity here is used in its broader sense, not only limited to creativity on the ball. A defensive action can be creative as well in the sense that a player or group of player can make original decisions to react to a situation.

Let’s take a few examples to illustrate and understand better each of these stages.

When planning games for a session, it’s essential to know what we want to focus on primarily. With young players, or players new to football, we might want to improve the execution more than the decision making in a first place. Training sessions should then follow in priority an horizontal progression on our matrix, to help the players reaching technical mastery. This obviously doesn’t mean that complexity in games should be completely removed. For example, a group of Under 10 should, of course, play small-sided games at training. However, inside the game, the coach might ask the players to use only their other foot (or weaker foot), making it more difficult but maintaining the complexity level.

With older age groups, however, the sessions should become more decision-making orientated since players should already be comfortable with difficult tasks. To use the previous example, there would be little benefice asking a professional player to use only his weaker foot during a game. The coach should instead challenge the players with cognitive tasks. For example, in a game, asking the team in possession to constantly create numerical superiority around the ball to progress on the pitch would be complex.

Using the matrix in a constraint-led approach

Football coaches should be, consciously or not, familiar with the constraint-led approach. I will not go into too much details here because it is a topic of discussion of its own, and there are more qualified people who have already written very instructive articles about it ³. In summary, a constraint-led approach is the manipulation of certain elements of the game to guide the players towards specific learning outcomes. A constraint in this context is not necessarily a restriction, it can and should also take the form of an incentive. As an example, instead of only allowing a goal to be scored after 5 passes are made within the team, the coach can give an additional point if the team scores after making at least 5 passes. Although the outcome sought by the coach remains the same, the way the players will get there is different.

Using the matrix we just discussed, we are going to see how we can come with a system to help us setting up the relevant constraints in our games.

Constraints can be classified in 3 categories depending on the element they affect:

1. Player – These are specific to the individual. Typically, the genetic attributes, the emotional state, the behaviour, the ability to learn… These can’t hardly be manipulated by the coach but must be taken into consideration.
2. Environment – It is the general surrounding of the learning place. It includes elements like the weather, the playing surface, the training time/day… but it also includes the socio-cultural aspect such as the personal situation, the culture of the player, the culture of the club… Some of these can be manipulated by the coach, some can’t be.
3. Task – These are the rules of a game, the dimensions/shape of the playing area, the equipment used, the scoring system… All of them can be manipulated by the coach to affect the player-environment interaction.

Each time we manipulate one or more elements of these categories, we affect the way the player is going to act and learn. Some constraints might impact more the execution process, some the decision process. Coaches therefore need to be conscious of which process they want to impact more in a specific game, and use the appropriate constraints to reach this objective. To help us setting the right constraints in a game, I have tried to come with a system to monitor the level of difficulty and complexity we are proposing to the players.

To begin with, I have tried to classify a list of constraints into different categories depending on whether they would affect the difficulty or the complexity of a game. These are my personal views, and other coaches might have different perceptions. This is only a suggested framework which might need to be personalised.

Difficulty constraints:

• Numerical balance: whether there are any neutral players in a game, or whether one team has a numerical advantage over the other team. Having an overload in possession will obviously be easier than playing with even numbers or an underload.
• Playing area: the area can be adjusted to be either bigger or smaller. The appreciation will depend on the number of players involved in the game. For example, a 40×30 yards pitch to play a 5v5 game will be considered as normal since it is the standard size for this format. If you were to play the same game on a 30×20 yards pitch, the playing area would be considered small. In possession, the smallest the area, the more difficult it is to execute a task. And it is the opposite out of possession.
• Number of touches: the touches on the ball can be unlimited, conditioned or limited. Unlimited or limited constraints will apply to the whole playing area without conditions or players’ distinctions. Conditioned constraints might apply to specific zones of the playing area, or certain situations only (first touch finish, unlimited in defensive third but ‘x’ touches in attacking third…). Limited touches will typically be more difficult as it would usually be a 1 or 2 touches game.
• Physical stimuli: some constraints can affect the physical demand of a game. For example, allowing players to use their other foot only, or as Tuchel made it popular, asking defensive players to hold a tennis ball in each hand while training set pieces, to prevent them from grabbing their opponent’s shirt.
• Environmental stimuli: these constraints can either be manipulated or they are forced. If it’s raining heavily on the day of a session, we know it’s going to be more difficult for the players as the rain will have an affect on the condition of the pitch, the players’ comfort,… Although we can’t control these constraints, we should take them into account as they will impact the difficulty of the session. Some environmental constraints we can control would be for example to be a bias referee in a game, not using bibs to differentiate teams…

Complexity constraints:

• Type of game: games can be constant, variable or random, from the least to the most complex. In a constant game, a same skill is repeated in the same condition. In a variable game, a same skill is repeated in different situations. In a random game, different skills are performed in unpredictable situations.
• Freedom of movement: players’ movements across the playing area might be constrained. They can be locked inside a specific area, or conditioned to travel from one area to another, or finally they can be totally free. The more freedom the players have, the more complex it will be, since it will increase the number of decisions they have to make.
• Scale of the team: a game can focus on different part of the team. The simplest one will be at the individual level. More complex, it will focus on a group of players (3 or 4) or a unit (defence, midfield or forwards). Finally, the most complex will be units or at the whole team level. Systems, positions and lines require more thinking from the players as there will face a wider range of situations and will need to make decisions based on more factors at the same time (self, team mates, opponents, space, the ball).
• Topic of the game: sessions should be built around the principles of play, and these can either be macro principles, sub-principles, or sub-subprinciples. The macro level is the most complex as it also includes all the micro principles. For example, if the topic of a game is the macro attacking principle of progressing through the thirds, it will be a complex task for the players because they will have a number of problems to solve and therefore a lot of decisions to make: how to keep possession, when to play forward, what type of passes to make… However, if we were to break down this principle into smaller pieces and focus only on one sub-subprinciple such as creating width and depth for example, the players’ decision making process would mainly be concentrated on this topic, reducing considerably the number of problems to solve.
• Cognitive stimuli: it is possible to add some extra stimuli in a game to increase its cognitive load. The shape of the playing area can be modified (circle, hexagon, triangle…), the number, size and/or positioning of the goals can vary…

I have then summarised the categories and related constraints into the below tables. Although the complexity constraints’ categorisation won’t differ depending on the moment of the game we train, the difficulty one will need to be adapted. The below will apply to the possession and attacking transition phases. However, the numerical balance, number of touches and playing area will need to be inverted for the defensive transition and out of possession phases.

When designing a game, we can use these tables to measure its levels of difficulty and complexity to ensure it is in phase with the outcome we are targeting. Simple/easy constraints will be rated 1, medium 2 and difficult/complex 3. We can then rate each component of the game and come with difficulty and complexity average ratings.

Practical examples

Let’s see how a training program could be built, and how we could use the difficulty and complexity matrix to help us planning and monitoring our sessions.

Inspired by the tactical periodization methodology ⁴, I would base my training program upon my game model. Each session would be built around the acquisition of a principle of play. The first session would be of a low difficulty to help the players understanding the principle first. During a session though, the complexity level needs to constantly increase. Over the course of a season, the players will have multiple sessions on a same principle, but the difficulty will increase as their understanding of the principle improve.

As an example, if one of my attacking principle is, as mentioned previously, progressing through the thirds, I might start training one of its sub-subprinciple which could be third-man combinations. Here are 3 games we could do in a session, with a constant complex progression while maintaining a low difficulty level.

Using the matrix, the game seems to be fairly easy and simple:

The next game would then increase the complexity:

The players are now allowed to move across the pitch under certain conditions, making the game more complex. To make it more realistic and allow the players to make their own decisions, we add an incentive rather than a restriction (3 points for a goal after a third man combination). This is also the occasion for the coach to check the understanding of the players.

Finally, we would put the players into a small-sided game, increasing the complexity to its highest level, but still maintaining the difficulty level as low as possible to allow the players to focus on their understanding of the principle and their decision-making.

Players now have positions and roles in the game, as well as total freedom to move on the pitch.

Depending on the players’ acquisition of the principle, we would then train the same topic again later in the season, increasing again the difficulty of the sessions as well to develop the players’ ability to apply the principle in more difficult situations. As an example, we could use the same small-sided game but increase its difficulty:

This game is more difficult as the 2 neutral players have been removed, and it is now 7v7 instead of 6v6 in the same area. We have also added some conditions to the touches allowed.

In the last progression, we’ll remove all neutral and supporting players, playing a 9v9 in the same area as previously, with only 2 touches allowed per player.

Takeaways

In a recent interview ⁵, Borussia Monchengladbach’s assistant coach Rene Maric stated that “Sometimes, a player realises he needs to be four metres to the left to close a gap and by that simple act, he solves a problem for his team and creates a new one for the opposition. There are infinite decisions made in a game of football. It’s impossible for the coach to make this decisions for the players. We can give them a guideline or a “solution space” through principles, they have to perceive, decide and execute on the pitch.“

As coaches, we must make sure we are developing the players’ cognitive ability as much as we develop their technical, tactical and physical skills. Training sessions should therefore be planned and designed to achieve this objective, giving the players some guiding principles but encouraging them to solve problems on their own. Unconsciously though, we might be sometimes focusing too much on the player’s execution in training sessions, and not enough on the thinking process behind a movement. Making a clear distinction between decision and execution tasks might therefore be helpful. Coaches might have different views on this topic though, and this method is an example only. It might not work for everyone, or might need some alterations, but more importantly this might help some coaches to reflect on and improve their training methodology.

References:

1 David A. Sousa (2011) - How the brain learns
2 John Hattie (2008) - Visible Learning for Mathematics
3 https://medium.com/my-fastest-mile/constraints-player-development-in-football-748bdbb97441 and https://drowningintheshallow.wordpress.com/2016/03/14/what-is-a-constraints-led-approach/
4 X. Tamarit - What is tactical periodization? / J-L Delgado-Bordonau & A. Mendez-Villanueva - Tactical periodization, a new soccer training approach / J. Guilherme Oliveira - Tactical periodization, Theory & Fundamentals
5 https://theathletic.co.uk/1669125/2020/03/16/rene-maric-borussia-monchengladbach/

6th in La Liga with 12 draws in 27 games, Atletico stand 13 points behind the leader Barcelona. They also had a chaotic start in the Champions League, losing twice in the group stage, against Juventus and Bayer Leverkusen. On their side, Liverpool had a dream season in the Premier League, unbeaten until a trip to Watford at the end of February, few days after the first leg in Madrid. In the Champions League, they had lost their opening game against Napoli but still finished top of their group.

Unsurprisingly, Atletico didn’t approach these games with the ambition to fight over the possession of the the ball, averaging 28.5% possession over both legs. In terms of expected goals, Liverpool accumulated 3.3 xG against 1.7 for the Spaniards. However, the first leg saw Liverpool finishing the game with only 0.5 xG, showing a clear difference between both games. We will therefore look at how Atletico controlled the first leg, and then focus on Liverpool’s tactical adjustments in the second leg.

Atletico’s plan in the first leg

Deep and compact defensive block

Atletico would defend in a traditional, yet very compact, 4-4-2 shape.

Defending in a deep block was certainly Atletico’s plan, and their early goal in the 4th minute must have reinforced this idea. One of Liverpool’s main strength is the pace of their wingers, Salah and Mane, and their ability to make runs behind the defense to receive into space. With a deep block on the edge of the 18 yard box, Atletico already reduced significantly the risk of being caught behind their back. However, they were not the first team to try this approach against Liverpool, but not many managed to concede so little chances and get a win like they did.

Forcing wide play and setting up traps

With their very compact defensive shape, Atletico prevented any chances of playing through or inside their block, therefore forcing Liverpool to use the wide areas to go around it. In theory, this should not really disturb Liverpool’s game plan as they naturally use the wings in their attacking build up. This season, Arnold and Robertson are 2 of the 3 players with the most passes in the team, averaging respectively 91 and 76 passes per 90 minutes. Both play a very important role positionally too, as they often take high and wide positions to stretch the opposition’s defensive line, opening spaces in the channels for the wingers of the wide centre midfielders.

To prevent being manipulated by Liverpool in the wide areas to open space, centrally, Atletico relied mainly on 2 principles: aggressive press on the ball and pressing traps in wide areas.

It’s important not to confuse deep and passive defending. The defensive height of a block only determines how far from its goal a team is willing to start pressing the opposition. However, it doesn’t mean that a team defending deep is simply sitting there waiting for the ball. The risk by being too passive is to be played around too easily, which can lead to dangerous crosses or cut backs for example, or giving wide players too much space to run at pace with the ball and increase their chances to win 1v1 situations against defenders.

To force Liverpool to play wide, the centre forwards were crucial as first line of defense to break the relationship between the back line and the centre midfielders. Because of their front 2, Liverpool would typically build up with a back 3 to maintain numerical advantage. Correa and Morata then mainly had 2 situations to deal with: either Fabihno dropping between Van Dijk and Gomez, or one of Henderson or Wijnaldum dropping respectively on the right or the left.

By blocking passes in the central channel, the rest of the team could adjust its positioning and anticipate wide passes to trigger their pressing. In few situations, the centre forwards failed to block a pass into the central channel, in which case the centre midfielders, Thomas and Saul, were responsible for closing down the receiver and block him from playing between the lines.

Liverpool would typically try to build up short from the back. Atletico would not typically press the first pass. Instead, they would try to invite a further pass to a higher player on the touchline. From there, the fullback and the wide midfielder would team up to press the ball. Because the central midfielders would block any pass towards the central channel, the receiving player would generally have 2 choices: take a touch forward to try to dribble down the line, or pass the ball back. In the first scenario, Atletico would create a 2v1 situation in which they would almost always win the ball. In the second scenario, the wide midfielder would initiate a collective press on the back pass, allowing the block to step up and forcing either a further back pass, or a forward pass in the central channel where they had the density and the numerical advantage to regain possession. The intensity of the press would be maximal, with the ball carrier being hounded until he releases the ball.

