Few weeks ago, we looked at the first changes made by Maurizio Sarri since his appointment ( https://tacticandtechnique.com/a-first-assessment-of-sarris-juventus/ ), comparing his Juventus to Allegri’s one in all the phases of the game. After 10 games played this season, it’s now time for a second review.
Sarri is recognized as an attack-minded coach, and analysis often cover primarily his teams in the possession phase. However, the Italian tactician also has strong defending principles, and prone a zonal marking system that is not necessarily the most commonly used by other teams. In this analysis, we will then look at Juventus’ defensive organization in details, focusing mostly on the last 5 games played (from Brescia away to Bologna at home).
Line-up
With Douglas Costa’s injury, the lack of wingers in the squad forced Sarri to change the organisation. In the last 5 games, Juve lined up in a 4-3-1-2 shape, transitioning in a 4-2-2 organisation when out of possession.
Should Aaron Ramsey be fit, he would certainly take up the attacking midfield spot. Unfortunately, the Welshman has only been able to participate to 4 matches this season, for a total of 198 minutes.
The second centre-forward spot alongside Ronaldo is shared by Higuain and Dybala, both having played about the same number of minutes in those games.
With Ramsey out, it was mentioned that we could see a trio Dybala-Ronaldo-Higuain with the former playing as an attacking midfield behind the 2 centre-forwards, but it seems unlikely that Sarri would make this choice, as this could undermined the team’s defensive balance. Ramsey and Bernardeschi are both more suited to do the defensive work required in this position and within this system.
Analytical approach
To break down the organization, we can split the defensive phase into 3 moments:
- The pressing phase
- The restraining phase
- The blocking phase
Each phase depends on the position of the ball on the pitch, as schematized below:
In each phase, the team will adjust its organisation and behavior based on the objectives to achieve.
The pressing phase
Juventus adopt a high pressing line, starting roughly at the edge of the centre circle in the opposition’s end. In this area, they actively press the ball with 2 objectives in mind: prevent the other team to build-up from the back, and regain possession by either winning the ball in a high position, or forcing the other team to play a long ball under pressure, which would often results in a dead ball that the defense can easily win.
To prevent the other team to build-up from the back, Juventus opt for a man-marking coverage system, matching-up the opposition’s positioning in its own half.
This coverage system implies that the midfielders are often out of position, dragged out by the man they need to mark. The risk is to create an important gap between the defensive line and the midfield, opening up the chance for the opposition to receive the ball between the lines by playing over Juventus’ midfield.
Below is an example of the weak areas against an opposition building up in a 3-4-3 formation. The central area left empty by Pjanic is exposed in case the centre-forward drops and can receive the ball between the lines. On the wings, although Matuidi and Khedira have a quicker access to the wide areas by their positioning, they might be forced to defend facing their goal, which is not ideal and can be difficult in a 2v2 situation.
To mitigate this risk and make their high press successful, Juventus follow a few principles.
Forcing wide play
When pressing the defensive line, the centre-forwards make sure they block the relationship between the 2 centre-backs, forcing the ball to be played out to the fullbacks. In a first time, this allows the team to shift to one side of the pitch, reducing considerably the surface to cover and allowing to be more compact on the width. In a second time, Juventus actually set a trap once the ball is played to the fullback, by blocking a potential back-pass to the keeper or the centre-back. With the teammates close by man-marked, short options are difficult to find and the outcome will most of the time be either a long ball or even better, regaining possession in the fullback’s feet. A long ball is a good outcome for the pressing team, but as just discussed, it can be dangerous if it is played with accuracy.
Quick pressure on the ball
To force inaccurate long balls, Juventus need to apply quick pressure on the ball carrier to create urgency and provoke a clearance rather than a long pass. This requires from the midfielders to be attentive to the pressing triggers to anticipate when to close down the ball carrier. This also requires players being able to quickly shift positions to man-mark the closest opponent and shut down any short passing options. A last important skill for the pressing players is shadow marking, or screening. Given that the team in possession will always have a numerical advantage in the build-up, the defending team needs to be able to press a player while blocking a pass to another one to make it even. Below is an example of a pressing phase led by Ronaldo. When pressing the centre-back, he needs to keep the centre-midfield in his shadow to prevent a forward pass. Then, once the ball is played to the fullback, he screens the centre-back to block a back-pass and give himself a chance to press the fullback as well.
Hounding the forward players
This principle applies to the 4 players in the defensive line. To avoid dangerous forward passes behind the midfielders when the ball carrier couldn’t be pressed quick enough to force a long ball, it is crucial that the defenders follow any forward player who would drop to receive between the lines. Therefore, we can often see De Ligt or Bonucci following their man in the opposition’s half. When this happens, it’s important that the 3 other defenders slide to cover the position left empty to remain compact. This can obviously lead to dangerous situations if the defender is beaten and the opponent can turn. However, because the opponent had to drop in a deep position to receive the ball, he has a large distance to cover to reach the attacking third, which gives time to the other players to make recovery runs. A player who has to run with the ball will also be slowed down, giving extra-time to the team to recover.
