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Part 3:

Quick ball circulation, depth over width and preventing counter attacks

This sums up what RB Leipzig are looking to achieve when they are in possession of the ball, and thus the principles of play they have implemented: a high tempo possession based football with constant emphasis on penetrating the opponent.

This willingness to play forward as much as possible can be seen all over the pitch, but is particularly obvious in the way they play out from the back, with a common principle being to play the furthest pass possible. It is rare to see RB Leipzig having extensive possession spells in their own defensive third. The instruction seems to play limited number of passes in deep positions, with the centre-backs and the goalkeeper looking in priority to link up with their most advanced teammates. It’s important though that the players (and the coaches) understand the nuance between playing a clean pass as far as possible up the pitch, and simply booting the ball out as far as possible. There seems to be a misconception from some coaches, confusing playing out from the back and avoiding long passes, which lead to teams playing unnecessary number of passes in their own third thinking that long passes are forbidden.

One of the reasons RB Leipzig tend to play forward rather quickly from the back is that Nagelsmann asks his players to avoid square and vertical passes but play diagonal passes as much as possible. From a centre-back’s perspective, it means that the only conservative passing option is to play back to the goalkeeper, considering that square passes between the 2 CBs are avoided. Square passes obviously still happen, but at a much lower level than some other teams. As we discussed in the first article, square passes are often a pressing trigger for the defending team, therefore avoiding them reduces the occasions to be pressed and having a player isolated. Besides, as we consider that we need width and depth to occupy the pitch effectively and create space, we should apply the same rule to a pass and therefore play 2 dimensional passes i.e. diagonal. The below map shows the team’s most frequent passing circuits in the Bundesliga, evidencing the emphasis on diagonal passes, with the Bayern map as a comparison.

This principle is expressed on the pitch with RB Leipzig’s trademark zig zag passing patterns as in the below clip against Hertha Berlin.

Diagonal and penetrative passes are only possible because of the players positioning where everyone should support the ball carrier on different heights and width and move to receive behind a line of pressure. A way to breakdown how effective possession to penetrate can be achieved is to look at the different roles players should fulfil:

• Ball carrier: the player on the ball
• Passing option: a player the ball carrier can pass the ball to. He is ideally unmarked so he has space and time upon receiving the ball, but can also be marked while still able to receive a pass without being intercepted
• Third man: a player who can’t receive a pass directly from the ball carrier, but who is in a position to receive a pass from the player acting as the ‘passing option’., the second pass as we can call it. The third man usually can’t receive a pass from the ball carrier because he is marked, and/or because he is screened by an opponent
• Attract pressure: a player whose positioning and/or movement invites pressure from the defending team, creating space for his teammates
• Rest-defense: players who are not directly involved in the progression of the ball and whose role is to occupy positions allowing them to defend against potential counter attacks if possession is lost

Roles occupied by the players are dynamic though in relation to the position of the ball, of the opponents and of their teammates. Besides, a player can combine 2 roles depending on the situation (only the first 3 above can’t be matched together for obvious reasons)

In this clip we can see the roles each player is playing in a possession phase, and how they evolve as the ball, the opponents and the teammates move.

Sabitzer’s movement at the start of the clip, dropping closer to the ball carrier, is a regular play we can see from RB Leipzig. He stays in his marker’s eyeline and run at a rather slow pace so he can be followed and open space behind him. Below another example, in the same match against PSG, with Haidara in Sabitzer’s role.

To receive the ball behind a line of pressure, players basically have 2 options:

• Making a forward run behind the line starting from a deeper position
• Dropping behind the line starting from a higher position

Key tactical elements used by RB Leipzig here are:

• Forward runs behind the opponent’s defensive line
• Up-back-through combinations to find a teammate facing the opponent’s goal running forward
• Pinning the defensive line to create space between the lines
• Up & down counter movements between 2 players
• Combinations and rotations through wide triangles

Dribbling is obviously another way to penetrate an opposition’s block. However, this is not a key feature in RB Leipzig’s game. Compared to the other teams in the Bundesliga’s top 6, they are well behind in terms of progressive runs and dribbles attempted per 90 minutes. It might be intentional from Nagelsmann as dribbling situations typically have a lower success rate than passing, but it might also be due to the players’ profiles with only a few of them appearing as particularly skilled in this exercise.

Another aspect of Nagelsmann’s system that might be unfavourable to dribbling is that he asks his players to move the ball quickly, with short amount of time on the ball per player. Interestingly though, he asks his players to avoid one-touch passes as much as possible as these increase the risk of misplacing a pass ¹. That doesn’t stop them from being one of the team with the most passes per minute of possession as per the below chart.

Quick and efficient passing sequences requires to constantly have passing options available and shorter distances between players. Nagelsmann therefore asks his players to maintain closeness to the ball to ensure it can circulate quickly, but also allowing the team to produce an effective counter pressing (which I will discuss further later)². This closeness among players in possession also involves the ball-far players, a concept sometimes called ‘minimum width’ and that can also be observed in Ten Hag’s Ajax Amsterdam for example (see video below).

We often read or hear that to be successful in possession, teams must occupy the whole pitch and in particular the 5 vertical channels we typically split the pitch in. However, deploying wide players off the opposition’s fullback rather than all the way out to the touchline has some advantages over maximum width:

• The ball travels quicker when switching the play as there is less distance to reach the target
• As the ball is switched, teammates also have less distance to cover to slide and support the receiver
• Wide players have less distance to cover to get into their defensive positions when possession is lost

Having a compact shape in possession might make things a little bit harder though as this also encourages and allows the opponent to be even more compact himself. The quick ball circulation is therefore essential, and so is having multiple forward passing options to force the opponent back and pin players in deeper positions so the ball carrier can’t be pressed easily.

To create forward passing options and reduce the opponent’s coverage of the wide areas despite not necessarily using the whole width of the pitch, RB Leipzig aim to have as many players as possible ahead of the ball and overload the centre of the pitch.

Common attacking shapes nowadays are 1-3-2-5 and 1-2-3-5, meaning that teams usually try to have 5 players ahead of the ball. This number will vary depending on the opponent, the moment of the game, the type of game, etc. We can say that for a team like RB Leipzig who aims to dominate his opponent this is the minimum number they would try to keep in most games. This is a very important principle to encourage players to constantly move with the ball and make forward runs. Let say you are the player on the ball and you have 5 teammates ahead of you. You pass the ball to one of them so there are now maybe 4 or less players in front of the ball. Yourself or a teammate therefore need to make a forward run to rebalance the team, and on and on as the ball travels forward. It basically ensures that the team constantly attack the opposition’s goal while maintaining closeness between players.

Overloading the centre of the pitch, and more specifically the centre-backs/centre-midfields area, is crucial as well for RB Leipzig to be able to still use the width of the pitch while not necessarily deploying all out wingers. They typically try to maintain 3 players in central positions. Against back 4s, it generally forces all 4 defenders to remain compact, slowing down or preventing the fullbacks to access the wide areas, Against back 3s, the defending team would usually drop a centre-midfield or one of the wing-backs. This is simply due to the fact that defending team usually try to maintain a numerical advantage against the most advanced players to avoid 1v1s.

Some examples of how overloading the centre of the pitch and having numbers ahead of the ball help RB Leipzig progressing possession:

Counter pressing to score

Similar to the defensive phase discussed in the first article, the ultimate objective in each moment of the game is crucial to determine the principles and tactical elements to implement. In Nagelsmann’s case, the defensive transition is seen as an opportunity to catch the opponent off guard to create goal scoring opportunities. As we already mentioned, the way he wants his team to attack is very much influenced by how he wants to react during defensive transitions. When RB Leipzig lose possession, they should therefore already have numbers around the ball to counter press effectively.

The very first counter pressing principle is to apply immediate pressure on the ball upon losing possession. Obviously, there are situations where this is either not possible, or just not the best option. A rule of thumb is to counter press only if a certain amount of passes were made in the zone where the ball is lost, and to otherwise drop behind the ball to prevent penetration. The rationale behind it is that if the team had a possession phase in a specific zone before losing the ball, there should be a high number of players around it ready to counter press. And conversely, if the team only only had a short possession spell in that zone, there is a lack of compactness around the ball and it is therefore safer to drop into the defensive shape.

As in when they are in their defensive organisation, RB Leipzig aim to attack the ball with as many players as possible. This doesn’t mean players are just running frenetically towards the ball in the hope of winning it. In some situations, as many players as possible might just be one. Generally speaking, the closest player to the ball press it. But to increase efficiency, it’s also important that the first pressure comes in front of the ball carrier and diagonally from the centre of the pitch towards the touchline. Frontal pressure will prevent the ball carrier from being able to shield the ball and resist the press. The diagonal run will screen central passing options and force the ball carrier into a wide area where he will have less options to escape the press. Players around the ball are then responsible for squeezing the area, screening short passing options to create an overload, while players away from the ball should drop into their defensive positions in case the counter press is unsuccessful. RB Leipzig’s centre-backs are typically man-marking the opposition’s centre-forwards and can therefore be seen stepping up when one of the forward drops, with the other players in the backline covering the space. In some situations, this can lead to RB Leipzig’s centre-backs taking very high positions into the opposition’s half as below against PSG

As short and central passing options are blocked, RB Leipzig can create a second wave to attack the ball carrier in numbers. A common feature is to ‘sandwich’ the ball carrier, with a second RB Leipzig player attacking him from behind. If the first press is more efficient from the front as just explained, the player on the ball is less likely to be able to shield the ball when pressed from behind by a second player as he would typically not be able to see this player coming as he focuses on the pressure in front of him.

To conclude this section, some clips of counter pressing situations:

How are RB Leipzig performing?

Looking at the goals scored only, they haven’t been particularly prolific so far this season. In Bundesliga, they have scored 37 goals in 21 games, 1.76 goals per game. In Champions League, 11 goals in 7 games, only 1.57 goals per game. By comparison, they averaged 2.2 goals per game last season in the same competitions (97 goals in 44 games). Compared to other top teams across Europe, this is a rather low average thankfully offset by their good defensive performances.