Atletico were mainly able to press as quick as they did because their wide midfielders were never pinned into their starting position, allowing them to press without having a difficult decision, and because of a recurring defensive overload in favor of the Spaniards.

An option for Liverpool would have been to overload the wide areas to have more chances to disorganize Atletico’s shape, and create spaces to penetrate.

Defensive balance to prevent switches

When they face a deep defensive block, one of Liverpool’s response is to proceed with quick switches of play to use the space available on the ball-far side. With Van Dijk’s long passing quality and the pace of their pairs on the wings (Robertson/Mane and Arnold/Salah), they can move the ball quickly enough to unbalance the opposition’s defensive organisation.

Typically, teams are vulnerable to switches of play because they try to be very compact on the near-ball side, and to overload the team in possession, but they fail to restrain the ball in this strong zone. In most cases, the team in possession will try to play back to a player in support if the pressure is too intense. When this player has then more time and space on the ball, he might have the opportunity to switch the play.

Atletico’s response to that was to always have the ball-far wide midfielder covering the width rather than tucking in to support his central midfielder and half the pitch, as we would often see.

Atletico’s positioning had 2 possible effects on Liverpool:

Firstly, it dissuaded the ball carrier to switch the play as the wide midfielder would often be in a position to intercept a long ball (Saul in the above picture) and would the have space to initiate a counter-attack.

Secondly, even if the wide midfielder was not really in a position to intercept a long pass, his positioning would give him quick access to press the receiver (Lemar in the second picture). He would then need to react to simple triggers to anticipate a pass: the ball carrier’s body position, and the level of pressure on the ball.

Both of these are essential to avoid being exposed to switch of plays, and the result was that Liverpool were either reluctant to do so, keeping possession in an area where Atletico were dominant, or passing the ball backwards in which case Atletico would press as mentioned previously. When Liverpool chose to switch anyway, Atletico were able to close down the receiver quick enough to not concede any space and were therefore rarely exposed.

10 days after this game, Watford used a similar defensive approach in a Premier League game they won 3-0, for Liverpool’s first league loss this season.

Cautious possession

Atletico seemed to have a clear plan in possession, with one key idea in mind: do not give Liverpool any opportunity to counter. We could observe that intent from the first minutes, on the corner kick leading to their goal in the 4th minute.

In the same way they tried to minimize the Reds’ strengths in possession, Atletico were well conscious of the threat when they were themselves in possession. Liverpool thrive in situations when they can counter-attack, using the pace of Mane and Salah to exploit spaces. They are also well known for their counter-pressing in the seconds after losing the ball.

Atletico therefore based their attacking transitions and possession phases on 2 principles: first, secure possession, then attack the depth behind the defensive line.

Despite their deep defensive line, Atletico were rather patient when they would regain possession, even though we could think that the plan would be to proceed with quick counter-attacks like many teams would do in this set up. However, Atletico might lack of some pace to really be efficient on counters from a deep block, whereas their 4 midfielders are good technicians and are able to keep the ball even against an aggressive pressing.

To secure possession, they could then rely on their individual technique, but also on their defensive compactness, which allow them to always have support in the area where the ball was won to make a first safe pass away from the pressure.

Once they had managed to play out of the counter-pressing zone, they would intend to take advantage of Liverpool’s high defensive line, and exploit the space behind their back 4. We can then identify 2 main situations.

The first one is when they were attacking down one wing. The opposite side’s wide midfielder would be tucking into the central channel, either in a central midfield position if Thomas and Saul drifted wide to support on the ball side, or in a centre forward position alongside Morata and Correa to form a narrow front 3 if the centre midfield area was occupied. Maintaining cover in the centre midfield was essential to prevent counter-attacks from Liverpool, and was therefore the priority. Only once the positional cover was in place the wide midfielders would join the attacking line, often creating a 3v3 against Liverpool’s back line.

The second main attacking situation would be when Atletico could initiate their attack from a central position. Koke would typically again be the third centre forward, but the fullbacks would also push up to stretch Liverpool’s block and be available to attack the depth. Lodi would play an important role in Atletico’s possession phase, finishing the match with the highest number of touches in his team.

In both situations, Atletico’s priority seems to have been to play forward passes in areas which would not represent a threat should they lose the ball. Therefore, most of their forward passes in the final third would be through balls over the defensive line, or passes to their widest player. In some occasions, when they had to play from a deeper positions, they would also try to use Morata’s height and play long balls for a deviation. They would follow the same principle on set pieces, with most of their indirect free kicks being played over Liverpool’s block. As a result, Atletico ended up with 5 offsides against them, and only 1 against Liverpool.

Liverpool’s adjustment in the second leg

In the second leg at Anfield, it’s fair to say that Liverpool created more chances to score, tallying 2.8 xG and scoring 2 goals in 120 minutes. Although it wasn’t enough to beat a very effective Atletico side, it evidenced that Klopp and his staff made relevant changes after struggling offensively in Madrid.

There were 2 changes in the Liverpool starting eleven from the fist leg: Adrian in goal in place of the injured Alisson, and Henderson sliding into the central midfielder position, Oxlade-Chamberlain replacing him as the right centre midfield, and Fabinho starting as a sub. Both new starters had a direct impact on the game, with mixed success. We will focus on the midfielder’s contribution and how Liverpool’s right side was adjusted in this leg.

Oxlade-Chamberlain’s direct impact

As a versatile player alternating between central and wide positions, Oxlade-Chamberlain offers different options than Henderson in this right centre midfield position. Naturally more attracted by the wing than the Liverpool captain, and more willing to make forward runs behind the defensive line, he solved some of the problems the English side had in the first leg.

As discussed previously, one of the key in Atletico’s pressing success was that they could direct Liverpool in areas of the pitch where they wanted to be, and they had numerical advantages to press the ball without conceding space. With Oxlade-Chamberlain, Liverpool now had a player who could drift wide and dribble down the wing with pace, and who was eager to attack the space in the centre-back/fullback channel when in a more central position. On the left side, Wijnaldum would also make this type of runs in the first leg. However, Atletico could contain him because Liverpool could not use the spaces these runs open, which they did better in the 2nd leg.

The forward runs in the CB/FB channel are more difficult to defend because they create a confusion as to who should mark the runner between the central midfielder, the fullback and the centre-back.

How did Arnold and Salah adjust?

At Anfield, Liverpool could find Salah more often, the Egyptian finishing the game 111 touches against 36 in Madrid. Although he only played 72 minutes in the first leg and 120 in the second one, his ratio touch per minute more than doubled, from 0.40 to 0.93. His passing also improved, from 70% to 84% completed passes, despite increasing his forward pass ratio from 33% to 59%.

Arnold also got more involved and had more impact on the game. He delivered 7 key passes against 2 in the first game, and his crossing accuracy increased from 13% for 16 crosses to 20% for 25.

With Oxlade-Chamberlain, they would in most situations build a triangle to occupy and secure 3 key zones:

1. The CB/FB channel, to pin the wide midfielder and prevent him from stepping out quickly to press on a pass, and to attack the space behind the defensive line to either receive in depth, or create space for a teammate between the defense and midfield lines
2. The width, to stretch the defensive block and either exploit space around it, or create space inside it to penetrate
3. The depth, to either attract pressure and open space between and/or behind the lines, or, if not pressed, being able to drive into space, or cross from a deep position

In zone 1, we would usually see Oxlade-Chamberlain, in zone 2 Salah, and in zone 3 Arnold. However, the shape was flexible, and players would rotate as they see fit (Cf. above picture). The first goal was a great example of this build-up.

Liverpool created more chances in second half through similar movements, although they were not able to score to avoid a fatal extra-time.

Conclusion

Atletico controlled the first leg, with an impressive defensive organization to which Liverpool couldn’t adjust in-game to score a precious away goal. The Spaniards were also the most dangerous team offensively, making very good use of their 28% possession to create goal scoring situations. Simeone’s plan to protect his team against Liverpool’s strengths was well thought, and his defensive principles are clearly very well integrated by his players.

3 weeks later in Liverpool though, the same game plan didn’t deliver the same outcome, and Atletico conceded much more chances. However, the English side wasted too many opportunities, whereas the Spaniards were incredibly efficient with a 30% conversion rate. Klopp’s tactical changes seemed to be relevant though, and his team didn’t look as helpless in the final third as they did in Madrid. Ultimately, individual performances decided of the result.

After the elimination, Klopp regretted Atletico’s very defensive approach despite the quality of the players they’ve got. From a purely strategic and tactical perspective though, Atletico’s performance was remarkable. Many teams have tried this approach against Liverpool this season, but not many have got a result out of it.

Even though they conceded 3 goals at home, the first leg in Madrid seems like the real failure. From a tactical point of view, Klopp and his staff didn’t react to adapt to Atletico’s game plan. Maybe they were satisfied with a 1-0 loss away, and thought that they would make the difference in the second leg. However, the home game showed that they had the resources to be more dangerous in the final third, and that they could have made some adjustments to get an away goal. From a players’ performance point of view, some key players didn’t seem at their best level, and the goal Atletico scored could have definitely been avoided. Defending 11v4 on a corner, it’s hard to imagine Liverpool conceding a goal.

Session’s objectives

• Encourage a team to press high and regain possession early
• Develop confidence and bravery out of possession
• Demonstrate the importance of playing at high intensity
• Encourage team work

Coaching points

On the ball:

• Identify and react to pressing triggers
• When pressing, runs MUST be at 100% pace
• Body shape to show the player wide

Around the ball:

• Mark players directly around the ball carrier to block short passes

Away from the ball:

• Get closer to the your teammates to restrict space
• Anticipate long balls/switch of play

Practice 1: Possession game

Organisation:

Pitch size depending on numbers and abilities. Increase the size if players find it too easy.

4v4+4 – 2 target players outside the pitch at opposite ends and 2 jokers in the middle playing with the team in possession. Target players can be pressed.

Rules:

Team in possession try to pass the ball from one target player to the other without being intercepted.

Team in possession can use both jokers.

All passes must be on the ground.

Target players can’t pass the ball to each other.

Scoring system:

In possession: 1 point for linking up both target players in a same possession phase.

Out of possession: 1 point for winning possession and passing the ball to a target player before the other team can either make 3 passes or link up the target players.

Coaching points:

• When to press? On any of the pressing triggers (soft pass, back-pass, poor first touch…), on the time of the pass to be as close as possible to the receiver on his first touch
• How to press? At full pace, slow down just before the receiver’s first touch, body shape to force the player into one direction
• How to support? Quick support, anticipate next pass based on teammate’s body shape, compress the area around the ball to block short passes

Practice 2: 5v5 directional game

Organisation:

A pitch 40x30m split in 2 halves

5v5+2

Rules:

Directional game – Team in possession scores by passing the ball to the target player defended by the other team (here, reds attack from left to right).

Team in possession can only score by passing from inside the target player’s half.

Target players can be pressed and tackled.

No offsides but all passes must be on the ground.

Scoring system:

Team in possession:

1 point for a pass to the target player

Team out of possession:

1 point for winning the ball in the target player’s feet

2 points for winning the ball in the other team’s half and completing a pass to their target player or making 3 passes

Coaching points:

• Know when to press – Identify pressing triggers. If the situation doesn’t allow press, hold positions to prevent forward play
• Press at pace – High intensity to close the receiver down as quickly as possible
• Force wide play – Body shape to force the opponent wide, curved runs to block central passes
• Quick support – React quickly to teammates movements to overload the area around the ball and restrict space to the ball carrier
• Balance – Player on the weak side tuck in to maintain compactness

Situations to coach:

Here are a few situations likely to happen during the game, which can give the opportunity for the coach to intervene and reinforce the coaching points.

• Ball in target player’s feet

#9: Do not press the target player unless you have close support to block short passes options. It is too easy here for the target player to pass the player even under pressure. Instead, wait for him to make a decision, and press on the time of the pass.

• Pass to the centre-back

#9: Curve your run to prevent switch of play and force the CB to play wide

• Winger drops to support CB

#11: Quick support when the CB is forced to play wide, mark your man to prevent short pass

• Cover

#8: Cover your teammates, block the space between #10 and #11 to prevent through ball and overload the area

• Balance

#7: On the weak side, tuck in to maintain compactness and anticipate a long ball

The team should be able to create the below situation:

Practice 3: Phase of play

Organisation:

Half a pitch

One goal and 3 gates

5v6+GK

Rules:

Red Team defends the goal and score by dribbling through one of the 3 gates

Blue Team tries to win the ball and score

Every time the ball goes off the pitch, the play restarts from the GK with a goal kick

Scoring system:

Red Team

1 point for dribbling through an orange gate

3 points for dribbling through the red gate

1 point every 5 passes completed

Blue Team

1 point for a goal

3 points for scoring a goal after regaining possession before the Red Team has completed 5 passes

Coaching points:

• Triggers – Identify the triggers and react quickly
• Force wide play – Isolate the ball carrier to restrict his options with the ball
• Compactness – The whole team must press together to remain compact and prevent play through the central channel
• Intensity and aggression – When the pressing is engaged, players around the ball must press at full pace and challenge the opponents with aggression

Here I will then suggest a training session focused on running behind the defensive line. It will involve 4 practices, based on a squad of 16 players.

Session’s introduction

To introduce the topic, I like to start with a little game. This one is very simple. It is played with the hands on a pitch longer than wide. The size will mostly depend on the age group, but 45m x 35m is fine for U18 upwards. There should be a light warm-up before starting though as this will involve accelerations.

The pitch includes 2 end zones, about 10 metres deep and on the whole width, where teams can score points. We’ll play for 10 minutes.