Triggers
Although Juve are pressing high and aggressively, it doesn’t mean they are chasing the ball in a reckless way. They would typically press on all the usual triggers (soft pass, receiver facing his own goal, bouncing ball, inaccurate pass, pass to the keeper…). They also press any back-pass very aggressively, and of course, anytime they manage to trap a wide player as mentioned above, they would press him immediately. With a high pressing line though, it’s important that the defensive line, and particularly the centre-backs, remain focus and understand the dynamics of the game. When the opposition’s ball carrier is closed down quickly, it is harder for him to play an accurate and quick long pass. Therefore, it will often end up with a high but rather weak long ball, leading to a 1v1 aerial challenge. On the opposite, if the ball carrier is not pressed and has time on the ball, they should drop few metres to control the depth and anticipate a potential long ball in their back. It’s also crucial that the goalkeeper is able to get off his line to sweep long through balls behind his back line.
Some examples
Here are some clips of Juventus pressing phase. In the first one, we have identified the key moments. In the next videos though, there is no annotations to allow the readers to make their own analysis.
The restraining phase
When Juventus’ pressing is beaten and the opponent manage to enter the second third of the pitch, the team enters a new phase. While the primary objective when pressing is to disrupt the build-up and force mistakes to regain possession, in this phase, the priority is to restrain the other team to deny penetration into the attacking third.
To do so, there are many different defensive systems. Man-marking has become very rare nowadays, teams preferring instead to use zonal marking. However, within zonal marking, there are still many variations. The difference between the systems will be the main point of reference the defending team bases its movements and positioning on. Most teams currently would use the opponent as their reference, which means that a player would cover his zone and press any opponent in it. On his part, Maurizio Sarri prefers Juventus to direct its defensive organisation towards the ball. The idea is then to cover options rather than the opponents. It can be seen as an anticipation-based system since the players need at all time to consider where the ball could be played and to who, in order to position themselves in a way to prevent this to happen.
In this system, the players need to be very intelligent and able to understand the different situations quickly. Most of the time, the midfield players won’t be directly marking any opponent. Similar to what we mentioned while discussing the pressing phase, most of the marking will be done through screening opponent’s positions, and a player might often be in a 1v2 situation in-between 2 opponents, where he needs to press the ball carrier while covering a passing option. Here is a good example of Matuidi moving with the ball to deny the ball carrier’s space to penetrate, while at the same time keeping the forward pass option in his shadow.
This video also highlights another important aspect of this coverage system: decision making. When a player is in the middle of 3 opponents for example, he needs to be able to assess which one is in the most dangerous position should he receive the ball, and therefore block this option in priority. In the clip, Matuidi has 2 men behind him, Weiser on the wing, and Havertz in a more central position. He rightly decides to cut the passing line to Havertz to force the play wide where it will be easier for the team to press.
From a collective point of view, the main benefit of an option-oriented system is the ability to cover the area around the ball with great compactness, which should in theory make it more difficult for the other team to penetrate through the defensive block. Indeed, in a man-oriented system for example, players are in some extent locked into a zone. Therefore, in some situations, the density around the ball can be lower than it should be. Besides, against teams with attacking players travelling between zones a lot, there is a high risk of being overloaded in certain area of the pitch. In Juventus’ system, it should be less likely to happen since players are instructed to mirror the ball. On the contrary, if the opposing team lacks support in possession, there are high chances to overload the area surrounding the ball carrier and winning the ball back.
An important principle in Juventus’ organisation is the distances between the players, both on the width and the depth. As just mentioned, the aim of the system is to oppose great compactness to the ball carrier, therefore, players need to maintain tight distances between each other. On the depth, the defensive line needs to be close to its midfield. It is the case for all teams when out of possession, however, it might be even more important in option-oriented zonal marking. Because the midfielders are not always marking a player, there might often be players between the defensive line and the midfield. Screening passing options can also be difficult at times, so there is a real risk when a penetrative pass through the midfield is played. In such case, the defenders need to be close enough to the midfielders to step up and press the receiving player.
This compactness associated to passing options’ screening also allows the midfielders to step up and press when the opposing team plays a back-pass. In general, the 2 centre-forwards’ role would be to block any back-pass. We already mentioned in the previous article that Juventus seemed to be defending with only 9 men behind the ball. In the following games, we saw that it was still the case, Juventus wanting to force the opposition to play wide and forward to increase the chances of regaining possession. However, opposing teams are still able in some occasions to play backwards when they are denied forward play. When this happens, it is usually the responsibility of the closest centre-midfield to push up and press, making sure that he presses in a way that allows him to screen a forward pass. His second objective is to force the play wide as always when Juventus press the ball carrier.