A first element to explain this drop is Timo Werner’s departure. With 34 goals scored in all competitions last season, he scored a third of RB Leipzig’s goals and we can’t say he’s been replaced by a player of the same impact. Their top goal scorer this season is Yussuf Poulsen with 9 across all competitions, followed by Angelino with 8. Having a key goal scorer in a team to rely on isn’t a necessity though, the below chart illustrating the contribution of each team’s top 2 scorers to the team’s total goals, with high scoring teams like Manchester City and AC Milan also not heavily relying on 1 or 2 players.

In terms of shots per game, they are only slightly behind compared to last season in the Bundesliga (15.10 vs 15.85). It’s unlikely therefore that they score less just because they create less chances. Judging purely by the data, it simply looks like they highly overperformed in front of the goal last season, with a goal minus expected goals difference of +10.1 goals. In comparison, the difference this season is -3.4. Werner was very much outperforming his xG last season with a +5.7 difference, and so was Schick with a +4 difference. Both players having left the club during the summer while most attacking players this season are underperforming could be the beginning of an explanation to RB Leipzig’s lower goal scoring rate. The general impression is that the team slightly lack individual quality among its attacking players, and even if collectively they are well drilled and able to create chances, they would definitely benefit from a top level attacker, whether a centre or a wide forward.

It will be interesting to see how they act on the transfer market this summer, but also whether Julian Nagelsmann will still be their head coach, with a number of top European teams presumably interested in hiring him. He is known for being ambitious and not settling for second place, and although his RB Leipzig team seems very well drilled and on the right track to keep improving, he might recognise the club’s difficulty to compete with Bayern Munich in terms of the quality of players they can attract as a major barrier to his race for titles. The recent confirmation that Dayot Upamecano will leave to Bayern at the end of the season is another clear message that the Bavarian club remains ahead of everyone in the Bundesliga, and might influence Nagelsmann if he has a choice to make this summer.

¹ Football hackers, Christoph Biermann
² https://www.bundesliga.com/en/bundesliga/news/julian-nagelsmann-interview-winning-titles-rb-leipzig-dreaming-klopp-rangnick-14127

Nagelsmann’s brand of football is based on 31 principles. ‘The players probably can’t list them all. But once I stop training and ask them what we are currently working on, they can name that particular principle,’ he said. Those 31 principles are Nagelsmann’s trade secret.

The young German coach has attracted lots of attention from the media in the last 5-6 years, first because of his age (born in 1987), then thanks to his results and the style of football he has had both Hoffenheim and RB Leipzig playing. He is often recognised for his flexibility, regularly changing his team’s formations and line-ups between but also during matches. However, what we will focus on here are the principles of play his team follows, independently of its shape or line-up.

This is part 1 of 2. Follow this link for part 2 looking at the attacking organisation and the defensive transition: https://tacticandtechnique.com/rb-leipzig-principles-of-play-under-julian-nagelsmann-attacking-organisation-and-defensive-transition/

What is a principle of play?

First and foremost, we need to define the term ‘principle of play’. It has become a common expression in the coaching and analysis world, alongside ‘game model’. However, it might mean something different from one person to another. Personally, I use the below definition from Xavier Tamarit’s book, ‘What is tactical periodization?’:

The principles are general behaviours that the coach wants to achieve in his game. To Oliveira (mentioned by Gomes, M. in 2006) “the principle is the beginning of a behaviour that a coach wants the team to assume, in collective terms, and the players in individual ones.” In other words, it would never be an aim by itself. For instance, a coach wants, when the team wins possession of the ball, to play long passes looking for the head of the striker, so he can deflect the ball towards one of the wingers. This would be a principle of the game. However, what happens next is not determined.

What is tactical periodization?, Xavier Tamarit

Principles of play are therefore a set of actions given by the coach to the players to simplify the game, and to guide them in making decisions in the 4 moments of the game.

The Red Bull philosophy

Red Bull have a very clear idea of how they want their teams to play. Although head coaches are obviously free to implement their own playing model, they are selected on the criteria that this model is very close to the Red Bull philosophy. In the case of Nagelsmann, he was already wanted by the club during the 2017/18 season while he was at Hoffenheim. Although he couldn’t join RB Leipzig at the end of that season, they were ready to wait another season, but didn’t want to commit to another coach during this period. Ralf Rangnick, then sporting director, therefore decided to take the head coach role in the interim while waiting for Nagelsmann.

Without going into Rangnick’s biography, he had an immense influence over German football and coaches, notably for introducing gegenpressing and ball-oriented zonal marking. As the sporting director from 2012 to 2020 (with spells as head coach), Rangnick has also had a very big influence over the Red Bull football teams’ philosophy and style of play. In a nutshell, their teams are looking to press the opponent high up the pitch, with an emphasis on fast forward play in possession, and quick and aggressive transitions.

In terms of defensive organisation and transition management, Nagelsmann has a similar approach to Rangnick. He wants his teams to attack the opponent as early as possible to regain possession with a chance to score and react quickly in both defensive and attacking transition moments to restart an attack.

In possession however, Nagelsmann is more possession-oriented and put more emphasis on his team circulating the ball to prepare safer forward passing options, whereas Rangnick would want his team to play forward as much and as quick as possible. The results of both approaches translates into the stats below, with Rangnick’s RB Leipzig playing a more important ratio of their passes forward and into the final third, with obviously more misplaced passes than Nagelsmann’s team.

We’ll now go into more details, looking at each moment of the game and what principles Julian Nagelsmann has implemented. In this article, I will focus on the defensive organisation and the attacking transition phases. In another article, I will go through the attacking phase and the defensive transitions.

We press to score goals

In a recent webinar with The Coaches’ Voice, Jesse Marsch (RB Salzburg head coach) talked about ‘pressing to score goals’ as opposed to ‘pressing to regain possession’.

Julian Nagelsmann adopts the same defensive strategy at RB Leipzig, executed through several principles of play that I have tried to identify (in bold below).

The starting point is that they press as high as possible to regain possession as close as possible from the opposition’s goal. Different researches have been done on attacking transitions in Elite football, concluding that chances to create goal scoring opportunities, and scoring goals were much higher when possession was regained in the opposition’s half ^1,2, implying that the best approach to score goals after regaining possession is to press with a high line.

The risk with the high press is to be played through, or over in the depth behind the high defensive line. In terms of personnel, RB Leipzig are well equipped to maintain a high line with a player like Upamecano who has recorded the second fastest sprint in the Bundesliga this season with a peak at 35.34 km/h.

To prevent being played through, they maintain a compact shape with the main reference point being the ball, and covering players defending on the front foot, meaning that whenever a pass is played through a line, a player from the line behind should be ready to step up to attack the receiver between the lines to deny him to turn.

Although they are aggressive and keen on attacking the opponent as early as possible, Leipzig are also well disciplined when it comes to initiating the press. When the opposition is in balance and under control of the ball, they would maintain their high line while waiting for specific triggers to start the press.

The main trigger they are looking for is a square pass between 2 centre-backs. This type of pass allows the pressing team to isolate the receiver from his teammate, making it easier to force the play into a specific direction.

Another trigger is a forward touch from the player on the ball (typically is a CB). As the player takes a forward touch into space, it is more difficult for him to then play a back pass because of the momentum of the play. Therefore, he is more often forced to keep playing forward a more difficult pass.

Lastly, a back pass to the goalkeeper would typically trigger a press as well, as most high pressing team would.

Once the press is initiated, it is crucial that the whole team moves forward and towards the ball to maintain the compactness. The intensity and the speed are very important as Marsch also explains in the webinar. From the point they start pressing, RB Leipzig’s objective is then to reduce the opponent’s options on the ball so they can overload the ball-near area. We can then identify 3 different roles in the press. I use a car mechanic analogy to illustrate these roles:

• The starter: very simply, he is the player initiating the press, the one reacting to the trigger. His role is to attack the ball carrier (preferably with a diagonal run) in a way that he can’t play the ball to the initial passer, but instead has to play towards a specific direction. Generally, RB Leipzig would try to force the play towards a wide area where they can use the touchline as an extra defender, but the actual principle of play here should be to force the play where they have an advantage. It can therefore be towards the central channel if they have a numerical advantage there for example
• The turbo: he’s also called the second wave. He’s typically the closest player to the starter. His role is to increase the pressure initiated by the starter, either by teaming up against the ball carrier to create a 2v1, or by pressing the second pass. His action should force the opposition to play quicker, with less time to make decision, and therefore more chance to misplace a pass or lose a challenge
• The pistons: they are the players in the cover. Their role is to compress the area around the ball to create a numerical advantage and increase their chances to regain possession. By forcing the opponent into a specific area of the pitch, the players in the cover are able to empty (or underload) the ball-far areas to instead overload the ball-near area before the opponent had time to move in numbers to support the ball carrier

On an individual level, a very important skill for the success of the press is the ability to press and screen the opponent. As the first line of pressure would typically be outnumbered by the team in possession, they need to press while blocking passing lines between 2 players so a 2v1 becomes a 1v1. In this clip, we see how Leipzig turn a 2v4 into a 3v2 with Forsberg and Poulsen both blocking the pass to the pivot player while pressing the ball.

As the ball has been forced into a specific area, it needs to be locked into this area and prevent any switch of play into underloaded areas of the pitch. Typically, the main danger for a ball-oriented pressing team is a long diagonal switch which could find the opposite winger in a 1v1 or even 1v0 situation. The image often used here is the creation of a net that the opponent can’t escape. Not only the pressing team needs to attack the ball in numbers, they also need to constantly aggress the ball carrier so he has no time to prepare an accurate long pass. Another important principle here is to press the ball with as many players as possible to increase the chances to win the ball. In this clip against Dortmund, we can see both Meunier and Sancho being pressed by 2 Leipzig players.