To score a point, a player must receive a pass in the end zone, but can’t enter the zone before a pass is made. Same rule applies for the defending team to block a pass. Players are allowed to run with the ball, but possession turns over if the ball carrier is tagged.

To progress this game, you can forbid back-passes to encourage forward runs. You can also only allow passes below the chest to encourage players to create clear passing lines.

There is no coaching in this game, the aim is to let the game introduce the topic.

Constant practice

We would then go into an unopposed technical practice, for about 20 minutes (6 minutes per variation and 2 minutes break). This practice will set the base for the rest of the session, introducing different variations of forward runs behind a defensive line. This will also allow players to work on their passing and receiving technique. The set up is as shown on the below picture. If you don’t have mannequins, I usually use 3 cones placed in a triangle shape, to represent an opponent. The ball can’t go through the cones. You need a minimum of 7 players.

Players will work on different variations:

• Straight run outside the defender
• Curved run outside the defender to receive in a different channel
• Wall pass and forward run between 2 defenders

Coaching points for the wide players (C and F) are:

• Movement: Go-to-show to create space
• Communication: Make eye contact, verbal or non-verbal communication with passer
• Timing of runs: Time your run to avoid being offside
• Change of pace: Acceleration needs to be brutal

It’s important to insist and get the players to make a dummy run before their forward runs. In match situation, this movement will often drag the defender and give a considerable edge to the attacker. It’s also a way to avoid being offside, as it gives the attacker some extra space before reaching the offside line, and the passer a second or 2 to execute his pass.

For players A, B, E and D:

• Weight of pass: Passes need to be whipped to switch the play quickly and change the angle of pass
• Body shape: Side-on to be able to receive to play forward
• First touch: With the inside of the foot, forward to pass the ball on the second touch

Note that between variation 1 and 2, players in B and E should adjust their first touch to have the appropriate angle to play forward. In the 1st variation, the wide player wants the ball through the closest channel, therefore B and E should take their first touch slightly towards the centre of the pitch. In the 2nd variation, the wide player wants the ball in the far-side channel, so the touch should be forward towards this space.

Function practice

In the same area, we replace the mannequins by defenders and draw a halfway line. A team of 4+GK will play against the 3 defenders. We add another goal and a GK at the other end of the pitch. The practice will last about 25 minutes, split in 5 sequences of 4 minutes to allow rest and have a high intensity during the practice.

The play always restart from the GK if the ball goes out. Passes are only played on the ground. The defending team can only defend in the other team’s half, and offsides apply from the halfway line. When an attacking player receive the ball in the other half, he plays a 1v1 with the GK. The attacking team get a point for a goal, the defending team 2 points. This will encourage the defending team to press.

In this game, we should encourage the centre-backs to move the ball quickly at the back to find the right angle to play forward. It will also move the player pressing them and open gaps in the unit. As in the technical practice, we should ask the CBs to play diagonal forward passes rather than straight ones. This is much more difficult for the other team to defend, and it is easier for the receiver to play forward when the ball comes from in an angle rather than from behind.

There are lots of decision making and problems to solve in this game: when is the right time to play forward? What type of forward run should I make? How can we create gaps in the defensive team?

To progress, you can allow one defender at a time to defend in his own half. In this configuration, you can introduce to the players the idea of dummy forward runs to create space behind. Players will also need to identify when they can use a teammate’s run to their advantage. In this progression, you can also allow the player on the ball to dribble forward to enter the attacking half. It will reward even more the players making the runs, and force the defenders to make more decisions.

Phase of play

In the last practice, we play on roughly 3 quarter of a pitch, with the halfway line as the offside line. The attacking team will have an overload to get more success, so the teams are 9v7 with a GK in each team.

We play with no corners to keep the game going and get as many situations as possible. The play restarts from the attacking team’s GK if the ball goes out for a corner. Equally, if the defending team’s GK get the ball, play restarts from the other GK.

To start, the defending team can’t enter its own half, this will give more success to the attacking team. If the defending team manages to regain possession too quickly and keep the ball for too long, you can restrict their number of touches, and split the half in 2 or 3 zones, with players locked in specific zones.

Here, the attacking team (blues) is set up in a 2-3-3 to replicate a 4-3-3 formation, but it should be adjusted depending on the team’s shape in matches.

In this game, players can play long balls off the ground as it should be game realistic. However, we should encourage passes on the ground as much as possible to make the play as quick as possible. This will be important when we progress the game and that defenders are allowed in their half. In this progression, like in the previous practice, we should encourage players to make multiple forward runs even if they don’t receive the ball, as it will create space for teammates. You can add the same rule as previously (ball carrier allowed to dribble in the other half).

Sarri is recognized as an attack-minded coach, and analysis often cover primarily his teams in the possession phase. However, the Italian tactician also has strong defending principles, and prone a zonal marking system that is not necessarily the most commonly used by other teams. In this analysis, we will then look at Juventus’ defensive organization in details, focusing mostly on the last 5 games played (from Brescia away to Bologna at home).

Line-up

With Douglas Costa’s injury, the lack of wingers in the squad forced Sarri to change the organisation. In the last 5 games, Juve lined up in a 4-3-1-2 shape, transitioning in a 4-2-2 organisation when out of possession.

Should Aaron Ramsey be fit, he would certainly take up the attacking midfield spot. Unfortunately, the Welshman has only been able to participate to 4 matches this season, for a total of 198 minutes.

The second centre-forward spot alongside Ronaldo is shared by Higuain and Dybala, both having played about the same number of minutes in those games.

With Ramsey out, it was mentioned that we could see a trio Dybala-Ronaldo-Higuain with the former playing as an attacking midfield behind the 2 centre-forwards, but it seems unlikely that Sarri would make this choice, as this could undermined the team’s defensive balance. Ramsey and Bernardeschi are both more suited to do the defensive work required in this position and within this system.

Analytical approach

To break down the organization, we can split the defensive phase into 3 moments:

• The pressing phase
• The restraining phase
• The blocking phase

Each phase depends on the position of the ball on the pitch, as schematized below:

In each phase, the team will adjust its organisation and behavior based on the objectives to achieve.

The pressing phase

Juventus adopt a high pressing line, starting roughly at the edge of the centre circle in the opposition’s end. In this area, they actively press the ball with 2 objectives in mind: prevent the other team to build-up from the back, and regain possession by either winning the ball in a high position, or forcing the other team to play a long ball under pressure, which would often results in a dead ball that the defense can easily win.

To prevent the other team to build-up from the back, Juventus opt for a man-marking coverage system, matching-up the opposition’s positioning in its own half.

This coverage system implies that the midfielders are often out of position, dragged out by the man they need to mark. The risk is to create an important gap between the defensive line and the midfield, opening up the chance for the opposition to receive the ball between the lines by playing over Juventus’ midfield.

Below is an example of the weak areas against an opposition building up in a 3-4-3 formation. The central area left empty by Pjanic is exposed in case the centre-forward drops and can receive the ball between the lines. On the wings, although Matuidi and Khedira have a quicker access to the wide areas by their positioning, they might be forced to defend facing their goal, which is not ideal and can be difficult in a 2v2 situation.

To mitigate this risk and make their high press successful, Juventus follow a few principles.

Forcing wide play

When pressing the defensive line, the centre-forwards make sure they block the relationship between the 2 centre-backs, forcing the ball to be played out to the fullbacks. In a first time, this allows the team to shift to one side of the pitch, reducing considerably the surface to cover and allowing to be more compact on the width. In a second time, Juventus actually set a trap once the ball is played to the fullback, by blocking a potential back-pass to the keeper or the centre-back. With the teammates close by man-marked, short options are difficult to find and the outcome will most of the time be either a long ball or even better, regaining possession in the fullback’s feet. A long ball is a good outcome for the pressing team, but as just discussed, it can be dangerous if it is played with accuracy.

Quick pressure on the ball

To force inaccurate long balls, Juventus need to apply quick pressure on the ball carrier to create urgency and provoke a clearance rather than a long pass. This requires from the midfielders to be attentive to the pressing triggers to anticipate when to close down the ball carrier. This also requires players being able to quickly shift positions to man-mark the closest opponent and shut down any short passing options. A last important skill for the pressing players is shadow marking, or screening. Given that the team in possession will always have a numerical advantage in the build-up, the defending team needs to be able to press a player while blocking a pass to another one to make it even. Below is an example of a pressing phase led by Ronaldo. When pressing the centre-back, he needs to keep the centre-midfield in his shadow to prevent a forward pass. Then, once the ball is played to the fullback, he screens the centre-back to block a back-pass and give himself a chance to press the fullback as well.

Hounding the forward players

This principle applies to the 4 players in the defensive line. To avoid dangerous forward passes behind the midfielders when the ball carrier couldn’t be pressed quick enough to force a long ball, it is crucial that the defenders follow any forward player who would drop to receive between the lines. Therefore, we can often see De Ligt or Bonucci following their man in the opposition’s half. When this happens, it’s important that the 3 other defenders slide to cover the position left empty to remain compact. This can obviously lead to dangerous situations if the defender is beaten and the opponent can turn. However, because the opponent had to drop in a deep position to receive the ball, he has a large distance to cover to reach the attacking third, which gives time to the other players to make recovery runs. A player who has to run with the ball will also be slowed down, giving extra-time to the team to recover.

Triggers

Although Juve are pressing high and aggressively, it doesn’t mean they are chasing the ball in a reckless way. They would typically press on all the usual triggers (soft pass, receiver facing his own goal, bouncing ball, inaccurate pass, pass to the keeper…). They also press any back-pass very aggressively, and of course, anytime they manage to trap a wide player as mentioned above, they would press him immediately. With a high pressing line though, it’s important that the defensive line, and particularly the centre-backs, remain focus and understand the dynamics of the game. When the opposition’s ball carrier is closed down quickly, it is harder for him to play an accurate and quick long pass. Therefore, it will often end up with a high but rather weak long ball, leading to a 1v1 aerial challenge. On the opposite, if the ball carrier is not pressed and has time on the ball, they should drop few metres to control the depth and anticipate a potential long ball in their back. It’s also crucial that the goalkeeper is able to get off his line to sweep long through balls behind his back line.

Some examples

Here are some clips of Juventus pressing phase. In the first one, we have identified the key moments. In the next videos though, there is no annotations to allow the readers to make their own analysis.

The restraining phase

When Juventus’ pressing is beaten and the opponent manage to enter the second third of the pitch, the team enters a new phase. While the primary objective when pressing is to disrupt the build-up and force mistakes to regain possession, in this phase, the priority is to restrain the other team to deny penetration into the attacking third.

To do so, there are many different defensive systems. Man-marking has become very rare nowadays, teams preferring instead to use zonal marking. However, within zonal marking, there are still many variations. The difference between the systems will be the main point of reference the defending team bases its movements and positioning on. Most teams currently would use the opponent as their reference, which means that a player would cover his zone and press any opponent in it. On his part, Maurizio Sarri prefers Juventus to direct its defensive organisation towards the ball. The idea is then to cover options rather than the opponents. It can be seen as an anticipation-based system since the players need at all time to consider where the ball could be played and to who, in order to position themselves in a way to prevent this to happen.

In this system, the players need to be very intelligent and able to understand the different situations quickly. Most of the time, the midfield players won’t be directly marking any opponent. Similar to what we mentioned while discussing the pressing phase, most of the marking will be done through screening opponent’s positions, and a player might often be in a 1v2 situation in-between 2 opponents, where he needs to press the ball carrier while covering a passing option. Here is a good example of Matuidi moving with the ball to deny the ball carrier’s space to penetrate, while at the same time keeping the forward pass option in his shadow.

This video also highlights another important aspect of this coverage system: decision making. When a player is in the middle of 3 opponents for example, he needs to be able to assess which one is in the most dangerous position should he receive the ball, and therefore block this option in priority. In the clip, Matuidi has 2 men behind him, Weiser on the wing, and Havertz in a more central position. He rightly decides to cut the passing line to Havertz to force the play wide where it will be easier for the team to press.

From a collective point of view, the main benefit of an option-oriented system is the ability to cover the area around the ball with great compactness, which should in theory make it more difficult for the other team to penetrate through the defensive block. Indeed, in a man-oriented system for example, players are in some extent locked into a zone. Therefore, in some situations, the density around the ball can be lower than it should be. Besides, against teams with attacking players travelling between zones a lot, there is a high risk of being overloaded in certain area of the pitch. In Juventus’ system, it should be less likely to happen since players are instructed to mirror the ball. On the contrary, if the opposing team lacks support in possession, there are high chances to overload the area surrounding the ball carrier and winning the ball back.

An important principle in Juventus’ organisation is the distances between the players, both on the width and the depth. As just mentioned, the aim of the system is to oppose great compactness to the ball carrier, therefore, players need to maintain tight distances between each other. On the depth, the defensive line needs to be close to its midfield. It is the case for all teams when out of possession, however, it might be even more important in option-oriented zonal marking. Because the midfielders are not always marking a player, there might often be players between the defensive line and the midfield. Screening passing options can also be difficult at times, so there is a real risk when a penetrative pass through the midfield is played. In such case, the defenders need to be close enough to the midfielders to step up and press the receiving player.

This compactness associated to passing options’ screening also allows the midfielders to step up and press when the opposing team plays a back-pass. In general, the 2 centre-forwards’ role would be to block any back-pass. We already mentioned in the previous article that Juventus seemed to be defending with only 9 men behind the ball. In the following games, we saw that it was still the case, Juventus wanting to force the opposition to play wide and forward to increase the chances of regaining possession. However, opposing teams are still able in some occasions to play backwards when they are denied forward play. When this happens, it is usually the responsibility of the closest centre-midfield to push up and press, making sure that he presses in a way that allows him to screen a forward pass. His second objective is to force the play wide as always when Juventus press the ball carrier.