The above clip summarizes those defending principles:
- Compactness on the width
- Pjanic, Bernardeschi and Matuidi screening the Leverkusen players between the lines
- High defensive line to remain tight to midfielders
- On the back-pass, Bernardeschi steps up to press while keeping Alario in his shadow to prevent a forward pass
- Matuidi screens the pass to Havertz
- On the penetrative pass through Pjanic and Matuidi, De Ligt is able to step up and intercept the pass
On the last point, the back 4’s excellent body shape deserves to be highlighted. By being side-on like that, they are able to anticipate any pass, whether it is a through ball or a short pass to feet. In this video, De Ligt can react quickly enough to intercept the pass because of that.
Intercepting passes is another potential benefit of Juventus’ defensive system. Because players are screening passing lines rather than marking players, they have more chances to intercept passes, which can lead to quicker attacking transitions. Although statistically so far, Juventus isn’t among the top teams in terms of interceptions in Serie A or Champion’s League, it is one of the team with the lowest number of tackles per game ( https://www.whoscored.com/Regions/250/Tournaments/12/Seasons/7804/Stages/17993/TeamStatistics/Europe-UEFA-Champions-League-2019-2020 – https://www.whoscored.com/Regions/108/Tournaments/5/Seasons/7928/Stages/17835/TeamStatistics/Italy-Serie-A-2019-2020 ).
Lastly, the compactness in midfield means that Pjanic is always close to the ball even when the team is out of possession. Although he is not expected to be a great defending player, his proximity makes it easier for his teammates to find him after regaining possession, allowing him to initiate the next play, which is his greatest skill.
In terms of weaknesses, we can expect Juventus to be exposed to quick switch of play. Because of the compactness on the width, the ball-far side can at time be left with no coverage. Switch of play can then be difficult to defend, because of the distance to cover to access the opposite wing, which can lead to overload situations against the fullback.
To avoid this situation, there are 3 solutions. Firstly, the ball carrier needs to be pressed quickly to reduce his time on the ball, which will also reduce his ability to make (accurate) long passes. Secondly, the defense need to be attentive to the triggers as mentioned in the paragraph on the pressing phase. When the ball carrier isn’t pressed, the defensive line needs to drop, when he is pressed, the back 4 should hold the line and be ready to step up on a back-pass. Lastly, the ball-far centre-midfield can position himself slightly further out wide from his teammates to have quicker access to the wing in case of a switch.
Another downside is the risk linked to screening players. Against teams with very mobile players who can navigate between the lines and find space, it can become difficult to block the passing lines properly. Although the defenders should be able to step up to press as we saw previously with De Ligt, it also open gaps in the defense every time a player leaves his position. Quick combinations can then expose the defense to risky situations.
The blocking phase
Lastly, the blocking phase is the moment when the team must protect its 18-yards box. The priority here is to prevent shots and passes into the central channel. The first objective is, again, to force the play wide. The second objective is to increase the presence in the box in front of the goal to deny space for shots. At the moment, Juventus seems to have some issues at times to defend the box effectively, as seen against Bologna.
The goal conceded against Bologna is a great example of mistakes made when defending in the last third. On the wide pass, Alex Sandro is too far from his player to stop his run, which allows him to deliver a cross in the box. De Ligt, Bonucci and Cuadrado are defending against 5 Bologna players. Bernardeschi is still outside the box when the cross is made, while Pjanic and Rabiot are both marking the same player, who is not even in a dangerous position.
Against Inter already, some situations showed a lack of presence in the box.
In both situations, the fullbacks are not defending close enough to their opponent, giving them the chance to cross in the box. The midfielders should also interpret the triggers quicker, and drop in the box when the opposing team is in a position to deliver a cross. It might be something which will improve with the time as it is not an easy transition to make for the players. When playing in a man-oriented coverage system in the last seasons, the centre-midfielders were closer to the box even when the ball was in a wide area, thus needed less time to drop. In this system, they tend to be dragged further away from the box as they mirror the ball, increasing the distance to cover to drop.
Conclusion
Sarri is implementing a quite ambitious defensive system, based on anticipation rather reaction. In its first 10 games, Juventus have conceded 9 goals, despite having conceded the lowest number of shots per goal in Serie A, and one of the lowest in Champion’s League. Unsurprisingly, most goals have been conceded either on set pieces, or on counter-attacks. Therefore, it is likely that the main issue at the moment are the defensive transitions rather than the defensive organisation, even though as we mentioned, it seems that the team could do better in certain situations.