Winning the ball can then be done through different actions, typically a tackle, an interception, or recovering a loose ball or a misplaced pass. Nagelsmann prefers to win the ball via an interception.

Nagelsmann prefers to force the opponent into playing a poor pass rather than win the ball in one-vs-one situations, which are subject to too many random outcomes for his liking. ‘Our goal is to always use an interception to have an advantage of pace over an opponent that’s fanned out and positioned widely,’ Nagelsmann declared.

Football Hackers: The science and art of data revolution, Christoph Biermann

The main advantage of an interception is that the player winning the ball has no direct opposition ahead of him and can therefore run into space to initiate a counterattack. To create situations where they can intercept a pass, RB Leipzig try to always have at least one spare player in the net around the ball lurking for a potential interception. In this clip, Laimer is the spare player. Screening here is again an important skill as we can first see him getting between Saul (on the ball) and Carrasco (left of the front 3). His first intention might well be to block a penetrative pass before thinking about intercepting, but his positioning in Olmo’s (pressing the ball) shadow could have led to Saul not seeing him and trying to play that pass to Carrasco. As Lodi takes a poor first touch and the ball bounces in the air, he understands he can step up to intercept a soft header. Intercepting skills therefore come with a player’s ability to read the game and opponents’ intentions: identifying passing lines, anticipating the next move based on the ball carrier’s body shape and field of vision, hiding behind teammates/opponents to jump in and intercept a pass.

Lastly, the role of the first line of pressure is not limited to initiating the press. More often than not, the ball won’t be regained directly by the first line, but instead by a covering player. The role of the first line then becomes to support a potential counter attack should possession be regained. Leipzig would try to keep as many players as possible ahead of the ball to do so, with advanced players looking to position themselves in gaps between opponents and between the lines to be open targets for a penetrative pass as the ball is recovered. This concept is often called rest attack.

The below clip offers a great camera angle (for once!) to see most of the principles discussed above in action against Dortmund. I have left the video unannotated so readers can make their own analysis.

Gone in 10 seconds

If it takes Nicolas Cage 60 seconds to steal a car, Ralf Rangnick and his disciples believe that it takes 10 seconds to score a goal after regaining possession of the ball.

Jokes aside, other studies have demonstrated that performing a penetrative action within 3 seconds after regaining possession increased the chances to create goal scoring opportunities ³, and that successful counter attacks lasted between 10 and 15 seconds and consisted of 4 to 8 actions ⁴.

The first of Nagelsmann’s principles to transition from defense to attack is therefore to play forward as soon as the ball is recovered, whether by a pass or a carry. RB Leipzig’s priority seems to be to play a forward pass rather than running with the ball or dribbling. An obvious reason could be that the ball travels faster with a pass than a run, therefore they can penetrate and put pressure on the defensive line quicker. Another reason is that their whole defensive system is built around the objective of regaining possession to score, so when they win the ball, they have numbers around it, players are at passing distances to each other, and they have support ahead of the ball to play forward. A player would generally run with the ball because he is either isolated, or because his teammates are all marked. But RB Leipzig’s defensive system should prevent these type of scenarios to happen on a regular basis.

Independently from where the ball is recovered, their first objective is to play through the central channel as early as possible. It is again very logical to play through the centre, as playing in a wide area would considerably restrict the ball carrier’s options.

The next objective is to get at least 3 players ahead of the ball as quickly as possible. Most teams nowadays keep 4 or 5 field players behind the ball when in possession, with a 3-1, 2-2, 3-2 or 2-3 structure. The countering team can therefore maximise its chances to create a goal scoring opportunity by quickly breaking through the opposition’s midfield line and attacking the back line with 3 players in an attempt to create an even numbers situation, or at least a slight underload. Having players running forward as soon as the ball is recovered also forces the opposition’s defensive line to drop, increasing the distances between the lines.

Another reason for getting 3 players ahead of the ball is to quickly occupy the 3 central channels. When counter attacking, players should remain relatively close to each other to stay connected and facilitate a quick ball circulation. Having players 25-30 metres apart would considerably slow down the attack due to the time for the ball to travel, the risk of inaccurate passes, and the low chances of creating overloads against a defender. By attacking down the 3 central channels, RB Leipzig (and any team counter attacking really) are able to combine quickly and arrive in the opposition’s box to attack the 3 crucial zones (front post, penalty spot area and back post).

Finally, players should try to take as few touches as possible to increase the speed of the attack.

In this clip, we can see all these principles in action against Atletico:

And below are some unannotated clips again for the reader to make his own analysis.

How are RB Leipzig performing?

Defensively, they are the best defense in the Bundesliga, with 18 goals conceded in 21 games so far this season, 0.86 goals conceded per game. Last season, this ratio was up to 1.09 after 34 league games. They are also the team with the lowest number of shots conceded per 90 minutes with 7.2, well below Leverkusen in the 2nd place with 8.52.

In the Champions League though, this ratio climbs to 2 goals conceded per game this season, with 8 goals conceded against Manchester Untied alone over 2 games. It is hard to give a definitive answer as to why there is such difference between the 2 competitions. We can only agree that above all, the quality of the opponents is clearly higher than the average Bundesliga team, making it more difficult to defend against them, and mistakes are more easily punished than in their domestic league. They have also conceded 4 penalties in the Champions League in only 6 matches, whereas they have conceded only 2 in their 21 Bundesliga matches.

In an interview with the Independent last year, he also talked about the need to have more defensive-minded players on the pitch when playing in the Champions League compared to the Bundesliga ⁵. However, in the first match against Manchester United lost 5-0, Nagelsmann lined-up a rather attacking midfield 3 of Kampl, Olmo and Nkunku to start the game. He then added more attacking players, bringing on Sorloth and Kluivert to try to come back in the game. They instead conceded 4 goals in the last 15 minutes. The youth of his squad (24.4 years old on average), and of himself (only 33 years old) certainly also have an impact at the European level.

Attacking transitions are more difficult to accurately evaluate. In terms of goals scored on the counter, they tally only 2 so far in the Bundesliga where Bayern have scored 8 and Leverkusen 9 for example. However, in terms of counters leading to a shot, they have a better rate than Bayern (Leverkusen are in their own league there).

Last season, they averaged 4.24 counter attacks per 90 minutes. Moreover, they scored 7 times through counters (Source: Whoscored). It’s likely that they are underperforming this season due to Werner leaving the squad as he was one of their main attacking threat last season and a very efficient counter attacking player. We will have the occasion to discuss the impact of Werner’s absence compared to last season in the next article where I will look into the attacking phase and the defensive transitions.

¹ Hughes, M., & Lovell, T. (2019): Transition to attack in elite soccer
² Daniel Cooper & Craig Pulling (2020): The impact of ball recovery type, location of ball recovery and duration of possession on the outcomes of possessions in the English Premier League and the Spanish La Liga
³ Gonzalez-Rodenas et al. (2015): The effects of playing tactics on creating scoring opportunities in random matches from US Major League Soccer
⁴ Fleig & Hughes (2004): Counter attacks in the 2002 World Cup for association football
⁵ https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/european/julian-nagelsmann-interview-rb-leipzig-jose-mourinho-real-madrid-tottenham-champions-league-a9335101.html

Under Sarri, Juventus have won their 9th consecutive league title this season. However, they have lost in the Coppa Italia final against Napoli, in the Supercoppa Italiana final against Lazio, and got knocked out the Champions League in the round of 16 by Lyon. Independently from the team’s results, Sarri was appointed to initiate a “revolution” in terms of playing style, but it never seemed like it really clicked with the players. As a result, he was relieved of his duties the day after the elimination against Lyon and replaced by the novice Andrea Pirlo ahead of the new season.

So what exactly didn’t work as expected this season for Sarri and Juve? In this 1st part of the analysis, I will focus mainly on the possession phase.

N.B. Data to support this analysis have been collected via various providers: StatsBomb (via Fbref), Whoscored, Transfermarkt and Understat.

THE SQUAD

First and foremost, let’s have a look at the players at Sarri’s disposal. The season started with a group of 25 players, although the new head coach rapidly made it clear that he wouldn’t count on Mario Mandzukic. When the Champion’s League squad was due to be announced, Emre Can was more surprisingly excluded. These 2 players ended up leaving the club with none to very few appearances.

Looking at the rest of the squad, there is a clear lack of depth in terms of wide players. With only 3 full-backs (Sandro, Danilo, De Sciglio) and 4 wingers (Ronaldo, Costa, Bernardeschi, Cuadrado), it was clear that there would be times when playing in certain systems would be challenging, especially taking into account Costa’s and De Sciglio’s tendency to get injured (which was confirmed again this season). To compensate the lack of full-backs, Cuadrado has played in this position most of the season. It wasn’t entirely new to him as he had played right-back before under Allegri, although only on rare occasions.

The midfield raised questions as well, with 6 players available after Can’s departure, and including the regularly injured Khedira and Ramsey. After half a season without a single first team match with PSG, Rabiot was also expected to need some time to get back in good form. Expectations were met as the Frenchman only started to be in physically good condition after the lock-down break.

THE LINE-UPS

14 players shared more than 40% of game time this season, from Bonucci with 4,192 minutes played (approx. 47 matches) to Bernardeschi with 1,999 (approx. 22 games).

The trend compared to last season is that Sarri has rotated his squad slightly less than Allegri. Ronaldo and Bonucci both played about 10% more than last season, while 10 players have played a minimum of 60% of all the minutes. Under Allegri, only 7 players had reached this mark.