The above clip summarizes those defending principles:

• Compactness on the width
• Pjanic, Bernardeschi and Matuidi screening the Leverkusen players between the lines
• High defensive line to remain tight to midfielders
• On the back-pass, Bernardeschi steps up to press while keeping Alario in his shadow to prevent a forward pass
• Matuidi screens the pass to Havertz
• On the penetrative pass through Pjanic and Matuidi, De Ligt is able to step up and intercept the pass

On the last point, the back 4’s excellent body shape deserves to be highlighted. By being side-on like that, they are able to anticipate any pass, whether it is a through ball or a short pass to feet. In this video, De Ligt can react quickly enough to intercept the pass because of that.

Intercepting passes is another potential benefit of Juventus’ defensive system. Because players are screening passing lines rather than marking players, they have more chances to intercept passes, which can lead to quicker attacking transitions. Although statistically so far, Juventus isn’t among the top teams in terms of interceptions in Serie A or Champion’s League, it is one of the team with the lowest number of tackles per game ( https://www.whoscored.com/Regions/250/Tournaments/12/Seasons/7804/Stages/17993/TeamStatistics/Europe-UEFA-Champions-League-2019-2020 – https://www.whoscored.com/Regions/108/Tournaments/5/Seasons/7928/Stages/17835/TeamStatistics/Italy-Serie-A-2019-2020 ).

Lastly, the compactness in midfield means that Pjanic is always close to the ball even when the team is out of possession. Although he is not expected to be a great defending player, his proximity makes it easier for his teammates to find him after regaining possession, allowing him to initiate the next play, which is his greatest skill.

In terms of weaknesses, we can expect Juventus to be exposed to quick switch of play. Because of the compactness on the width, the ball-far side can at time be left with no coverage. Switch of play can then be difficult to defend, because of the distance to cover to access the opposite wing, which can lead to overload situations against the fullback.

To avoid this situation, there are 3 solutions. Firstly, the ball carrier needs to be pressed quickly to reduce his time on the ball, which will also reduce his ability to make (accurate) long passes. Secondly, the defense need to be attentive to the triggers as mentioned in the paragraph on the pressing phase. When the ball carrier isn’t pressed, the defensive line needs to drop, when he is pressed, the back 4 should hold the line and be ready to step up on a back-pass. Lastly, the ball-far centre-midfield can position himself slightly further out wide from his teammates to have quicker access to the wing in case of a switch.

Another downside is the risk linked to screening players. Against teams with very mobile players who can navigate between the lines and find space, it can become difficult to block the passing lines properly. Although the defenders should be able to step up to press as we saw previously with De Ligt, it also open gaps in the defense every time a player leaves his position. Quick combinations can then expose the defense to risky situations.

The blocking phase

Lastly, the blocking phase is the moment when the team must protect its 18-yards box. The priority here is to prevent shots and passes into the central channel. The first objective is, again, to force the play wide. The second objective is to increase the presence in the box in front of the goal to deny space for shots. At the moment, Juventus seems to have some issues at times to defend the box effectively, as seen against Bologna.

The goal conceded against Bologna is a great example of mistakes made when defending in the last third. On the wide pass, Alex Sandro is too far from his player to stop his run, which allows him to deliver a cross in the box. De Ligt, Bonucci and Cuadrado are defending against 5 Bologna players. Bernardeschi is still outside the box when the cross is made, while Pjanic and Rabiot are both marking the same player, who is not even in a dangerous position.

Against Inter already, some situations showed a lack of presence in the box.

In both situations, the fullbacks are not defending close enough to their opponent, giving them the chance to cross in the box. The midfielders should also interpret the triggers quicker, and drop in the box when the opposing team is in a position to deliver a cross. It might be something which will improve with the time as it is not an easy transition to make for the players. When playing in a man-oriented coverage system in the last seasons, the centre-midfielders were closer to the box even when the ball was in a wide area, thus needed less time to drop. In this system, they tend to be dragged further away from the box as they mirror the ball, increasing the distance to cover to drop.

Conclusion

Sarri is implementing a quite ambitious defensive system, based on anticipation rather reaction. In its first 10 games, Juventus have conceded 9 goals, despite having conceded the lowest number of shots per goal in Serie A, and one of the lowest in Champion’s League. Unsurprisingly, most goals have been conceded either on set pieces, or on counter-attacks. Therefore, it is likely that the main issue at the moment are the defensive transitions rather than the defensive organisation, even though as we mentioned, it seems that the team could do better in certain situations.

It was then becoming clear that a change was needed, with a view to attract a more attacking-minded manager. The likes of Pochettino and Guardiola were named favourites for the role, but both are currently in a good place at their clubs, so Juventus turned to Maurizio Sarri, who have had a difficult season at Chelsea despite winning the UEFA Europa League. The ex-Napoli manager is of course well-known by Juventus’ tifosi, and in all aspects, he is one of the most anti-Allegri the board could have chosen.

After five official games in charge, it’s time for a first assessment: What has already changed? Has the team shown any weaknesses?

Games observed

Organisation

Injuries have been a recurring problem for Juventus in the last five or six years, and it doesn’t look like this season will be any different. Chiellini started the first match against Parma, but due to injury has been replaced by De Ligt. It’s a similar situation for De Sciglio, who started against Parma and Napoli, but picked up an injury early in the latter game, and has since then been replaced by summer signing Danilo. Lastly, Costa was the starter until the Fiorentina game, when he also got injured early in the game and got replaced by Cuadrado. New signing Aaron Ramsey has also started the season at the J Medical, before making his first appearance against Hellas Verona. As the starting eleven, I have therefore picked the players who have started the most games so far.

Out of possession, the team is set up in a classic 4-4-2, with Ronaldo and Higuain as centre-forwards.

In possession, it’s a more unusual shape, sort of an asymetric 4-3-3. Whether it is Costa or Cuadrado on the right wing, there is only one actual winger on the pitch. On the left wing, Matuidi has an hybrid role, between a central midfield and a left midfield. He is familiar with this role though, having played this regularly with both the French national team and Juventus last season. However, this creates an unbalanced shape, and different dynamics whether the team attacks form the right or the left wing.

Differences with last season

In only five official games, there are already obvious differences in each phase of the game, between Allegri’s and Sarri’s Juventus.

In possession

Sarri is known for his possession based football, applying broadly the positional play’s principles. In this model, players must hold specific positions when the team is in possession of the ball, laying out clear structures and patterns of play. Allegri has a completely opposing view, giving as much freedom as possible to his creative players, and avoiding using too many passing circuits.

A major change with last season is the use of the wide areas, keeping possession on a wing to attract pressure, and create a 1v1 situation, or an overload, on the far side, unbalancing the opposition’s defensive shape with a switch of play.

When the ball is played on a wing, the ball carrier will receive support from three teammates, creating a diamond shape around the pressure. Basically, creating rondos all over the pitch, ensuring to always have at least one free player to pass the ball to.

To escape the pressure then, Sarri is implementing some passing circuits. The most commonly used is what we call up-back-through, where the ball carrier at the bottom of the diamond pass the ball to the furthest player, who in turn lays off a third player who can then either play a forward pass through the opposition, or switch the play.

Another principle we are likely to see develop throughout the season as the players get familiar with it is the positional rotations. On the left wing, the movements between Higuain, Ronaldo and Matuidi seem to be in a more advanced stage already. The rotations are important because they allow the structure to be dynamic, while making sure the space is still rationally occupied. In the second clip, Matuidi’s forward run creates a space in which Ronaldo can drop to be the free man, while maintaining the diamond structure around the ball.

Defensive transition

When possession is lost, the first objective of the team is to regain it as quick as possible. Under Allegri, unless there was a clear chance to win the ball back early, the team would usually focus primarily on getting into its defensive shape. The counter-pressing being implemented is only possible because of the way the team operates in possession though. With shorter distances between the players, there is more density around the ball when it is lost, therefore it is easier to apply quick pressure and regain possession. Besides, the role of the players directly around the ball is crucial. They need to cut any short options available to force the ball carrier to either play long or dribble. Forcing a player to dribble is not fundamentally a bad thing since a player dribbling will always be slower than a pass, giving time to the team to recover its positioning.

The below clip shows how every player is involved in recovering possession, with even De Ligt pressing in the attacking third. The pressure on the ball is then less important than actually cutting the short passing options.

Out of possession

Allegri and Sarri have two very different approaches as well in the defensive phase. In Allegri’s system, the zonal marking is man-oriented, meaning that players’ positions within their zones are dictated by their closest opponent. In Sarri’s system, they are option oriented, with the aim to prevent passes rather than react to passes. This implies that players shadow mark their opponents like on the below picture. In the meantime, the direct pressure on the ball carrier is not necessarily very intense, the objective being to force an opponent’s mistake more than winning challenges. It therefore requires patience, and defensive phases can be quite long depending on the opposition’s ability. This is also a reason why in the defensive transitions the team tries to regain possession quickly.

Lastly, Allegri’s Juventus would often defend with 10 or even the whole team behind the ball, while it seems like Sarri will defend with only 9 men most of the time.

Attacking transitions

The defensive system put in place encourage counter-attacks. As mentioned earlier, players are constantly shadow marking their opponents. Therefore, they most of the time regain possession by intercepting a pass rather than winning a challenge. It’s then easier to initiate a counter-attack since there isn’t any direct pressure on the ball. Besides, with two players remaining in high positions when the team is out of possession, there are always two forward options to support the counter.

Weaknesses

Building up against high man-to-man press

Against Fiorentina, Juventus have shown great difficulties to play out against a very aggressive pressing and a man-marking pressing. This is a problem both Napoli and Chelsea had under Sarri, although it was more pronounced with the English team. As explained previously, when the team is in possession, one of the main principle is to create overloads to have a free man to pass the ball to. When matched up by the opposition, and if it’s done properly like Fiorentina did, it becomes very difficult to find a player unmarked, and it’s then down to winning 1v1 situations.

The previous seasons, in similar situations, Juventus could play long balls to Mandzukic to escape the pressure. Whether he played on the left wing or as a centre-forward, his strength and ability in aerial challenges allowed the team to have a plan B if short play wasn’t possible. Since Mandzukic is very unlikely to play with Sarri, the Italian tactician will need to find other solutions to avoid this to become a recurring problem.

A key to solve this issue will be the positional rotations in midfield in order to disorganise the man-marking. Last season with Chelsea, opponents figured out quite quickly that Jorginho was essential in the build-up, and that once he was under control, Chelsea were struggling to develop their game. Pjanic is expected to be Sarri’s new Jorginho. However, his influence in the first games was nowhere close to the Brazilian’s one at Napoli or Chelsea, probably because Sarri can also count on Bonucci to organise the build-up.

Defending against switch of plays

This is an inherent problem to Juventus’ new defensive system. Since the players are ball-oriented when defending, they tend to be more compact on the width than other teams, Allegri’s Juventus for example. More compactness around the ball reduces the chances to be beaten by penetrative passes or individual actions, but in the meantime it reduces the access to the weak side when the action is on a wing. Although in most situations the block should have time to shift while the ball is travelling to the other wing, there is more distance to cover, and if the switch is quick enough it can lead to a dangerous situation.

Although this will always be a weakness with this defensive system, it will probably be mitigated in the future once the players have completely integrated its mechanics and understood the risks. In the man-oriented system, a switch of play was rather easy to defend, the team being more spread out on the width and therefore having quicker access to the opposite wing. It might therefore take few more games for the players to understand that they need to close down the ball carrier on the wing to prevent him from switching the play. Besides, the wide midfielders should also get familiar with the triggers and learn to anticipate those situations by drifting wider when a switch is possible.

Defending set pieces

This is certainly the biggest problem at the moment, and the most concerning. Indeed, it hasn’t been an issue only in the last five games. Like injuries, this has been a long-time problem under Allegri already, and one that need to be fixed quickly. This season already, Juventus have conceded six goals, four of them on set pieces (plus a penalty missed by Hellas Verona).

Juventus have shown in the previous seasons two major weaknesses when defending set pieces, both mental rather than technic: lack of aggression and concentration. Having switched to zonal marking since the start of the season, those weaknesses might be even more apparent now.

While players are very used to zonal marking in open plays, it’s very different to implement it on set pieces. There are two key risks with this marking system.

Firstly, players tend to ignore, or pay less attention, to their opponents because their main focus is on the ball and the area they need to cover, when with man-marking the focus is on the ball and the man. It’s therefore difficult to defend when one or more opponents make long runs, because they travel across different zones and often come off a blind side.

Secondly, when defending the zone, players are more static when the ball is played on, whereas the attacking players are in motion and can therefore attack the ball and the space at pace. In a 1v1 challenge then, the player in movement will always have more power and more chances to win the ball.

In terms of positioning on corners, there are four players responsible to cover the 6-yards box in front of the goal. Alex Sandro covers the far post, then De Ligt and Bonucci the central area, and finally Ronaldo the front post. Matuidi is just outside the 6-yards box in a central position and there are two players covering the front post as well in front of Ronaldo. Those seven players have been so far the base of the system. The other three players seem to be varying positions depending on the opposition.

This goal conceded against Atletico is a perfect example of the issues Juventus have in this phase of play. Ramsey, Dybala and Matuidi are in good positions to effectively cover the penalty spot area. However, both Dybala and Ramsey are facing the ball, and are at no point checking their backs, leaving Herrera (#16) and Gimenez (#2) in their blind side. Only Matuidi can react to the two Madrid players’ runs once the ball is kicked on, but he is late and too slow to win the challenge.

In the last game against Hellas Verona, we could already see some changes. Firstly, Cuadrado was positioned directly at the front post, with Ramsey or Khedira within a couple of metres from him. To cover the edge of the 6-yards box there were now three players, Danilo, Matuidi and Pjanic. More importantly though, the players had a better, open body shape (especially Matuidi and Bentancur), allowing them to have sight on both the ball and the opponents.

What next?

In the next few weeks, there will be specific areas to observe.

Firstly, the set pieces. As just mentioned, changes have been made already, but there were still some dangerous situations in the last match. In October, Juventus will face Inter Milan. With the likes of Godin, Skriniar and Lukaku, it will be a tough test.

Secondly, how is Sarri going to deal with the lack of left wingers? Matuidi was not at all expected to be a starter this season, yet he is one of the four players who have played the full five first matches. His work rate and positioning provide the team with the balance it needs, allowing at the same time Ronaldo to play as a centre-forward with reduced defensive duties. Of all the midfielders in the squad, there doesn’t seem to be another player who could play this role. Replacing Ronaldo on the wing would mean losing his presence in the 18-yards box and risking the team’s defensive balance. The only viable option would then be Bernardeschi.

Lastly, more teams should follow Fiorentina’s example and press Juventus high in a man-marking system when they play from the back. The Inter game will again be a very interesting opposition. Conte has always had well organised pressing systems with his teams, and Inter are no different. We could expect Sarri to implement a back three system in the build-up in the next few games, with Pjanic dropping between De Ligt and Bonucci, allowing Danilo and Sandro to be in higher positions and prevent the wide players from pressing high. Besides, as mentioned before, positional rotations are still at an early stage, but we should expect to see more movements especially in midfield in the coming weeks.

Ajax is obviously one of, if not the, strongest team in the Dutch league, therefore their domestic title was not too much of a surprise, although they last won it in 2014. In the UCL though, it is clear that they were not individually superior to most of the teams they have faced and beaten. In this article we will hence look at how Ten Hag and his staff built a coherent and efficient game model to get the best collectively of their squad.

Notes

Games observed for this article were:

UEFA Champion’s league

Bayern Munich – Ajax / 02.10.18 / 1:1

Ajax – Benfica / 23.10.18 / 1:0

Ajax – Bayern / 12.12.18 / 3:3

Ajax – Real Madrid / 13.02.19 / 1:2

Real Madrid – Ajax / 05.03.19 / 1:4

Ajax – Juventus / 10.04.19 / 1:1

Juventus – Ajax / 16.04.19 / 1:2

Tottenham – Ajax / 30.04.19 / 0:1

Ajax – Tottenham / 08.05.19 / 2:3

Eredivisie

AZ Alkmaar – Ajax / 17.03.19 / 1:0

Ajax – PSV Eindhoven / 31.03.19 / 3:1

Groningen – Ajax / 20.04.19 / 0:1

References

In my research about game models I have been highly inspired by the following readings:

Play like Pep Guardiola’s Barcelona – by Agustin Peraita ) https://www.amazon.co.uk/Play-Like-Pep-Guardiolas-Barcelona/dp/1910515639 )

Rene Maric’s article on Spielverlagerung.com – https://spielverlagerung.com/2016/03/07/how-to-create-a-game-model/

Squad and formation

I have chosen to only take into consideration players who have played at least 1,350 minutes in the season, the equivalent of 15 matches. That restricts the group to 13 players. These are the players I will refer to when mentioning the squad or the team.

Ten Hag had set up his team in a 4-2-3-1, the below being the line-up displayed the most often, and the one used in big games.

Game model and individual instructions

Before looking at specific aspects of the Ajax game, we will break down Ten Hag’s game model to understand his principles of play and how he implemented it in his team. A game model is built depending on many factors such as the players, the league you play in,… but the main one is probably the coach’s philosophy or idea of the game. Ten Hag wants to play a fast paced attacking football and dominate matches using a combination style of play and an aggressive defensive set up.

Based on that, each phase of the game can be broken down into principles and sub-principles of play.

Ten Hag is not obsessed by the possession. He wants his team to dominate games and build out from the back, but he also insists on playing forward as much as possible, either by passing or dribbling. He follows most of the positional play’s principles, although the execution is very different than Pep Guardiola for example. I mention Guardiola because Ten Hag managed Bayern Munich II while the Spaniard was in charge of the first team. He has therefore had the chance to observe Guardiola’s positional play, and he has adapted it to his philosophy.

One of Ten Hag’s Ajax specificity is the restricted width in the opposition’s half. While most teams aim to always keep at least one wide player on their weak side to stretch the opposition’s defense and allow switch of plays, Ajax actually deliberately restrict the width and overload one half of the pitch (Cf below picture). It requires very technical and quick thinking players because the space in which they play is very tight. In theory, it also seems easier to defend since it automatically allow the defending team to be compact. However, most teams nowadays opt for a zonal defense. It is then difficult to defend against players who frequently change zones. The team in possession will therefore often have a free player to pass the ball to penetrate through the lines. This positioning also allowed Ajax to execute their counter-pressing with success, thanks to the compactness around the ball.

The fullbacks have a very important role to play in this structure, moving into the channels when the ball is on the opposite wing to block a potential counter-attack (Cf below pictures).

Counter-pressing is an important principle of play in Ajax’ philosophy. As we just mentioned above, the way they played in possession made the defensive transition very effective, with a high density of players around the ball, and a short passes style of play allowing them to have quick access to the opposition’s player who just gained possession. However, the team is obviously not always able to immediately regain possession. The players behind the ball therefore need to make sure they are controlling the depth to avoid being caught by long balls or through balls in the central area, should the counter-press fail. To ensure this control, Ten Hag has a strong emphasis on maintaining support behind the ball at any time (a concept sometimes called rest-defense). On the below clip, we can see that Ajax always have at least 4 players behind the ball when they are positioned in the opposition’s half. When they lose the ball, they either regain it almost immediately, or they have cover to defend the long balls. De Jong was a key player in this phase, holding his position in front of the defense and moving sideways with the ball to prevent counter-attacks (we will focus on him later).

When their counter-pressing fails, Ajax aim to reshape quickly, helped in this by the cover they have when they are in possession. They aim to press the ball high though to either force a long ball or a back-pass. In the latter situation, the team is asked to step up to move higher on the pitch while the ball travels, keeping the pressure on. If the other team is able to keep possession and take positions in Ajax half, they intend to stay compact. They use a defensive system based on zonal marking with a man orientation, meaning that each player’s priority when defending is to mark the opponent in his zone. However, Ajax players would occasionally leave their zone and switch for a man marking when their opponent drops to receive the ball. The objective is to prevent the other team to have a free man to play between the lines. That requires a high level of understanding and awareness from the team though as when this happens, a teammate will need to cover the zone left free.

The clip below shows Tagliafico hounding Bernardeschi to prevent him from receiving the ball and turning behind Ajax midfield line, and forcing him back. We can also see Neres dropping to cover the left zone (Tagliafico’s zone) and De Jong dropping in the central area in cover.

In the attacking transitions, Ajax look at playing forward on their first pass every time it is possible. As mentioned before, Ten Hag is not obsessed by possession, so he is looking for a counter-attack when his team win the ball. On this clip in the game against Real Madrid, we can see the players’ instant reaction when they win the ball, especially Neres who makes an immediate run into the channel and deliver the assist to Ziyech. To initiate a counter-attack, it’s important that the wide players are either positioned in the channel between the centre-back and the fullback, or make their run in that space (like Neres in this clip). This is likely to be the zone where the other team is the most vulnerable because the fullback will often be in a very wide position when his team is in possession, so when they lose possession, there will be a space inside the pitch.

It’s also important in a counter-attack to have runners to provide quick support to the player on the ball in order to create an overload or at least match the opposition’s defenders. In the below clip, we can see Ziyech sprinting to support Tadic, with also Van de Beek and Neres making the run into the box. Ajax end up in a 4v4 situation in Real’s 18-yards.

This was a high level presentation of Ten Hag’s game model. In reality, each sub-principle would be split into sub-sub-principles. We will look at some in more details later in the article.

Although simplified, a game model presented like that to players would have little chances to be understood by every one. The main reason is that it remains highly conceptual and focused on the team as a whole, while players are more receptive to concrete and individual instructions.

We’re thus going to see how Ten Hag’s model can be passed on to the players with a few simple individual instructions.

We’re now going to look at some specific aspects of the Ajax game, and see how they link up to the game model.

Defensive transition and organisation

As seen in the game model, Ajax always aim to counter-press as soon they lose the ball, trying to meet the 6 seconds rule (or sometimes 5 depending on coaches) i.e. winning the ball back within this time frame. Of course, that doesn’t always work. Their defensive transition can therefore lead to 2 different results :

1. They win the ball back and start over a new possession phase. This is obviously the outcome they are aiming for.
2. They are not able to regain possession and now need to switch into their defensive organisation.

Ajax have opted for a man-oriented counter-pressing, which means that when they lose possession, the closest player to the ball applies pressure, and his teammates around him match up with an opponent to close any short passing options. In this part, we will focus on what happens when Ajax fail to regain possession.

There can be 3 situations to which Ajax will respond differently:

1. The other team bypass the counter-press and is able to play forward
2. The other team escape the counter-press by playing a side-pass
3. The other team avoid the counter-press by playing a back-pass

The difference between the 3 situations is the level of threat the other team represents.

Defending against forward play

Forward play, or counter-attack, is obviously the highest threat Ajax has to deal with. When this happens, Ajax’ first objective is to slow down the progression of the player on the ball to allow the rest of the team to recover. Then, they will force the player towards one side, depending on where the ball was lost. If the possession was lost on a wing, they’d force the play on that same wing, because they will have cover and compactness behind the ball, while their weak side would be more open. Therefore they are trying to prevent a switch of play which would force the block to shift over while the other team has time to progress into space.

If possession was lost in the central area and the other team managed to progress through the centre, while a player is trying to slow down the progression, the players just around the ball must close down any short passing options, either by man marking or shadow covering. The rest of the team need to recover to block the central channel in priority.

Independently from where the ball was lost, Ajax try to always keep a back 3 with a centre-midfield screening in front of them (see clip above). It would usually be the 2 centre-backs and 1 of the fullback. The other fullback is typically in a higher position on the strong side to support the pressing. The centre-midfield is usually De Jong. The above clip is a good example of the shape Ajax adopts when their counter-pressing failed. Tagliafico is the first line of pressure. Him and De Jong are preventing Tottenham from playing short, De Jong shadow marking Alli. The long ball gives Mazraoui time to run back, while De Ligt and Blind are blocking the centre. Mazraoui’s clearance is missed, but gives them time to get into their shape. As mentioned previously, Ajax are using a zonal marking, but when a player drops to receive the ball, the player marking him needs to follow him. Here, Blind is hounding Lucas. De Jong’s role is then to drop in the space left free by the centre-back to cover him and maintain the shape. By then, Tagliafico had time to get back in his position, allowing De Jong to step up towards Lucas since Blind wasn’t able to win his 1v1. De Jong’s role is crucial. He needs to protect the defensive line, but also cover the defenders when they are out of position.

Defending against horizontal play

This is the next more threatening situation for Ajax, should they fail to regain possession with their counter-pressing. Although the other team is not progressing up the pitch, the angle of attack is changing, which might open passing lines to then play forward. Here again though, there are 2 different situations. A horizontal pass can be towards the centre of the pitch or the wing. Both are very different from a defending point of view.

If the pass is towards the centre, the threat is higher because the team might be able to play a penetrative pass or find space to dribble forward. Besides, the player in the centre of the pitch has more options and is therefore less predictable. In this situation, Ajax would hold their positions rather than pressing to avoid opening spaces. The aim is then to:

• Force wide play
• Block short options
• Prevent switch of play

If the possession is lost in an advanced position, Ajax can maintain a high line even without pressing, aiming to force a long ball or a short play which they could then press. If they lose possession in their half, it’s important to apply pressure on the player the ball though to prevent him for progressing. The idea is still to force a wide play, but the focus is more on the ball and rather than closing down options around, the team is better getting compact in the centre to block penetrative plays.

If the pass is made towards the wing, Ajax would then press to win the ball, closing down options and space around the player on the ball, forcing him to either make a mistake, play a long ball or a back-pass. Again, it’s important to also block a potential switch of play which could off balance the whole block. When the ball is played on the wing, Ajax don’t hesitate to overload the area, committing few players even though it means leaving other players unmarked.

The above clip shows both situations in a same play i.e. Ajax lose the ball, counter-pressing isn’t successful, Tottenham play a pass in the centre, then towards the wing.

• On the pass to the centre, Tadic curves his run to block the switch option
• Players behind match up Spurs
• Rose is left unmarked. It is either Veltman who is late to push up, or a trap set by Ajax. In both cases, Rose is facing his goal so he is in a good position to be pressed, what Veltman does
• Rose is forced to play back, Tadic is still blocking the switch option
• Sanchez plays a side-pass behind Vertonghen, it’s a pressing cue for Neres
• Tadic and Van de Beek close down all short options, forcing a back-pass

Defending against a back-pass

Ajax’ intention is to defend high, so every back-pass is a trigger to press and move the defensive line up. As per the previous situations mentioned, Ajax pressing organisation is always to match up the other team to block them building up from the back. On the back-passes though, it’s crucial that the defensive lines, at least the centre-backs, adopt the correct body shape i.e. side-on, to be ready to react to a long ball. Because the front line will be pressing, one of the most common reaction will be for the opponent to play long. The centre-backs therefore need to be able to drop quickly to avoid being caught in the depth.

The build-up phase

When discussing the build-up phase, it’s important to agree which area of the pitch we are talking about. Below is how the pitch can be split in 4 horizontal zones, from a team’s own goal (phase 1) to the opponent’s goal. Here we will focus on Ajax’ organisation when they are in possession in the 1st phase. That doesn’t mean we would ignore players off the ball in the other zones of course.

As mentioned earlier in the article, Ten Hag is prone to play forward as much as possible and avoid repetitive square passes. That said, he still wants his team to be in control in the build-up.