THE FORMATIONS

Sarri primarily used 2 starting formations this season: 4-3-3 and 4-3-1-2. He would typically use a same shape over a series of game over a certain period of time rather than changing more often. 4-3-3 was used at the start of the season for the first 5 games (4 Serie A games and 1 UCL). 4-3-2-1 was then introduced and installed until the end of January, with 3 exceptions where 4-3-3 was used again. After that, it was 4-3-3 to the end of the season. Although we obviously can’t know for sure what were Sarri’s intentions with his game management, we can extrapolate that 1) he wanted to give the players some sort of continuity to facilitate the implementation of his principles of play and 2) he would rarely adapt his system based on the opponent. As to why he decided to come back to the 4-3-3 at the end of January, we can imagine that he wanted more wide players on the pitch for when the team was in possession.

That said though, it’s important to understand that starting formations are mostly given as an indication and vary during a match depending on the moment of the game (in/out possession), the players on the pitch, the principles of play of the team, the reaction of the opponent,… Therefore, in this section I will only highlight some key features and characteristics of the different formations used by Sarri.

1. Independently of the shape, Sarri started the season with Bonucci as the right centre-back and De Ligt as the left one. It is probably simply because the Dutchman came off the bench in the first game to replace an injured Chiellini in the left CB position. However, after the team’s first defeat of the season in December against Lazio, during which De Ligt picked up a shoulder injury, Sarri started Demiral as the right CB for the next 6 games, moving Bonucci in the left CB spot. Demiral in his turn got injured early in a game against Roma, and De Ligt came in at the same position, which he then kept until the end of the season. Again, it’s impossible to know why Sarri made this change. Was it linked to the defeat against Lazio? Was Demiral not capable of playing on the left of the defence? Did he think Bonucci could be more beneficial to the team on the left?
2. In defensive phases, the 4-3-3 would become a flat 4-4-2 while the 4-3-1-2 would remain in a similar shape with a compact diamond midfield.
3. In attacking phases, the team’s positional deployment would very much change in function of the players’ profiles and particularly the most attacking players. Below are some examples of the players’ most common movements when the team is in possession. We will see later how this influence the team’s attacking plays.

PLAYING STYLE

As with Napoli and Chelsea previously, Sarri aims for the control of the possession to open spaces in the opponents’ defensive structures and create goal-scoring opportunities. Out of possession, the team is defending in a ball oriented zonal-marking system, both in open plays and on set pieces. Although the intention is to defend on the front-foot and be pro-active, the zonal-marking system implies to be patient and can sometimes lead to longer defensive phases. The transitions are very much dictated by the way the team wants to play in and out of possession. In order to be able to control the possession, the team must be able to secure the ball as soon as it is regained. The defending system should in theory create many opportunities to counter-attack. When possession is lost, the team needs to react very quickly to avoid being caught in the depth because during long possession spells, most of the team should be positioned in the opposition’s half.

That said, Juventus didn’t always dominate their opponents as expected. Throughout the season, they appeared to struggle to develop effective possession phases and showed unusual defensive weaknesses.

ISSUES TO PLAY THROUGH THE THIRDS

When in possession of the ball, the team looks to build the attack by travelling with the ball through the thirds. The transition from the defensive to the midfield third can be more or less difficult depending on the opponent’s intentions. Some teams opt for a conservative approach with a medium/low defensive block, in which case progressing to the midfield third is somewhat easy. Other teams are more ambitious and decide to press high to disrupt the build-up play and try to regain possession closer to the opponent’s goal.

BREAKING THROUGH A HIGH PRESS

In Serie A, the quality of the Juventus’ squad compared to majority of the other teams is so that they face low blocks more often. However, when facing a high press, they demonstrated some difficulties to play out efficiently.

Juventus would always use the same structure against any pressing system and shape. Whether the opponent is pressing with a front 3 or 2, or whether it is organised in a zonal or man-marking system, Juventus would always set up with a back 4 and deep full-backs. Deep means that they would typically be positioned in front of the first line of pressure rather than behind. In midfield, the deep-lying playmaker (generally Pjanic) would roam in front of the defence to support the player on the ball, trying to get into positions to receive the ball behind the first line of pressure. As Jorginho at Napoli and Chelsea under Sarri, Pjanic was expected to play a key role and be at the centre of all the attacks. The other 2 centre-midfielders would be operating in slightly higher positions, split either side of Pjanic to create a triangle shape to offer different lines of pass. The forwards position would then depend on the line-ups though. When lining up with a front 3, they would get into a classic high and wide positioning to occupy the width of the pitch, although Ronaldo likes to be slightly more inside the pitch. Similar with Dybala if he plays on the wing. Costa and Bernardeschi would be more like traditional wingers in very wide positions. When lining up with an attacking midfield and 2 centre-forwards though, there would be 2 options:

• Higuain would always stay in a more central position and very rarely go wide to the right channel. Ronaldo would still occupy the left side of the pitch
• Dybala would get into wider positions and free up the central channel for the attacking midfielder to push up and make a front 3. In a game against SPAL in September, Ronaldo, Ramsey and Dybala displayed a good performance in this set up

ISSUES

What are the main reasons why Juventus have sometimes been vulnerable against high pressing teams?

When playing with Higuain and Ronaldo up front, there was a serious lack of width. As just mentioned, Higuain would almost always stay in a central position, leading to a totally abandoned right wing, and therefore a more predictable play for the opponent. The fact that the full-backs are also both in deep positions means that no Juventus player was able to occupy the right wing in the early build up. The below heatmaps are an example of the different areas of the pitch that are mostly covered whether Dybala or Higuain is associated to Ronaldo.

The role of the forward players is also essential to buildup against a high press. Because the weakness of a team pressing is the depth behind its defensive line, it’s crucial that forward players represent a threat to force the defender to stay in a deep position, what is called pinning the defensive line. By holding them in a deeper position, they create space for their teammates in their own half to circulate the ball and progress up the pitch. Higuain would usually be good at holding a high position and not dropping deep to much. He would as a matter of fact be useful because of his quality at playing back to the the opposition’s goal, making him a good target to receive long passes on the ground. He could then hold up, or lay-off a midfielder to play forward in an up-back-through combination. Ronaldo and Dybala however, have a strong tendency to drop to receive in deeper positions. While it can in certain situation really help the team escaping the pressure, dropping deep can also allow a defender to step out of the defensive line to press, and reduce the threat of a pass behind the defensive line. This is especially observable when the opponent is man-marking. In some phases, we could even see Juventus with the whole 11 players in their own half, making it an 11v10 on half a pitch, which becomes very difficult to escape.

“I would like to see Pjanic touch 150 balls per game, but we have to train the ability of the other players to always give him the ball” ¹

Maurizio Sarri

As mentioned earlier, Pjanic was expected to hold a key role in Juventus’ attacking organisation. Maurizio Sarri himself explained his plan for him during a press conference following his appointment. In some games, this message sounded like an invitation for the opponent to focus on marking the Bosnian. Atalanta and Hellas Verona for example defended with an aggressive man-marking system against Juventus, restraining Pjanic to a minimal amount of passes received (see chart below).

Although it is certainly collective failure when a team’s playmaker can’t find himself on the ball as often as he should, Pjanic’s movements didn’t always seemed very efficient and he could have probably done better to get into receiving positions. His main issue was to constantly follow the ball and mirror its movements as well as often coming too close to the ball carrier. This sometimes created problems for himself and the team in general:

• It makes it easier for the defending players to press the ball: in this type of situation, a player would typically try to achieve 2 actions at the same time: pressing the ball and screening a passing line. If the players off the ball follow the movements of the ball, he will always be easier to screen by the defender, and will therefore have more issues to create a passing line
• It makes it easier for a player marking him to stay close: as mentioned before, more teams are now man-marking opponents in the opposition’s half to disrupt the build-up. Pjanic would obviously be a prime target. To lose a marker though, one needs to deceive him with his movements and/or take advantage of his inattention. When always following the ball’s movements, one already can’t deceive his marker since his movements are very predictable. By following the ball, one would also always remain in the defender’s eyesight who is then able to see both the ball and the player without having to scan around him.
• It gets him in non-ideal positions to receive the ball and prepare his next pass: as he follows the ball, Pjanic would then often be facing it. Meanings that when he receives the ball, he would face the side of the pitch where the ball was already in play, which is typically the most congested area since the opposition would try to close it down. It would then reduce his passing options and make it very difficult to switch the play or play forward. As a result, his options would often then be to bounce back to the original passer who might end up under high pressure, or play inside the traffic where it is easier for the opposition to close down spaces and win the ball.
• It attracts opponents towards the ball and puts even more pressure on the ball carrier: as Pjanic would very often move towards the ball carrier, sometimes way too close, he would also attract opposition’s player(s) with him. As a result, the area around the ball carrier would get even more congested, reducing the chances to play forward in good conditions and increasing the pressure.
• It can close other passing options: as mentioned before, Pjanic would never drop between and/or behind the centre-backs in the build-up. He would therefore always be in front of them. By following the ball and attracting more pressure with him, he can also in some situations close down the space in front of the ball carrier and actually other passing options that his teammates would have created. It is even more true when he is man-marked. Again, his movements would just make the defenders’ life easier by achieving 2 defensive actions by simply following him.

I have highlighted the forward players’ and Pjanic’s role in the build-up, and their responsibilities in the issues the team has sometimes faced. However, there could have been a collective solution that Juventus didn’t manage to really implement: positional rotations. When a forward player drops in midfield, it could be a good opportunity for a midfielder to swap position and attack the space vacated by this teammate. Even though Matuidi would sometimes make a run to exploit the space freed up by Ronaldo, it didn’t seem like the rest of the team could really notice this movement and interpret the triggers to play a longer pass. I’ve also already mentioned that no midfield player would ever join the back-line to change the shape of the team, and the full-backs would always play in deep positions, making the structure quite rigid and predictable for the opponent. In midfield, we could sometimes see a pattern where Pjanic would move up centrally to reverse the triangle with the 2 other midfielders, and become the tip of the shape. We could also start to see a pattern involving Pjanic, Rabiot and Dybala after the restart, where the Frenchman would drop into a space vacated by Pjanic, while Dybala would drop in midfield in Rabiot’s position. It worked well against Torino in July, although it was made easier by Torino’s poor pressing coordination. In the end, it often looked like Juventus’ players were moving with little collective purpose.