To be able to play forward, a team basically only needs one thing: have at least one player unmarked behind the first line of pressure to pass the ball to. To create this free man, the team needs to:

• Increase the space between the opposition’s lines (depth)
• Increase the space between the players within a same line (width)
• Create numerical superiority

The key player in the build-up is De Jong. He will either be the free man behind the line of pressure, or he will be the one creating numerical superiority to free up another player.

To create space between the lines, the front 3 players and Van de Beek are crucial. They will typically start in the highest position possible to pin the opposition’s defense (Cf. https://tacticandtechnique.com/pinning-the-defense-to-create-numerical-superiority/ ). Ajax will then often start off with a front 4 to pin 5 of the other team’s players at the back. Including the goalkeeper, that’s already 6 players unable to move up the pitch to cover the 2nd line of pressure. Ajax are then playing a 7v5 in the build-up phase.

The lines are thus stretched from the back. Ajax then need to drag the 1st line of pressure up the pitch to increase the distances even further. If we refer to the game model, this is the “attracting pressure” sub-principle in the possession phase. This is mostly the centre-backs’ role to do this. Unless there is an open passing option, the player on the ball should retain it until an opponent is pressing him, thus leaving his zone and potentially his marking. However, there are different situations Ajax will face here, and thus different organisations in which De Jong is key:

Playing out against a front 2

Against a pressing led by 2 players, Ajax will seek at 2 options: either playing through the pair, or around it. Splitting the 2 players and playing through is the ideal situation. De Jong would typically position himself behind the 2 players, trying to create a passing line through them. If successful, he can then initiate the transition to the possession phase. However, throughout the season his talent and role were recognized, and he often became the target of a tight marking in the build-up to prevent him from receiving the ball between the lines. The obvious solution is then for him to drop in the defensive line to form a back 3 with De Ligt and Blind.

• The other team might decide to strictly man mark him in this situation, switching to a front 3 pressing line. This cuts short passes options for Ajax, but it opens space behind De Jong for Schone and the fullbacks. On the below clip, De Jong drops, marked by Pjanic. Matuidi is then in a 1v2 situation against Schone and Mazraoui. Unfortunately, Onana’s pass is inaccurate.

• If the other team sticks to a zonal marking, De Jong is now the free man and Ajax have created a 4v2 overload (including the GK). De Jong can move into 2 positions here, either between the 2 centre-backs or on the left of the newly formed back 3. He would very rarely move to the right side though. In case Ajax lose the ball quickly, he would have more distance to cover to move back into his zone. When he drops in the centre of the back 3, it releases Blind and De Ligt who can move out wider and allow Ajax to play around the front 2 (picture 1 below). When he’s on the left of the back 3, Schone can move inside and position himself between the lines (picture 2 below). If De Jong has space in front of him though, he would run forward with the ball. He’s excellent at running into space with the ball and penetrate.

If the pressing from the front 2 is somehow passive, De Jong and Schone can also be in a double pivot shape, both giving passing options to the centre-backs who have time on the ball (picture below).

It might also happen that the 2 centre-forwards get slightly disorganized and open a gap between them. In this case, De Jong would also try to run with the ball to penetrate into the space. In the below clip, he identifies the gap between Ronaldo and Dybala. However, the Portuguese and Pjanic manage to dispossess him form the ball.

Another combination is to use the fullback to go around the pressure and then find De Jong or Schone between the lines, a combination typically called in-out-in because the ball goes from the centre to the wing, then back to the centre. In the clip below, Veltman drops to create a passing line around the front 2. While the ball is played out, Kean doesn’t realize that De Jong is diving in his back to receive the ball from another angle. In the meantime, Schone has created space for the Dutchman with his forward run.

Playing against a front 3

The patterns against a front 3 are quite similar. De Jong either drops in the defensive line or stay in a central position. Against a front 3 though, he would drop into the left CB position rather than the central one. The reason is that against a front 2, the space is in-between the 2 attackers, while against a front 3, the centre-forward will be pressing the central area, thus the space is around him, and we already explained why De Jong would mostly stay on the left side of the pitch.

A direct impact of De Jong dropping in defense is that Tagliafico can push up to create space between the lines.Besides, it is fairly easy for a well organised team to press against a back 4. Below is a schema of how a team can press against Ajax back 4 and block most options with only 5 players.

When De Jong drops though, it is a different picture:

De Jong’s positioning allow Ajax to have more players in advanced positions, making it easier for them to play forward quickly, which is what Ajax are looking for. From his position in the above simulation, De Jong can then pass or dribble, his technical skills making him a very good player in 1v1 situations. He can also be used as a lure to create space centrally for Schone. Blind in the centre of the back 3 is a high quality passer and can thus also find good forward passing lines.

Even when De Jong doesn’t drop in defense, Ajax would still maintain a back 3 to play out, with typically Mazraoui being the 3rd defender. Here again, it allows Tagliafico to quickly join the attacking line, which gives Neres, Tadic, Van de Beek and Ziyech the opportunity to change positions and create options for the defense should they opt for a direct play. Tadic and Ziyech are usually the players dropping between the lines to receive from the back.

In summary, Ajax put in practice these sub-principles of play when playing out from the back:

• Width and depth to increase space between and within the lines
• Attracting pressure to create space and free up players in advanced positions
• Overloads to maintain numerical superiority to control the build up
• Staggering to create as many passing lines as possible
• Play the free man to progress between the lines
• Forward play as soon as possible to get into the other team’s half

Penetrating the attacking third

Ajax’ attacks in the final third rely on 4 pillars:

• Positional rotations
• Use of the wings to open centrally
• Forward runs
• Combination plays

All 4 have the same purpose, opening gaps in the opposition’s defense to penetrate.

Positional rotations

This would essentially apply to the 4 attacking players, Neres, Tadic, Ziyech and Van de Beek. The other players had some clear positions to hold at all time, to ensure that the team didn’t get totally disorganized when they lost possession.

Positional rotations sometimes look like they are improvised moves by the players, and it is wrongly associated to complete freedom of movements. Quite the contrary, those movements are prepared and worked at training because they require a perfect synchronization to be efficient. We will see the main patterns Ajax had put in practice.

As we discussed previously, when they are in the build-up phase, Ajax start by forming a front line with 4 players to use the whole width of the pitch, to engage the full opposition’s back line, and force a spare player to sit in front of defense to avoid defending in 1v1 across the whole line.

Once space is created between the opposition’s midfield and defense, the front 4 can then start moving into space to receive between the lines, unless the rest of the team can progress further without support. When they are in the opposition’s final third, Ajax try to keep a narrow front 3 to be able to combine. However, the players in this front 3 and the positions they hold is very flexible. The main rotations are:

• Tadic drops: Van de Beek takes the centre-forward position, Neres and Ziyech tuck in
• Ziyech drops in a central midfield position: Van de Beek takes the right spot in the front 3
• Tadic moves to the left wing: Neres drops and either Ziyech of Van de Beek move into the central position

We could loosely split the 4 players in 2 groups: Ziyech and Tadic who initiate the movements, and Neres and Van de Beek who adjust their positions accordingly. Despite his starting position on the team sheet, Van de Beek ends up being more often in a striker position than a midfield in the possession phase, using the space created by Tadic. This is the benefit of having a false nine who is originally a winger as centre-forward.

Use of the wings to open centrally

Ajax very rarely cross the ball into the box. Both fullbacks don’t really overlap, and the wingers are actually inside forwards. Besides, they don’t have particularly tall players, or players who are notably good with headers apart from De Ligt. It therefore makes sense for them to limit the number of crosses to a minimum. When they have the opportunity to cross though, they aim for low crosses.

Wide play is an important part of their attacking game though, using the wings to attract the opposition with the aim of opening gaps in central areas. The below clip highlights how Ajax use the wide areas. 6 important moments of this phase of play have been annotated.

1- De Jong’s forward pass to Neres encourage Gnabry and Goretzka to step back and follow the pass, giving De Jong space to get the ball back

2- Blind makes a rather soft pass to De Jong who holds his position to encourage Lewandowski to press him

3- Blind could split Goretzka and Kimmich with a pass, but Mazraoui and Van de Beek are outnumbered, therefore they are unlikely to benefit from the situation. Blind then chooses to keep possession and switch the play to move Bayern’s block

4- De Jong is in the same situation as Blind before. The forward pass is possible, but the actual benefit of it is mitigated by the outnumbered situation. Ajax are very patient in those phase of play

5- They have created a 4v3 in their favor on the wing. With his forward pass to Mazaoui, De Ligt have moved both Alaba and Ribery, leaving Ziyech and Blind free

6- Ribery and Alaba have drifted too wide to block the central area, both De Jong and Ziyech are free between the lines

Forward runs

We just discussed how Ajax were using the width of the pitch to create space centrally. Another important element is the use of the depth. Van de Beek has been crucial in this aspect. His ability to identify space and run into it is very strong, often creating space for his teammates as well as being in good positions to create chances. Becomes he comes from a deeper position, his forward runs are a threat to the defense who needs to control the depth to defend against through balls.

Often though, Van de Beek’s runs are only a lure as he doesn’t intend to receive the ball. The objective is simply to pin the defenders, force them to step back and thus create space between them and the midfielders for either Neres, Tadic or Ziyech to drop and receive the ball.

This clip is an example of Van de Beek’s forward run to force the defense back. Trippier’s movement because of his run opens a gap for Tagliafico.

Combination plays

Finally, to manipulate the opposition, Ajax relied on combination plays:

Up-back-through

Wall passes and in-out-in

Third man run

Conclusion

Ajax offered a very entertaining football during the 2018/19 season. They showed a constant willingness to play forward, while remaining disciplined to anticipate turnovers. If they have been essentially praised for the attacking side of their game, their defensive organisation was probably more important, and the reason why they could attack so well. Finally, Ten Hag proved he had a very well thought game model in place. The main reason of its success is that in each phase of the game, he made sure his team was preparing the next phase, so they could transition quickly and smoothly from the attacking phase to the defensive one and vice versa. He was already successful when managing Utrecht, and he seems to be on good tracks to establish himself as a hot prospect in Europe. Having now lost players like De Ligt and De Jong though, he will face a new challenge in 2019/20.

This season, the two sides have met twice in Premier League with the same result in each game, a 2-1 win for the Reds. We will use these two games to support our analysis, as well as the most recent games of each team in the UCL.

How will Liverpool approach the game?

It’s very unlikely that Liverpool will change their system for that game, and their lineup should be quiet predictable, with one or two exceptions.

Liverpool should be lining up in a 4-3-3 as they most often did this season. There shouldn’t be any surprise in the composition of the back four, nor with the front three, assuming that all players are fit. We could expect some changes in the midfield though. At the time of writing this analysis, Naby Keita is still injured and is not expected to be ready for the final, at least not as a starter. Should he be available, he could potentially be in the starting eleven. After a difficult start of the season, him and Fabinho have progressively earned more game time. The Brazilian seems to have become a key player, starting most of the games since February and playing in all four of Liverpool’s last UCL games. Wijnaldum is the midfielder Klopp has the most used this season, ahead of Henderson and Milner. However, it is difficult to imagine the German manager benching his captain in such a big game, therefore Henderson seems to be favorite to start over Milner or even Keita.

The Reds have had an impressive season so far, scoring 97 points in the Premier League, only losing the title race against Manchester City for one point. In the UCL, they got out of one of the toughest group, facing Napoli and PSG. In the next phase, they have knocked out Bayern Munich, FC Porto and Barcelona in a memorable two-legs’ opposition. Generally speaking, Jurgen Klopp is not seen as very tactically flexible. He would rather be classified as a dogmatic manager, who follows his principles of play independently of the opponent or the game. We can therefore use previous games to draw a pretty clear picture of what to expect on June 1st.

High and intense pressing

This is Jurgen Klopp’s trademark since he started being known at Mainz. The German is famous for making counter-pressing popular. His teams always press very intensively in the defensive transition to regain quick possession of the ball. When the counter-pressing is not successful, Klopp’s teams typically still press high and aggressively. Since the signing of Van Dijk, this aggressive pressing has become more effective, the Dutchman’s positioning, height and pace allowing the defensive line to play higher. At the front, Mane and Salah demonstrate an impressive work rate, and they are able to apply intense pressure on the oppositions’ defenders with their pace.

Use of the width

One of Liverpool’s major strength this season has been its fullbacks. Alexander-Arnold and Robertson are the top two players in term of assists so far, with respectively 15 and 13 in the Premier League and UCL combined. In Liverpool’s system in possession, the two fullbacks are broadly responsible of controlling the wide lanes. While nowadays it is quite common for teams to use inverted fullbacks to control the central area and free up their wingers in the wide channels, Liverpool tend to do the opposite.

The role of the wingers, typically Salah and Mane, is to attack the central space opened by Firmino’s false nine’s positioning. The threat the two wingers represent when they cut in has for effect to pin the center back and fullback, preventing the latter to step up and press forward, leaving space in front of Arnold or Robertson.

Liverpool also tend to position their fullbacks high on the pitch to pin the defense and open space in the middle (above picture). One of the midfield would then drop to integrate the defensive line and provide support should the team lose the ball. Below is an example of this shape during the second game against Tottenham in the Premier League this season, with James Milner (on the ball) who dropped from his midfield position and Robertson on the left wing on the same line as the three forwards.

Quick vertical play

Another of Klopp’s trademark. The German himself qualified his style as “heavy metal” football in 2015. Unlike some of his colleagues, the German is not obsessed by possession and rather want his team to play a slightly more direct style. His team still manage to be have one of the highest possession rate in Premier League – 3rd with 58.8% – however in UCL they rank 12th with 51.6%. Even more significant, their percentage of completed passes in UCL is only 80.6%, ranking them 21st. This statistic could be wrongly interpreted as if Liverpool were lacking quality in their passing compared to other teams. Manchester City for example have a success rate of 89.6% in UCL, the highest in the competition. In reality, it is perfectly in line with Liverpool’s style of play and well representative of their mentality and their manager’s one.