As a result of the disorganised movements from a collective point of view, Juventus were too rarely able to combine to escape the pressure. A classic pattern of play from Sarri from his days at Napoli was an up-back-through combination, starting from one of the centre-backs playing a long ground pass to an advanced player (typically Higuain or then Mertens) who could then lay-off one of the 3 midfielders facing the opposition’s goal to either play out wide in space, or carry into space himself. With the Juventus players being most of the time unable to manipulate the opponents by their movements, it was difficult, if not impossible, to execute this kind of combination. As explained about Pjanic’s movements and the forward players dropping deep too often, the central channel seemed so congested at times that no centre-back would have been able to play through that much traffic. Even when they were, it didn’t look like the midfielders were ready for it, and they would therefore not be in position to receive a lay-off.

Lastly, Szczesny seemed to have been underused in those phases, although his passing skills are decent. For a team aiming to attract the pressure with its possession, it is quite surprising to use the goalkeeper so few. As the only player on the pitch who is never marked, the keeper can be vital to create numerical superiority and beat a high press. Recently, Manchester City (vs Real Madrid) and PSG (vs Atalanta) have demonstrated how useful the goalkeeper could be to play out from the back, Ederson and Navas playing as a third centre-back to create overloads against the first line of pressure. The below chart show how little Szczesny have been used by his teammates compared to other teams across Europe (Top 4 of the 4 best leagues according to UEFA ratings).

Below are 2 clips to illustrate Juventus’ issues against high press, where the reasons explained above can be observed.

BREAKING UP A LOW BLOCK

When Juventus were not able to quickly break through their opponent from their build-up, they would very often then face a low block in which the whole team would be behind the ball to defend any entries in their box. These situations are regularly problematic or the teams in possession as it can be difficult to unlock the situation and score. In the meantime, it can be relatively easy to get sucked in the defensive structure and commit too many players, with the risk of conceding dangerous counter-attacks.

When the opponent holds a deep position, Juventus would typically always have one central forward, generally Higuain or Dybala. Ronaldo would have some freedom, roaming across the left wing and the centre, occasionally even drifting to the right wing. If they play with a right winger, he would occupy this side of the pitch. If they play with a central attacking midfield, he would either drift wide or stay central and try to find space between the lines. The 3 central midfielder typically keep their triangle shape with the deep-lying playmaker in a deeper position. One of the full-backs would generally also say at the back to maintain a back 3 with the 2 centre-backs, keeping a 3-1 shape with the deep-lying midfielder. Only once The full-back would typically get higher on the pitch once possession is progressing, but in a more central position, leaving the wide area to the winger or a central midfielder. The decision as to which full-back should drop into this position is driven by the position of the ball. If the left centre-back is on the ball, then the right full-back drops, and vice versa.

Generally speaking, to break down a low block, a team needs to:

• Stretch the opponent’s block to progress (through positioning and movements)
• Control the tempo of play
• Be patient to find a break to play in the box
• Be efficient at crossing in the box
• Have players able to beat opponents in 1v1 situations

Juventus are relatively effective in 1v1 situations in the attacking third, with the likes of Ronaldo, Dybala or Costa. As a matter of fact, individual brilliance rather than collective efforts have in many occasions unlocked situations.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

The main objective for a team defending deep is to protect the central channel, and therefore the access to its goal, by holding a very compact shape and force the opponent to play wide where it can be pressed with more chances of success. The challenge for the team in possession is then to get closer to the goal, either by finding space between the lines and progress towards the goal, or by crossing into the box to create chances. Either ways, the key is to manipulate the opponent to disorganise its block and penetrate its penalty area. In various recent analysis, it’s been observed at the top level that at least 80% of goals were scored from inside the penalty area, and that in 80% of the cases, the scorer takes fewer than 3 touches (example below with the World Cup 2018 stats)

Juventus had some difficulties to enter their opponents’ penalty area though. As a result, there one of the top teams in Europe with the highest ratio of shots from outside the box:

It is also one of the team with the lowest ratio of touches taken inside the opponent’s penalty area:

ISSUES TO PENETRATE INSIDE THE BOX

For this section, I will highlight some of the main issues faced by Juventus in different clips. All these clips are from different games, but the same issues can be observed, as they were in other games as well.

0:00 – Positioning & movements: It might not be necessary to have 5 players in front of the lone centre-forward to initiate this attack, knowing that he is very unlikely to press with intensity. Starting the phase with that many players in front of the first line of pressure just delays the team’s positional deployment in the other half. We can also note the lack of pressure on the back line. As Napoli’s defence is still reasonably high, Juventus could at least threat the back 4 with a long through ball in the depth, especially since De Ligt on the ball is not pressed and could have time to adjust an accurate pass

0:10 – Using the wide areas: No particular reasons for Cuadrado to switch the play here. He is under no pressure, and Juventus have no positional or numerical advantage they can exploit on the other wing. They are actually in a decent situation on the right wing, with both Dybala and Bentancur playing 1 on 1 with their marker, and Pjanic in a pocket of space between 3 players. Besides, Costa is now in Insigne’s blindside. Cuadrado could have therefore carry the ball into space to attract pressure, play a split pass for Costa between Zielinski and Insigne, initiate a 3rd man combination through Pjanic to then reach Costa or Bentancur,…

0:12 to 0:16 – Positioning: As the ball travels from Bonucci to Ronaldo, Matuidi moves into Callejon’s shadow, which makes him an unreachable passing option for the Portuguese.

0:17 – Using wide areas: Here again, we can wonder whether it is necessary to switch the play back to the right wing. Ronaldo, Sandro and Matuidi are potentially playing 3v3 against Maksimovic, Di Lorenzo and Callejon on the left wing, whereas in the centre Pjanic is isolated in the middle of 3 players. We can also note that Matuidi has dragged out Maksimovic out of the defenisve line, which creates a gap that Dybala could exploit.

0:22 – Movements: Ronaldo attempts the first run behind Napoli’s defensive line. However, Napoli are now too deep to really be able to exploit the depth. His run creates a pocket for Dybala though, but Cuadrado can’t play into him directly, and Bentancur’s body shape doesn’t allow him to lay him off for a 3rd man combination.

0:04 – Positioning: As against Napoli, there is no real threat on Milan’s defensive line. Players don’t necessarily need to be anchored on the same line as the defence. However, here, all Juventus players are in front of Milan’s midfield line, which facilitates their press as they don’t need to mind the space behind them. This can obviously be done purposely though, and the rest of the sequence shows how perhaps it was actually a move to prepare a cross.

0:06 to 0:14 – Tempo of play & attacking the box: This time, the switch seems to be a good decision as Costa is unmarked on the left wing, and it could have been a good crossing situation. An issue here is Juventus’ speed of ball circulation. It’s been 8 seconds between Dybala’s pass to Pjanic and Costa’s first touch on the wing, giving enough time to Milan’s block to shift across the pitch. Players in the penalty area are also too static. Switches of play to prepare a cross can be very efficient. As the ball travels to the other wing, the opponents are typically turning their bodies to follow the ball, placing some of the attacking team’s players in their blindside, and therefore in a good position to make runs into the box without being marked. In this sequence, Dybala and Bentancur are in ideal positions to make a timed run in the penalty area and attack a cross. However, as the switch is taking too long to be completed, they are already too close to the goal when Costa can finally cross.

0:10 to 0:14 – Positioning & movements: Rabiot makes a good forward run as Bonucci progresses up the pitch to open space for him. However, he remains in Tousart’s shadow and allows the Lyon player to step up and press Bonucci while screening the passing line towards Rabiot.

0:16 to 0:31 – Movements & speed of play: This sequence again highlights the absence of runs behind the defensive line. This type of runs can be used as a passing options or a dummy to open space for a teammate. By not making any of these runs, Juventus make the play predictable to the opponent and miss chances to open space between the lines. At 0:25, we can also see the 4 central players all following the ball and facing the opposite touchline. As I mentioned for Pjanic, it dramatically reduces their vision of the pitch, and should they receive the ball, they would most likely only be able to play towards the same direction as where the ball was already travelling to. Alex Sandro decision to try an impossible pass to Ronaldo through 5 players is obviously very questionable.

0:42 – Movements: A good run forward from Ronaldo to open space for Bentancur. A movement that would have been very useful in more occasions.

0:49 to 0:53 – Movements: Dybala is getting sucked into Cuadrado’s space by the ball. At 0:46, the diamond shape they were in was probably good to circulate the ball and escape the pressure. However, Dybala closes down all space by coming too close and reducing the angle with both Cuadrado and Bentancur.

CONCLUSION

It’s fair to say that Maurizio Sarri’s footprint on Juventus’ attacking play was hardly visible this season, and some of the critics he received at Chelsea were heard again: mainly, a slow-paced and predictable possession.

The quality of the squad was also questioned, as some players didn’t seem to either be able to play this type of football and/or were not at the level expected from them. There can be endless discussions as to whether the players or the coach were at fault here. In reality, it’s probably a mix of Sarri and his staff being unable to truly convince the players with their playing style, an the squad not being totally adapted to the coach’s demands. Sarri could have perhaps had saved his head by adjusting to the players at his disposal, and wait the next transfers window to get the personnel he wanted, but he can’t be blamed for sticking to his philosophy.

A critic we can make though is his tactical rigidity and the impression given that he was never able to anticipate, or answer, in-game tactical problems.

In a second part, I’ll discuss the defensive organisation, and why Juventus have conceded a (negative) record 43 goals in Serie A.

¹ https://www.gazzetta.it/Calcio/Serie-A/Juventus/21-06-2019/sarri-quei-150-palloni-pjanic-cosi-bosniaco-nuovo-sole-juve-340254245240.shtml

Although as coaches we (should) always consider progressions into our session plans, are we always thinking these through as much as we should? Could we use a systematic approach to make sure we are meeting the players’ needs?