For other teams, a rather low percentage of successful passes could be a major issue since it means a higher number of turnovers and could translate to longer out of possession phases. In the case of Liverpool, it is not so much an issue, and it can even be an advantage. With their counter-pressing in defensive transition, missed passes should not be a real problem for Liverpool since they should be in a position to either win the ball back quickly or at least prevent counter-attacks from the opposition. Against some teams with less technical defenders, it might even be a strength since losing the ball in advanced area could actually result in winning the ball back close to the opposition’s goal.

Another characteristic of Liverpool’s passing style is the frequent use of long diagonal balls towards the wingers or the fullbacks. Diagonal passes are typically more difficult to defend. To keep it short, they combine the benefits of vertical and horizontal passes, and they allow the receiver to be in the right body shape to play forward on his first touch.

Tottenham’s tactical flexibility

Unlike Liverpool, Pochettino’s team is tactically versatile and has shown different faces this season.

Spurs have mostly started their games with a back four this season (around 70% of their games), using a back three or five in the other matches, one of them being the Premier League second game against Liverpool. More recently, they have used a back three in the UCL semi-final’s first leg against Ajax. In both occasions, the North Londoners have displayed weaknesses in this system. In the Ajax game’s analysis we already discussed the issues Spurs faced when playing with a back three ( https://tacticandtechnique.com/a-two-faced-ajax-brings-back-a-win-from-london/ ). Against Liverpool, the same issues arose.

In the build-up phase, Spurs were not able to overcome the high pressing applied by their opponents. Both Ajax and Liverpool play with a front three, matching up Tottenham’s defense and therefore blocking the passing options at the back. Lloris was then forced to play long balls more often.

In the Premier League game, Liverpool’s plan was to prevent Tottenham from playing wide passes from the back. To achieve this, Mane and Salah would position themselves in a way they could quickly access Alderweireld and Vertonghen should the center backs receive the ball, but also shadow mark Rose and Trippier to prevent wide play. By doing so, Spurs were restricted in their passing options, and the Reds only needed three players to block five of their opponents. Another part of Liverpool’s pressing plan was to deliberately leave Sissoko free in the middle to invite Lloris to play to his fellow French teammate. Sissoko has many qualities but he is certainly not the best at building up plays from a deep position, hence this pressing trap set up by Klopp’s men.

Spurs also faced problems out of possession. As mentioned previously, Liverpool’s front three and fullbacks could often find themselves in advanced areas to force Tottenham’s wing backs to stay in deep positions and prevent them front pressing. The first goal of the match is a good illustration of the problems caused by the Reds.

To beat the press, Pochettino changed his set up to play with a back four with Alli dropping deeper to assist Sissoko with the build up.

The Argentinian manager made a similar tactical shift against Ajax. In both games, that change gave Tottenham a better control in possession, making Liverpool’s pressing less effective since it wasn’t possible for Klopp’s players to maintain their system against a back four. Firmino had to deal with two center backs now, while Salah and Mane could no longer shadow mark the fullbacks without opening gaps for Sissoko and Alli.

With Rose, Kane and Lucas higher on the pitch as well, Robertson and Alexander-Arnold found it more difficult to step up to press the Spurs’ fullbacks, allowing them more space and therefore time on the ball. The below clip gives an example of how this tactical adjustment created new options and more control in the build up.

With more possession in their favor and more frequent phases in advanced areas, Spurs had less defensive situations to deal with, and above all, Liverpool were recovering possession in deeper positions, allowing the Londoners to apply quick pressure in the defensive transition phase, and have more time to recover their defensive shape. With Robertson and Arnold forced to defend deeper on Rose and Lucas, the Scousers had more difficulties to quickly transition after regaining possession. Mane and Salah also had more defensive work to do every time Spurs’ fullbacks were able to go forward.

Outlook

Teams’ systems

As discussed at the beginning of this analysis, Liverpool are most likely to start the game in their usual system.

We can imagine that Pochettino will opt for a back four in the UCL final. It appeared obvious in the previous game against Liverpool and the semi-final against Ajax that his team was more comfortable in that system to face a front three. In terms of line-up, it will probably largely depend on Kane’s availability. Should the Englishman be available, a potential system would be similar to the one used in the Premier League game’s second half.

However, Kane is likely to be absent, Pochettino might then reproduce the same system as displayed in the semi-final’s second leg against Ajax. A third possibility for Pochettino is to line-up Llorente as a striker, although the Spaniard is more likely to be kept as a joker, his height and strength allowing his team to have a long passing option. His impact in the Ajax game was remarkable, however, it is doubtful he would dominate Van Dijk in the aerial challenges as much as he did against De Ligt.

Key phases

A crucial aspect of the game will be the control of the wide areas and the half-spaces. Liverpool’s attacking system relies mostly on the use of their fullbacks and wingers. Tottenham should therefore aim at keeping the game in the central area. If they were to play with a midfield four, they could use their numerical superiority to their advantage in midfield to force Liverpool to play through the middle in the build up.

In this clip, we see Alli and Sissoko’s roles in controlling the wide areas, while Lucas and Son are initiating the pressing and blocking the passing lines to Robertson and Alexander-Arnold. With a 4v3 situation in midfield, Spurs should be able to maintain a spare man in cover. To beat this pressing, an option for Liverpool is to have a midfield dropping into the defensive line. In the below clip we use Fabinho as a dropping midfield, but in reality Henderson and Wijnaldum would also hold this position depending on the situation. Salah and Mane’s positioning in the half-spaces allow Robertson and/or Arnold to move forward without being pressed by Rose or Tippier who are pinned at the back by the wingers.

An issue Tottenham had in their latest match against Liverpool was to apply pressure on Arnold and Robertson when they found themselves in advanced area (Cf. Liverpool’s 1st goal). A first option is to allow the center midfield on the strong side to press the fullback. The striker then needs to drop to cover the zone and maintain compactness in the center of the pitch.

Another option is to press with the fullbacks. In that system, The central midfielders need to cover the half-space left free by the fullback. Wanyama should be the spare man in most situations, therefore it makes sense for him to drop and join the back line to cover the fullback. In the situations where Salah or Mane will move out wide to drag Wanyama out of position, he will still behimself covered by Alli or Sissoko. An advantage of this system is to keep the two strikers high on the pitch as opposed to having one of them dropping in the midfield. Having two players in advanced areas will limit Fabinho’s forward movements as the Reds will want to maintain a back three structure ahead of the defensive transitions. A threat to Tottenham though will be the switch of plays to the weak side, one of Liverpool’s strength. The structure needs to slide quickly on the switches, with the risk of getting disorganized.

From Liverpool’s perspective, a key aspect in the defending phase will primarily be to control Lucas, Son and Eriksen. Lucas and Son tend to position themselves in the half-space between the fullbacks and the center backs, opening space in the center for Eriksen. Behind them, Sissoko could be described as a Mezz’ala, a center midfield who makes forward runs in the half-space to support the attack, the Frenchman using the space vacated by Lucas who has a natural tendency to drift wide. On the other side of the midfield, Alli is more attracted by the center of the pitch and is typically attacking the box. Liverpool therefore has to defend against four attacking players, Lucas, Eriksen, Alli and Son, with Sissoko as a support and Trippier and Rose to maintain the width. The compactness with which Spurs are attacking the 18-yards box will be the main threat for Liverpool.

Conclusion

Jurgen Klopp’s men are considered favorite, with two wins against Tottenham this season and a an impressive record in European cups under the spell of the German manager, playing their third consecutive final this Saturday. Nonetheless, in their latest confrontation, Spurs have demonstrated that they could compete on equal terms with the Reds, only conceding a late goal following a mistake from Lloris. The North Londoners’ tactical versatility and wide choice in terms of players’ profiles provide Pochettino with different options to solve the problems caused by Liverpool.

In this article we will focus on the possession phase, and how a team can have a numerical advantage in possession by simply pinning the opponent’s defenders.

Natural numerical superiority

When out of possession, a team’s defense has two main tasks: controlling the space in its back, the depth, and marking the opponent’s attackers to either prevent them from receiving the ball or from attacking the space. For that, the defense has one advantage on the attacking players with the offside rule. However, the defending team will generally want more comfort at the back, and it is therefore almost always agreed that there should be a spare man in the back line to cover his teammates and the depth without having to worry about another player to mark. There is also the keeper, who is forced to stay in his goal. In theory then, the defending team will always have at least three players at the back against a striker. If this is a numerical superiority for the defending team in this area of the pitch, it inevitably translates into a numerical inferiority in another one. The team in possession therefore has a natural numerical superiority elsewhere.

The concept of ‘pinning’

In common language, to spin something or someone is synonym of fixing, attaching or holding among other words. It is partly applicable to the concept of pinning in football, as what we are trying to achieve is to force players to stay in a particular position, therefore to pin them somewhere on the pitch. To capture the full meaning behind this concept though, we will refer to the game of chess.

Without getting into too much details, a chess game is an opposition between two players, in which each player has 16 pieces he can move across the chessboard. Each piece moves differently according to fix rules. Depending on the movements a piece is allowed, it will have a value. For example, a pawn is very restricted in its movements whereas the queen is allowed almost any movement possible. Hence we say that the pawn is the least valuable piece and the queen the most valuable. Ultimately, each team’s aim is to attack the other team’s king and mate it. The pin in chess is a situation created when the opponent cannot move a piece without exposing another more valuable piece.

To translate that into a football game, each team is trying to reach out the other team’s goal to score a point. Within the teams, players have different roles, instructions, abilities,… They therefore occupy different areas of the pitch and are more or less a threat for the opposition. Messi for example would be the queen of Barcelona, the most dangerous player. The other team’s objective is therefore to stop him from being on the ball too much and restraining him access to its own goal. So when Messi is in a forward position and his team is in possession of the ball, the other team’s defenders are likely to be pinned by him because they will not want to move away from him and exposing their goal to him. In reality, this doesn’t just apply to Messi, and any attacking player is likely to be a threat to the other team, therefore being able to pin at least one defender when in an advanced position. When we say that a defender is pinned, it means that he can’t leave the zone he is currently in without exposing his team. He is therefore not able to press forward on the pitch. As mentioned earlier, since it is common practice to always have at least a spare man at the back when defending, we can consider that one attacking player can pin at least two players. With the keeper, that makes three players out of eleven to look after one man, leaving 8 others pressing against 10 men. The team in possession has then already created a numerical superiority by having a player positioned in an advanced area.

Finding the right balance

We just discussed how with one striker we can create a 10v8 situation in our favor when our team is in possession. We’ll now look at how we can create greater overloads?

Let’s take the example of a build up situation from a goal kick. Nowadays, everyone is familiar with the basic positioning of the centre backs, centre midfield and full back when playing from the back on a goal kick: the split CBs, high fullbacks and deeper centre midfield(s) are now we’ll known. However, people might focus mostly on the positioning of the deeper players because it is called playing from ‘the back’, when in reality it is important to look at the top of the structure first to understand the mechanism and how a team can build up from the back.

Numerical superiority is key as mentioned. Another essential principle is creating spacio-temporal advantages. Unsurprisingly, a player is more likely to make accurate passes or successful dribbling when he has more time on the ball to think about his next action than when he is pressed by an opponent. Back to our example, if a team wants to build from the back on a goal kick, is having one striker and be in a 10v8 situation in its own half a favourable situation? In the Premier League, most pitches are 105 metres by 68 metres. In the build up phase, that means both teams will be playing in 52.5 metres by 68 metres, a half of the pitch. That’s 21 players in this reduced area. In simple words, that’s a lot! It’s then difficult to find space, and therefore time, for the team in possession when the other team has a smaller area to defend. To make space, pinning is then a very useful tactic.

To make things easier when we are in possession, we’ll try to reduce the number of players we will have to play against. However, if we want to force some defenders to stay as far as possible from the ball, we’ll have to sacrifice some of our own players to pin these defenders. Another thing to bear in mind is that if we pin 2 defenders and the keeper with one striker, another striker will not pin two more defenders. As we said, teams typically want to have one spare man at the back, so a team will usually have three defenders against two strikers, four against three,… So the more strikers we use to pin the defenders, the least benefit we actually get. It’s about finding the right balance then.

There is no right or wrong answer here. The number of players a team wants to keep high on the pitch will depend of many factors. One of them will be the technical ability of the other players in the team. If for example one of your center back isn’t really comfortable on the ball and one of your center midfield is not particularly good at long passes, you might want to have one of your most technical player to drop deeper to help in the build up. Another factor will be the height and the intensity with which the other team presses you. If the opponent is set to defend deep and press in its last third only, you might want to keep only up to two strikers to pin the defense since they will likely hold their positions anyway, so you don’t really need to force them back. Besides, you want to keep players in the middle of the pitch to overload the opposition’s midfield and break through their lines. Below is an example of a possible positioning against a low block. Instead of overloading the front line with three or four advanced players, we would rather overload the midfield and the wide areas to move the block. However, we could use a central attacking midfielder to pin the opposition’s center midfielders.

Inversely, against a team pressing high we will look at preventing more players to join the pressing, hence keeping more players in advanced positions. In the below situation, the opposition is pressing high, blocking short passing options. We would then position four attacking players, forcing five players to stay at the back, creating a 7v5.

Conclusion

Pinning the opposition’s defense has two main upsides for the team in possession. It creates numerical superiority and spacio-temporal advantages to progress through the pitch. Besides, it allows the team in possession to attack with several players in high positions, presenting a greater threat to the defending team. However, teams need to be flexible and adjust their positioning depending on their own ability and their opponent’s mentality.

To conclude, here is a clip of Ajax building from the back against Real Madrid. It’s interesting to see how Ajax are creating space during the course of the play, starting with two players up front, Neres and Ziyech, before Tadic and Van de Beek move forward to form a front four and open space in the middle of the pitch.

Juventus have already secured their eighth Serie A trophy in a row, being 16 points clear from Napoli with 3 games left to play. And unlike last season, they were never in danger in the league, leading the table since the 2nd match day and only losing their first game in March. However, they have failed to win the Italian Cup for the fifth time in a row, and more disappointing, they have lost in the Champions League’s quarter finals against Ajax Amsterdam. If the Dutch side have proven being a top team this season, the fact remained that losing at this stage was seen as a failure by most supporters and pundits.

Squad and formation

Juventus started the season with a strong squad of 23 players. However, they had only 5 central midfielders, which was anticipated as a potential problem should Massimiliano Allegri opt for a 4-3-3 formation. But the Italian manager has demonstrated in the past his versatility, and is seen as one who can work with any group at his disposal.

Coming up with a typical starting eleven for the season is challenging with Allegri as he is an adept of heavy squad rotation. Based on minutes played though, the starting eleven would be:

Overall this season, this eleven has been lined up 14 times. As a comparison, Liverpool starting eleven has appeared 23 times, Barcelona’s one 30 times.

Allegri is also very flexible in terms of formation. If he has used 4-3-3 more often this season, 19 times between Serie A and Champions League, he has also used 4-4-2 twelve times. When necessary, he will also set up a back three, although it will be more situational than tactical. In reality though, Allegri has some key principles regardless of its formation.

A team known for its defensive strength

Under Allegri, Juventus has almost always defended in a 4-4-2 shape when out of possession, whether the team is lined up with a back four or three. It can sometimes vary with a 4-4-1-1 although this is very similar.

4-4-2 remains probably the most commonly used defensive shape, mainly for its balance and compactness. From a coach perspective, it is also an easier system to put in place since all players at this level would have played 4-4-2 already in their careers.

Allegri is most certainly a coach who bases his approach from a defensive point of view. He has himself stated in interviews that for him, the main role of a manager was to lay the defensive structure of the team. He has a few principles he had implemented over the years at Juventus.

In terms of pressing, Allegri would usually opt for a medium block and he’s quite adaptable with the type of marking. He would typically use a zonal marking, but will also put in place man marking against some opponents, as he did against Napoli in September (images below).

When Juventus step up to press higher, they would be man-oriented as below against Manchester United in the Champions League’s group stage. On that day, Juventus started the match in a 4-4-2 formation with Dybala and Ronaldo up front. Here we can see Pjanic stepping up to cut De Gea’s short passing option.

Allegri wants his team to stay very compact when defending in its own half. Therefore, Juventus’ pressing when in a medium block would not be particularly aggressive to maintain its positioning. The first and second line of pressing’s objectives are to first try to force the opponent to play back and then force them wide. On the below image, we can see both principles in place against Napoli, Juventus defending in a very compact shape its defensive third, with 9 field players and leaving only Ronaldo with no defensive duties.

To defend the wide areas, Juventus would typically get their full backs to push up and press the winger, with one of the central midfield dropping in the half space to cover.

Juventus have been very defensively this season, conceding only 25 goals in Serie A so far, and 9 in the Champions League, the 5th team with the least goals conceded per game (0.9)

A team awaited for its striking force

With the signing of Ronaldo, Juventus got itself the best goal scorer in Champions League history. Alongside Dybala, Mandzukic, Douglas Costa and Bernardeschi, the old lady was expected to entertain and be among the highest scoring teams in Europe this season. In the end they are currently the second team with the most goals scored in Serie A behind Atalanta, and only the 13th team in UCL with an average of goals scored per game of 1.4, behind the likes of Porto, Hoffenheim and Lyon, for a total of 14 goals in 10 games played. This is exactly the same total as the previous season for the same number of games played.

Allegri prone a very flexible attacking system and aim at giving as much freedom as possible to his players in the possession phase. It is therefore difficult to define an attacking shape for his team. However, there are certain patterns we can highlight.

Building up from the back

Sold in the summer 2017 to AC Milan, Bonucci was brought back in the 2018 summer window. Rumors have said that him and Allegri had some relationship issues, and that during the half time of the lost UCL final in 2017, the Italian center back had words with other players and his manager, leading to his departure few weeks later. As we know though, there are no hard feelings in football if it can bring some good results, and Juventus decided to get their ball-playing defender back. The team appeared to suffer in the build up last season without Bonucci then, but also Dani Alves who although injured a good part of the 2016/17 season, played a major role in Juve’s european campaign. The following season, the build up would almost entirely rely on Pjanic, making it easier for the other teams to counter Allegri’s team, and forcing Dybala to drop deeper in many occasions to support his teammate. With Bonucci back, Pjanic could expect to have some help in the first third when playing out from the back, and Dybala could play higher on the pitch.

Juventus would vary between a back two or three in the build up phase, depending on whether the opponent press with one or two players. The typical structure when moving to a back three would be Chiellini on the left, Pjanic in the middle and Bonucci on the right. The idea behind having Bonucci on the left rather than in the middle is that he could use this position to play diagonal long balls with a better angle than from the middle of the pitch.

Pjanic’s role in the build up remains essential. When he arrived at Juventus from Roma, he was playing mostly as a center midfield or an attacking midfield. Allegri decided to reposition him in front of the defense, in a similar role than Pirlo was playing. When Juventus switched to a 4-2-3-1 in January 2017, Pjanic played as a center midfield again alongside Khedira. Since last season though, he is back into this regista role. His capacity to find pockets to receive from his defenders and his passing technique are key to initiate Juventus’ attacking phases. He has completed 92.3% of his passes this season in Serie A, the fifth highest rate in the league. While Pjanic’s role is to maintain possession and try to progress through the thirds, Bonnuci would use long balls more often, primarily targeting Mandzukic or Ronaldo. Together they complete themselves well.

Carte blanche to the attacking players

As mentioned earlier, Allegri wants to give his talented players as much freedom as possible. For him, systems are too predictable for the opposition, and therefore individual talent is the best weapon to score goals. The Italian manager is a self proclaimed basketball follower. And he explained in interviews that in basketball, you have a limited amount of time to shoot and try to score. So teams have prepared plays to deploy their attacks, but once the clock is coming to its end, we pass the ball to the best player and expect him to make things happen. There is no limited time to score in football, but for Allegri the idea is the same. Create space and time for your best players to express their talent and score.

Allegri in 2014

If you have Messi in your team, you almost start the game 2-0 up, same with Ronaldo

As a result, Ronaldo is free up front and has very limited defensive work to do. Dybala and Mandzukic are the other two players the most used to form the attacking three line. Mandzukic plays the role of the anchor in the center of the attack. He remains mostly in a central position, pinning the two center backs. His physicality allows the team to play long balls when necessary with good results. In the 18 yards box, his quality in the air is a major strength as well. Lastly, his work rate complete Ronaldo very well. If the Portuguese is not famous for his defensive work, the Croatian is a great first defender. Dybala on his end had a more difficult season. Scoring only 10 goals so far, three of them in a same game against Young Boys in UCL group stage, he had limited impact compared to previous seasons. His positioning on the right wing doesn’t seem to suit him very well. A main reason is that the defensive work is higher on the wing, therefore the Argentine is using lots of his energy in defensive tasks. Besides, he is in a further position to the goal than he was when playing second striker behind Higuain. If his technical ability makes no doubt, he is not an actual dribbler who will take one two or three players to make his own way to the goal. He has very good technique in tight spaces and despite his stature, his shielding of the ball is excellent. But he is no Leo Messi unlike what was said few years ago, and this wide position doesn’t fit his strengths.

Does too much freedom actually restrain individuals?

Let’s take a simple example to illustrate this idea. You are coaching an under 9 team. When kids arrive at training, they always ask you “what do we do?”. A simple answer could be “whatever you feel like”. Now, if you have ever tried that, you will know it doesn’t work. Although it sounds very cool to let the kids do whatever they want, the reality is that most of the time, at least at football, they don’t know what to do. Their most common reaction to “whatever you feel like” will be to take a football and shoot to the goal, with or without a goalkeeper.

Now, the same situation, but you tell the kids “play Wembley”. They will start playing immediately with much more intensity, and will actually benefit that way more. So by giving them some sort of constraint, I actually helped them to be creative and use their individual abilities.

Obviously, this is by far simpler than managing professional football players, but the idea remains the same. By telling his player “do whatever you want when we have the ball”, Allegri might actually restrain their creativity and impact on the game. Dybala is probably the best example.

So how does this lack of attacking structure materialized on the pitch?

It’s important to highlight that Juventus still has some structure in possession. However, the more they progress on the pitch, the less they apply any specific system. The below image summarize the different phases of possession, from the build up to the finishing.

We have discussed earlier the build up phase. Clear patterns can be found, such as the role of Pjanic to organize the build up, but also the use of a double pivot to progress to the second phase. Overall, Juve are comfortable in their build up.

Juventus have also been good in the finishing phase. With a conversion rate of 16.8% in Serie A, they are the second most efficient team in the league. In UCL, their rate lower down to 12.2%, ranking them only as the 23rd most efficient team in the tournament. However, it is difficult to make any conclusion on the UCL since they have only played 10 games, which is quite a restricted sample. For example, in the second leg of the group stage against Manchester United, their conversion rate was down to 4% in a game they largely dominated before losing 1-2 after conceding two goals on set pieces. Their Serie A rate seems therefore much more reliable, and as said, it is a good conversion rate so no major issue here. If there was one thing to highlight though, it would be the Ronaldo-dependence when it comes to scoring goals. With 28 goals so far this season, the Portuguese is by far the best goal scorer in the team, Dybala being second with 10 goals.

Where Juventus seem to have the suffer the most the lack of structure is in the second and third phase of possession. Since Juventus aims to build from the back, the second phase is crucial as it will be the moment when the team needs to disorganize the opposition to open up gaps to penetrate and progress towards the goal.

The below sequence highlights some of the recurring issues Juventus had this season:

Lack of patience

Bonucci is in possession at the back. Morata is screening to block a pass to Pjanic but leaves the left wing open. Bentancur is free with space in front of him. However, Bonucci decides to play a longer pass to Dybala, skipping the possession phase and putting Dybala in a difficult situation against four Atletico players. A better option for Bonucci here would have been to maintain possession by playing to Bentancur and wait for a better forward passing option. Which brings us to a second issue.

Lack of space and time

As good as Dybala is on the ball, he has very little chance to beat 4 players on his own. It would have been an interesting situation for Juventus if the Atletico players were defending further from the Argentine, giving him more space and time on the ball. The team in possession will always be looking at either creating overloads in an area of the pitch, or at least create 1v1 situations for their best dribblers. Here, if Dybala has four players around him, it means that Atletico must be under loaded in another area of the pitch. We can’t see on the above picture, but Ronaldo is on the left touchline. With Sandro, Matuidi and Mandzukic, Juventus therefore have a 4v2 situation against the right back and right midfield. However, Dybala has too much pressure around him to be be able to make a switch. Should have Bonucci switched the play himself? Probably not. Given the distance between him and Sandro, it is doubtful that the switch would have created any advantadge for Juve, the Atletico block would have had time to travel with the ball too easily.

Distances between the players

An important point here is the distance between Dybala and his closest teammates. De Sciglio on the right wing is the closest, but he is not accessible for Dybala given his body shape to receive the ball and the positioning of Lemar. Pjanic in the center of the pitch is not an option either as he is closed down within a triangle created by Atletico to neutralize him. Bentancur and Matuidi, the other two midfielders, are them too far from Dybala. This situation very much shed light on the structural issues Juventus have had this season. The positioning in possession seems to be too inaccurate, and although it does indeed achieve what Allegri is looking for, i.e. freedom for the attacking players, it also create disorganization within his team. The image below shows what a positional organization could look like to achieve safer possession and penetration. With De Sciglio, Dybala, Mandzukic and Ronaldo pushing up, they would create a 4v4, forcing an Atletico midfielder to drop back. Bonucci, Matuidi, Bentancur and Pjanic could create an overload on the right against Morata and Saul. If Rodrigo shifts over to the left to cover Saul, he will now leave Koke and Juanfran against Sandro, Ronaldo and Mandzukic. Another issue with Juventus initial positioning here is the vulnerability to counter-attacks in the defensive transition. Indeed, with so much space between the players, it is fairly easy for the opposition to find a quick forward pass in the transition, which is actually what happened when Dybala lost the ball. Shorter distances woul give Juventus a more solid block to counter-press or at least contain a counter-attack. Lastly, this suggested shape would allow Pjanic to be higher on the pitch. In games like this one, against a team with a very compact block like Atletico, it is important to have the most technical players in advanced areas to be able to create gaps and find dangerous vertical passes.

Outlook for next season

For many other clubs, a league title would be synonym of a successful season. Not in Turin. After eight Serie A titles in a row, the tifosi are naturally expecting something more, the Champions League.

After losing in the quarter finals again, Allegri has been heavily criticized in Italy, bothby the fans and the pundits, for his ‘simplistic’ vision of the role of the manager, and although he sticks to his philosophy in front of the cameras, we can think that he might consider a slight adjustment, should he still be at Juventus next season. Without suddenly turning into a positional play aficionado, Allegri could explore some other options. The old lady seems to have all the qualities of a deadly counter-attacking team for example: a solid defense, very quick players like Sandro, Cancelo, Costa, Ronaldo and Cuadrado. Dybala could also be re-positioned behind the striker where he had his best season so far in 2016/17. Juventus has also already signed Ramsey from Arsenal. His ability to run forward into spaces could be very efficient in this set up. Overall, the Italian side has the squad to play in any style really, but counter-attacking seems to be the best compromise between the players’ strengths and their manager’s philosophy, requiring a solid defensive structure and allowing the forward players to improvise when in possession.