The importance of differentiating between difficulty and complexity

When coaches discuss progressions in their training sessions, they often think of it as “how can we make this game more difficult for the players?”, but rarely “how can we make this game more complex?”. What might seem like a simple semantic question is actually essential to get what we really want out of a session.

Simply put, difficulty is the amount of effort the players must use to compete in a game while complexity is the level of thinking required from them ¹. It is therefore clear that the stimulation is different whether a task is difficult or complex.

As a tool for mathematics teachers, John Hattie suggests a difficulty and complexity matrix ² that can help teachers to assigned appropriate learning tasks to their students. It is a simple coordinate graph, with the horizontal axis representing the level of difficulty, and the vertical axis the level of complexity.

The matrix identifies four main relationships between difficulty and complexity. A fluency task will be learnt and then executed automatically, therefore being quite easy (low difficulty) and simple (low complexity). A stamina task can be viewed as a problem requiring to complete an addition of fluency tasks, hence increasing the amount of effort needed, and therefore the level of difficulty, while remaining simple. It can also be determined by the number of people able to solve the problem i.e. if only a few people are to solve this equation, it can be deemed as difficult. Strategic thinking intervenes in the context of a contextual problem i.e. a problem-solving situation that can be solved by using the appropriate knowledge. Finally, the expertise level requires the student to use his knowledge in a new way to come with an unique and personal answer.

Although the above examples are based on mathematics, we can try to apply this matrix to football.

To begin, we can differentiate the execution process in the lower half of the matrix, from the decision process in the upper half. The difference between the two is the cognitive load required to perform a task. Executing even a very difficult technical movement doesn’t necessarily requires a high level of thinking.

We can then split the matrix in four quadrants as per John Hattie’s.

The bottom-left will be the initial stage where a player learns a new technique, with very low to no cognitive stimuli, to focus exclusively on the execution. The player can then progress on the difficulty scale towards the mastery of the technique. Obviously, not all players will be able to reach mastery, and some will peak before this stage.

Problem-solving will be the point where high complexity and low difficulty meet. This is the part where players are in situations testing their understanding of the game. The amount of effort required to succeed is low, but the level of thinking is very high. Finally, when complexity and difficulty meet, the player will need to be creative to solve the problems he’s facing. Creativity here is used in its broader sense, not only limited to creativity on the ball. A defensive action can be creative as well in the sense that a player or group of player can make original decisions to react to a situation.

Let’s take a few examples to illustrate and understand better each of these stages.

When planning games for a session, it’s essential to know what we want to focus on primarily. With young players, or players new to football, we might want to improve the execution more than the decision making in a first place. Training sessions should then follow in priority an horizontal progression on our matrix, to help the players reaching technical mastery. This obviously doesn’t mean that complexity in games should be completely removed. For example, a group of Under 10 should, of course, play small-sided games at training. However, inside the game, the coach might ask the players to use only their other foot (or weaker foot), making it more difficult but maintaining the complexity level.

With older age groups, however, the sessions should become more decision-making orientated since players should already be comfortable with difficult tasks. To use the previous example, there would be little benefice asking a professional player to use only his weaker foot during a game. The coach should instead challenge the players with cognitive tasks. For example, in a game, asking the team in possession to constantly create numerical superiority around the ball to progress on the pitch would be complex.

Using the matrix in a constraint-led approach

Football coaches should be, consciously or not, familiar with the constraint-led approach. I will not go into too much details here because it is a topic of discussion of its own, and there are more qualified people who have already written very instructive articles about it ³. In summary, a constraint-led approach is the manipulation of certain elements of the game to guide the players towards specific learning outcomes. A constraint in this context is not necessarily a restriction, it can and should also take the form of an incentive. As an example, instead of only allowing a goal to be scored after 5 passes are made within the team, the coach can give an additional point if the team scores after making at least 5 passes. Although the outcome sought by the coach remains the same, the way the players will get there is different.

Using the matrix we just discussed, we are going to see how we can come with a system to help us setting up the relevant constraints in our games.

Constraints can be classified in 3 categories depending on the element they affect:

1. Player – These are specific to the individual. Typically, the genetic attributes, the emotional state, the behaviour, the ability to learn… These can’t hardly be manipulated by the coach but must be taken into consideration.
2. Environment – It is the general surrounding of the learning place. It includes elements like the weather, the playing surface, the training time/day… but it also includes the socio-cultural aspect such as the personal situation, the culture of the player, the culture of the club… Some of these can be manipulated by the coach, some can’t be.
3. Task – These are the rules of a game, the dimensions/shape of the playing area, the equipment used, the scoring system… All of them can be manipulated by the coach to affect the player-environment interaction.

Each time we manipulate one or more elements of these categories, we affect the way the player is going to act and learn. Some constraints might impact more the execution process, some the decision process. Coaches therefore need to be conscious of which process they want to impact more in a specific game, and use the appropriate constraints to reach this objective. To help us setting the right constraints in a game, I have tried to come with a system to monitor the level of difficulty and complexity we are proposing to the players.

To begin with, I have tried to classify a list of constraints into different categories depending on whether they would affect the difficulty or the complexity of a game. These are my personal views, and other coaches might have different perceptions. This is only a suggested framework which might need to be personalised.

Difficulty constraints:

• Numerical balance: whether there are any neutral players in a game, or whether one team has a numerical advantage over the other team. Having an overload in possession will obviously be easier than playing with even numbers or an underload.
• Playing area: the area can be adjusted to be either bigger or smaller. The appreciation will depend on the number of players involved in the game. For example, a 40×30 yards pitch to play a 5v5 game will be considered as normal since it is the standard size for this format. If you were to play the same game on a 30×20 yards pitch, the playing area would be considered small. In possession, the smallest the area, the more difficult it is to execute a task. And it is the opposite out of possession.
• Number of touches: the touches on the ball can be unlimited, conditioned or limited. Unlimited or limited constraints will apply to the whole playing area without conditions or players’ distinctions. Conditioned constraints might apply to specific zones of the playing area, or certain situations only (first touch finish, unlimited in defensive third but ‘x’ touches in attacking third…). Limited touches will typically be more difficult as it would usually be a 1 or 2 touches game.
• Physical stimuli: some constraints can affect the physical demand of a game. For example, allowing players to use their other foot only, or as Tuchel made it popular, asking defensive players to hold a tennis ball in each hand while training set pieces, to prevent them from grabbing their opponent’s shirt.
• Environmental stimuli: these constraints can either be manipulated or they are forced. If it’s raining heavily on the day of a session, we know it’s going to be more difficult for the players as the rain will have an affect on the condition of the pitch, the players’ comfort,… Although we can’t control these constraints, we should take them into account as they will impact the difficulty of the session. Some environmental constraints we can control would be for example to be a bias referee in a game, not using bibs to differentiate teams…

Complexity constraints:

• Type of game: games can be constant, variable or random, from the least to the most complex. In a constant game, a same skill is repeated in the same condition. In a variable game, a same skill is repeated in different situations. In a random game, different skills are performed in unpredictable situations.
• Freedom of movement: players’ movements across the playing area might be constrained. They can be locked inside a specific area, or conditioned to travel from one area to another, or finally they can be totally free. The more freedom the players have, the more complex it will be, since it will increase the number of decisions they have to make.
• Scale of the team: a game can focus on different part of the team. The simplest one will be at the individual level. More complex, it will focus on a group of players (3 or 4) or a unit (defence, midfield or forwards). Finally, the most complex will be units or at the whole team level. Systems, positions and lines require more thinking from the players as there will face a wider range of situations and will need to make decisions based on more factors at the same time (self, team mates, opponents, space, the ball).
• Topic of the game: sessions should be built around the principles of play, and these can either be macro principles, sub-principles, or sub-subprinciples. The macro level is the most complex as it also includes all the micro principles. For example, if the topic of a game is the macro attacking principle of progressing through the thirds, it will be a complex task for the players because they will have a number of problems to solve and therefore a lot of decisions to make: how to keep possession, when to play forward, what type of passes to make… However, if we were to break down this principle into smaller pieces and focus only on one sub-subprinciple such as creating width and depth for example, the players’ decision making process would mainly be concentrated on this topic, reducing considerably the number of problems to solve.
• Cognitive stimuli: it is possible to add some extra stimuli in a game to increase its cognitive load. The shape of the playing area can be modified (circle, hexagon, triangle…), the number, size and/or positioning of the goals can vary…

I have then summarised the categories and related constraints into the below tables. Although the complexity constraints’ categorisation won’t differ depending on the moment of the game we train, the difficulty one will need to be adapted. The below will apply to the possession and attacking transition phases. However, the numerical balance, number of touches and playing area will need to be inverted for the defensive transition and out of possession phases.

When designing a game, we can use these tables to measure its levels of difficulty and complexity to ensure it is in phase with the outcome we are targeting. Simple/easy constraints will be rated 1, medium 2 and difficult/complex 3. We can then rate each component of the game and come with difficulty and complexity average ratings.

Practical examples

Let’s see how a training program could be built, and how we could use the difficulty and complexity matrix to help us planning and monitoring our sessions.

Inspired by the tactical periodization methodology ⁴, I would base my training program upon my game model. Each session would be built around the acquisition of a principle of play. The first session would be of a low difficulty to help the players understanding the principle first. During a session though, the complexity level needs to constantly increase. Over the course of a season, the players will have multiple sessions on a same principle, but the difficulty will increase as their understanding of the principle improve.

As an example, if one of my attacking principle is, as mentioned previously, progressing through the thirds, I might start training one of its sub-subprinciple which could be third-man combinations. Here are 3 games we could do in a session, with a constant complex progression while maintaining a low difficulty level.

Using the matrix, the game seems to be fairly easy and simple:

The next game would then increase the complexity:

The players are now allowed to move across the pitch under certain conditions, making the game more complex. To make it more realistic and allow the players to make their own decisions, we add an incentive rather than a restriction (3 points for a goal after a third man combination). This is also the occasion for the coach to check the understanding of the players.

Finally, we would put the players into a small-sided game, increasing the complexity to its highest level, but still maintaining the difficulty level as low as possible to allow the players to focus on their understanding of the principle and their decision-making.

Players now have positions and roles in the game, as well as total freedom to move on the pitch.

Depending on the players’ acquisition of the principle, we would then train the same topic again later in the season, increasing again the difficulty of the sessions as well to develop the players’ ability to apply the principle in more difficult situations. As an example, we could use the same small-sided game but increase its difficulty:

This game is more difficult as the 2 neutral players have been removed, and it is now 7v7 instead of 6v6 in the same area. We have also added some conditions to the touches allowed.

In the last progression, we’ll remove all neutral and supporting players, playing a 9v9 in the same area as previously, with only 2 touches allowed per player.

Takeaways

In a recent interview ⁵, Borussia Monchengladbach’s assistant coach Rene Maric stated that “Sometimes, a player realises he needs to be four metres to the left to close a gap and by that simple act, he solves a problem for his team and creates a new one for the opposition. There are infinite decisions made in a game of football. It’s impossible for the coach to make this decisions for the players. We can give them a guideline or a “solution space” through principles, they have to perceive, decide and execute on the pitch.“

As coaches, we must make sure we are developing the players’ cognitive ability as much as we develop their technical, tactical and physical skills. Training sessions should therefore be planned and designed to achieve this objective, giving the players some guiding principles but encouraging them to solve problems on their own. Unconsciously though, we might be sometimes focusing too much on the player’s execution in training sessions, and not enough on the thinking process behind a movement. Making a clear distinction between decision and execution tasks might therefore be helpful. Coaches might have different views on this topic though, and this method is an example only. It might not work for everyone, or might need some alterations, but more importantly this might help some coaches to reflect on and improve their training methodology.

References:

1 David A. Sousa (2011) - How the brain learns
2 John Hattie (2008) - Visible Learning for Mathematics
3 https://medium.com/my-fastest-mile/constraints-player-development-in-football-748bdbb97441 and https://drowningintheshallow.wordpress.com/2016/03/14/what-is-a-constraints-led-approach/
4 X. Tamarit - What is tactical periodization? / J-L Delgado-Bordonau & A. Mendez-Villanueva - Tactical periodization, a new soccer training approach / J. Guilherme Oliveira - Tactical periodization, Theory & Fundamentals
5 https://theathletic.co.uk/1669125/2020/03/16/rene-maric-borussia-monchengladbach/

6th in La Liga with 12 draws in 27 games, Atletico stand 13 points behind the leader Barcelona. They also had a chaotic start in the Champions League, losing twice in the group stage, against Juventus and Bayer Leverkusen. On their side, Liverpool had a dream season in the Premier League, unbeaten until a trip to Watford at the end of February, few days after the first leg in Madrid. In the Champions League, they had lost their opening game against Napoli but still finished top of their group.

Unsurprisingly, Atletico didn’t approach these games with the ambition to fight over the possession of the the ball, averaging 28.5% possession over both legs. In terms of expected goals, Liverpool accumulated 3.3 xG against 1.7 for the Spaniards. However, the first leg saw Liverpool finishing the game with only 0.5 xG, showing a clear difference between both games. We will therefore look at how Atletico controlled the first leg, and then focus on Liverpool’s tactical adjustments in the second leg.

Atletico’s plan in the first leg

Deep and compact defensive block

Atletico would defend in a traditional, yet very compact, 4-4-2 shape.

Defending in a deep block was certainly Atletico’s plan, and their early goal in the 4th minute must have reinforced this idea. One of Liverpool’s main strength is the pace of their wingers, Salah and Mane, and their ability to make runs behind the defense to receive into space. With a deep block on the edge of the 18 yard box, Atletico already reduced significantly the risk of being caught behind their back. However, they were not the first team to try this approach against Liverpool, but not many managed to concede so little chances and get a win like they did.

Forcing wide play and setting up traps

With their very compact defensive shape, Atletico prevented any chances of playing through or inside their block, therefore forcing Liverpool to use the wide areas to go around it. In theory, this should not really disturb Liverpool’s game plan as they naturally use the wings in their attacking build up. This season, Arnold and Robertson are 2 of the 3 players with the most passes in the team, averaging respectively 91 and 76 passes per 90 minutes. Both play a very important role positionally too, as they often take high and wide positions to stretch the opposition’s defensive line, opening spaces in the channels for the wingers of the wide centre midfielders.

To prevent being manipulated by Liverpool in the wide areas to open space, centrally, Atletico relied mainly on 2 principles: aggressive press on the ball and pressing traps in wide areas.

It’s important not to confuse deep and passive defending. The defensive height of a block only determines how far from its goal a team is willing to start pressing the opposition. However, it doesn’t mean that a team defending deep is simply sitting there waiting for the ball. The risk by being too passive is to be played around too easily, which can lead to dangerous crosses or cut backs for example, or giving wide players too much space to run at pace with the ball and increase their chances to win 1v1 situations against defenders.

To force Liverpool to play wide, the centre forwards were crucial as first line of defense to break the relationship between the back line and the centre midfielders. Because of their front 2, Liverpool would typically build up with a back 3 to maintain numerical advantage. Correa and Morata then mainly had 2 situations to deal with: either Fabihno dropping between Van Dijk and Gomez, or one of Henderson or Wijnaldum dropping respectively on the right or the left.

By blocking passes in the central channel, the rest of the team could adjust its positioning and anticipate wide passes to trigger their pressing. In few situations, the centre forwards failed to block a pass into the central channel, in which case the centre midfielders, Thomas and Saul, were responsible for closing down the receiver and block him from playing between the lines.

Liverpool would typically try to build up short from the back. Atletico would not typically press the first pass. Instead, they would try to invite a further pass to a higher player on the touchline. From there, the fullback and the wide midfielder would team up to press the ball. Because the central midfielders would block any pass towards the central channel, the receiving player would generally have 2 choices: take a touch forward to try to dribble down the line, or pass the ball back. In the first scenario, Atletico would create a 2v1 situation in which they would almost always win the ball. In the second scenario, the wide midfielder would initiate a collective press on the back pass, allowing the block to step up and forcing either a further back pass, or a forward pass in the central channel where they had the density and the numerical advantage to regain possession. The intensity of the press would be maximal, with the ball carrier being hounded until he releases the ball.

Atletico were mainly able to press as quick as they did because their wide midfielders were never pinned into their starting position, allowing them to press without having a difficult decision, and because of a recurring defensive overload in favor of the Spaniards.

An option for Liverpool would have been to overload the wide areas to have more chances to disorganize Atletico’s shape, and create spaces to penetrate.

Defensive balance to prevent switches

When they face a deep defensive block, one of Liverpool’s response is to proceed with quick switches of play to use the space available on the ball-far side. With Van Dijk’s long passing quality and the pace of their pairs on the wings (Robertson/Mane and Arnold/Salah), they can move the ball quickly enough to unbalance the opposition’s defensive organisation.

Typically, teams are vulnerable to switches of play because they try to be very compact on the near-ball side, and to overload the team in possession, but they fail to restrain the ball in this strong zone. In most cases, the team in possession will try to play back to a player in support if the pressure is too intense. When this player has then more time and space on the ball, he might have the opportunity to switch the play.

Atletico’s response to that was to always have the ball-far wide midfielder covering the width rather than tucking in to support his central midfielder and half the pitch, as we would often see.

Atletico’s positioning had 2 possible effects on Liverpool:

Firstly, it dissuaded the ball carrier to switch the play as the wide midfielder would often be in a position to intercept a long ball (Saul in the above picture) and would the have space to initiate a counter-attack.

Secondly, even if the wide midfielder was not really in a position to intercept a long pass, his positioning would give him quick access to press the receiver (Lemar in the second picture). He would then need to react to simple triggers to anticipate a pass: the ball carrier’s body position, and the level of pressure on the ball.

Both of these are essential to avoid being exposed to switch of plays, and the result was that Liverpool were either reluctant to do so, keeping possession in an area where Atletico were dominant, or passing the ball backwards in which case Atletico would press as mentioned previously. When Liverpool chose to switch anyway, Atletico were able to close down the receiver quick enough to not concede any space and were therefore rarely exposed.

10 days after this game, Watford used a similar defensive approach in a Premier League game they won 3-0, for Liverpool’s first league loss this season.

Cautious possession

Atletico seemed to have a clear plan in possession, with one key idea in mind: do not give Liverpool any opportunity to counter. We could observe that intent from the first minutes, on the corner kick leading to their goal in the 4th minute.

In the same way they tried to minimize the Reds’ strengths in possession, Atletico were well conscious of the threat when they were themselves in possession. Liverpool thrive in situations when they can counter-attack, using the pace of Mane and Salah to exploit spaces. They are also well known for their counter-pressing in the seconds after losing the ball.

Atletico therefore based their attacking transitions and possession phases on 2 principles: first, secure possession, then attack the depth behind the defensive line.

Despite their deep defensive line, Atletico were rather patient when they would regain possession, even though we could think that the plan would be to proceed with quick counter-attacks like many teams would do in this set up. However, Atletico might lack of some pace to really be efficient on counters from a deep block, whereas their 4 midfielders are good technicians and are able to keep the ball even against an aggressive pressing.

To secure possession, they could then rely on their individual technique, but also on their defensive compactness, which allow them to always have support in the area where the ball was won to make a first safe pass away from the pressure.

Once they had managed to play out of the counter-pressing zone, they would intend to take advantage of Liverpool’s high defensive line, and exploit the space behind their back 4. We can then identify 2 main situations.

The first one is when they were attacking down one wing. The opposite side’s wide midfielder would be tucking into the central channel, either in a central midfield position if Thomas and Saul drifted wide to support on the ball side, or in a centre forward position alongside Morata and Correa to form a narrow front 3 if the centre midfield area was occupied. Maintaining cover in the centre midfield was essential to prevent counter-attacks from Liverpool, and was therefore the priority. Only once the positional cover was in place the wide midfielders would join the attacking line, often creating a 3v3 against Liverpool’s back line.

The second main attacking situation would be when Atletico could initiate their attack from a central position. Koke would typically again be the third centre forward, but the fullbacks would also push up to stretch Liverpool’s block and be available to attack the depth. Lodi would play an important role in Atletico’s possession phase, finishing the match with the highest number of touches in his team.

In both situations, Atletico’s priority seems to have been to play forward passes in areas which would not represent a threat should they lose the ball. Therefore, most of their forward passes in the final third would be through balls over the defensive line, or passes to their widest player. In some occasions, when they had to play from a deeper positions, they would also try to use Morata’s height and play long balls for a deviation. They would follow the same principle on set pieces, with most of their indirect free kicks being played over Liverpool’s block. As a result, Atletico ended up with 5 offsides against them, and only 1 against Liverpool.

Liverpool’s adjustment in the second leg

In the second leg at Anfield, it’s fair to say that Liverpool created more chances to score, tallying 2.8 xG and scoring 2 goals in 120 minutes. Although it wasn’t enough to beat a very effective Atletico side, it evidenced that Klopp and his staff made relevant changes after struggling offensively in Madrid.

There were 2 changes in the Liverpool starting eleven from the fist leg: Adrian in goal in place of the injured Alisson, and Henderson sliding into the central midfielder position, Oxlade-Chamberlain replacing him as the right centre midfield, and Fabinho starting as a sub. Both new starters had a direct impact on the game, with mixed success. We will focus on the midfielder’s contribution and how Liverpool’s right side was adjusted in this leg.

Oxlade-Chamberlain’s direct impact

As a versatile player alternating between central and wide positions, Oxlade-Chamberlain offers different options than Henderson in this right centre midfield position. Naturally more attracted by the wing than the Liverpool captain, and more willing to make forward runs behind the defensive line, he solved some of the problems the English side had in the first leg.

As discussed previously, one of the key in Atletico’s pressing success was that they could direct Liverpool in areas of the pitch where they wanted to be, and they had numerical advantages to press the ball without conceding space. With Oxlade-Chamberlain, Liverpool now had a player who could drift wide and dribble down the wing with pace, and who was eager to attack the space in the centre-back/fullback channel when in a more central position. On the left side, Wijnaldum would also make this type of runs in the first leg. However, Atletico could contain him because Liverpool could not use the spaces these runs open, which they did better in the 2nd leg.

The forward runs in the CB/FB channel are more difficult to defend because they create a confusion as to who should mark the runner between the central midfielder, the fullback and the centre-back.

How did Arnold and Salah adjust?

At Anfield, Liverpool could find Salah more often, the Egyptian finishing the game 111 touches against 36 in Madrid. Although he only played 72 minutes in the first leg and 120 in the second one, his ratio touch per minute more than doubled, from 0.40 to 0.93. His passing also improved, from 70% to 84% completed passes, despite increasing his forward pass ratio from 33% to 59%.

Arnold also got more involved and had more impact on the game. He delivered 7 key passes against 2 in the first game, and his crossing accuracy increased from 13% for 16 crosses to 20% for 25.

With Oxlade-Chamberlain, they would in most situations build a triangle to occupy and secure 3 key zones:

1. The CB/FB channel, to pin the wide midfielder and prevent him from stepping out quickly to press on a pass, and to attack the space behind the defensive line to either receive in depth, or create space for a teammate between the defense and midfield lines
2. The width, to stretch the defensive block and either exploit space around it, or create space inside it to penetrate
3. The depth, to either attract pressure and open space between and/or behind the lines, or, if not pressed, being able to drive into space, or cross from a deep position

In zone 1, we would usually see Oxlade-Chamberlain, in zone 2 Salah, and in zone 3 Arnold. However, the shape was flexible, and players would rotate as they see fit (Cf. above picture). The first goal was a great example of this build-up.

Liverpool created more chances in second half through similar movements, although they were not able to score to avoid a fatal extra-time.

Conclusion

Atletico controlled the first leg, with an impressive defensive organization to which Liverpool couldn’t adjust in-game to score a precious away goal. The Spaniards were also the most dangerous team offensively, making very good use of their 28% possession to create goal scoring situations. Simeone’s plan to protect his team against Liverpool’s strengths was well thought, and his defensive principles are clearly very well integrated by his players.

3 weeks later in Liverpool though, the same game plan didn’t deliver the same outcome, and Atletico conceded much more chances. However, the English side wasted too many opportunities, whereas the Spaniards were incredibly efficient with a 30% conversion rate. Klopp’s tactical changes seemed to be relevant though, and his team didn’t look as helpless in the final third as they did in Madrid. Ultimately, individual performances decided of the result.

After the elimination, Klopp regretted Atletico’s very defensive approach despite the quality of the players they’ve got. From a purely strategic and tactical perspective though, Atletico’s performance was remarkable. Many teams have tried this approach against Liverpool this season, but not many have got a result out of it.

Even though they conceded 3 goals at home, the first leg in Madrid seems like the real failure. From a tactical point of view, Klopp and his staff didn’t react to adapt to Atletico’s game plan. Maybe they were satisfied with a 1-0 loss away, and thought that they would make the difference in the second leg. However, the home game showed that they had the resources to be more dangerous in the final third, and that they could have made some adjustments to get an away goal. From a players’ performance point of view, some key players didn’t seem at their best level, and the goal Atletico scored could have definitely been avoided. Defending 11v4 on a corner, it’s hard to imagine Liverpool conceding a goal.

Session’s objectives

• Encourage a team to press high and regain possession early
• Develop confidence and bravery out of possession
• Demonstrate the importance of playing at high intensity
• Encourage team work

Coaching points

On the ball:

• Identify and react to pressing triggers
• When pressing, runs MUST be at 100% pace
• Body shape to show the player wide

Around the ball:

• Mark players directly around the ball carrier to block short passes

Away from the ball:

• Get closer to the your teammates to restrict space
• Anticipate long balls/switch of play

Practice 1: Possession game

Organisation:

Pitch size depending on numbers and abilities. Increase the size if players find it too easy.

4v4+4 – 2 target players outside the pitch at opposite ends and 2 jokers in the middle playing with the team in possession. Target players can be pressed.

Rules:

Team in possession try to pass the ball from one target player to the other without being intercepted.

Team in possession can use both jokers.

All passes must be on the ground.

Target players can’t pass the ball to each other.

Scoring system:

In possession: 1 point for linking up both target players in a same possession phase.

Out of possession: 1 point for winning possession and passing the ball to a target player before the other team can either make 3 passes or link up the target players.

Coaching points:

• When to press? On any of the pressing triggers (soft pass, back-pass, poor first touch…), on the time of the pass to be as close as possible to the receiver on his first touch
• How to press? At full pace, slow down just before the receiver’s first touch, body shape to force the player into one direction
• How to support? Quick support, anticipate next pass based on teammate’s body shape, compress the area around the ball to block short passes

Practice 2: 5v5 directional game

Organisation:

A pitch 40x30m split in 2 halves

5v5+2

Rules:

Directional game – Team in possession scores by passing the ball to the target player defended by the other team (here, reds attack from left to right).

Team in possession can only score by passing from inside the target player’s half.

Target players can be pressed and tackled.

No offsides but all passes must be on the ground.

Scoring system:

Team in possession:

1 point for a pass to the target player

Team out of possession:

1 point for winning the ball in the target player’s feet

2 points for winning the ball in the other team’s half and completing a pass to their target player or making 3 passes

Coaching points:

• Know when to press – Identify pressing triggers. If the situation doesn’t allow press, hold positions to prevent forward play
• Press at pace – High intensity to close the receiver down as quickly as possible
• Force wide play – Body shape to force the opponent wide, curved runs to block central passes
• Quick support – React quickly to teammates movements to overload the area around the ball and restrict space to the ball carrier
• Balance – Player on the weak side tuck in to maintain compactness

Situations to coach:

Here are a few situations likely to happen during the game, which can give the opportunity for the coach to intervene and reinforce the coaching points.

• Ball in target player’s feet

#9: Do not press the target player unless you have close support to block short passes options. It is too easy here for the target player to pass the player even under pressure. Instead, wait for him to make a decision, and press on the time of the pass.

• Pass to the centre-back

#9: Curve your run to prevent switch of play and force the CB to play wide

• Winger drops to support CB

#11: Quick support when the CB is forced to play wide, mark your man to prevent short pass

• Cover

#8: Cover your teammates, block the space between #10 and #11 to prevent through ball and overload the area

• Balance

#7: On the weak side, tuck in to maintain compactness and anticipate a long ball

The team should be able to create the below situation:

Practice 3: Phase of play

Organisation:

Half a pitch

One goal and 3 gates

5v6+GK

Rules:

Red Team defends the goal and score by dribbling through one of the 3 gates

Blue Team tries to win the ball and score

Every time the ball goes off the pitch, the play restarts from the GK with a goal kick

Scoring system:

Red Team

1 point for dribbling through an orange gate

3 points for dribbling through the red gate

1 point every 5 passes completed

Blue Team

1 point for a goal

3 points for scoring a goal after regaining possession before the Red Team has completed 5 passes

Coaching points:

• Triggers – Identify the triggers and react quickly
• Force wide play – Isolate the ball carrier to restrict his options with the ball
• Compactness – The whole team must press together to remain compact and prevent play through the central channel
• Intensity and aggression – When the pressing is engaged, players around the ball must press at full pace and challenge the opponents with aggression