Although Atletico are never an easy team to play, especially in knockout games, they haven’t had their best season so far, and Liverpool were seen as the favorite ahead of these 2 games.
6th in La Liga with 12 draws in 27 games, Atletico stand 13 points behind the leader Barcelona. They also had a chaotic start in the Champions League, losing twice in the group stage, against Juventus and Bayer Leverkusen. On their side, Liverpool had a dream season in the Premier League, unbeaten until a trip to Watford at the end of February, few days after the first leg in Madrid. In the Champions League, they had lost their opening game against Napoli but still finished top of their group.
Unsurprisingly, Atletico didn’t approach these games with the ambition to fight over the possession of the the ball, averaging 28.5% possession over both legs. In terms of expected goals, Liverpool accumulated 3.3 xG against 1.7 for the Spaniards. However, the first leg saw Liverpool finishing the game with only 0.5 xG, showing a clear difference between both games. We will therefore look at how Atletico controlled the first leg, and then focus on Liverpool’s tactical adjustments in the second leg.
Atletico’s plan in the first leg
Deep and compact defensive block
Atletico would defend in a traditional, yet very compact, 4-4-2 shape.
Defending in a deep block was certainly Atletico’s plan, and their early goal in the 4th minute must have reinforced this idea. One of Liverpool’s main strength is the pace of their wingers, Salah and Mane, and their ability to make runs behind the defense to receive into space. With a deep block on the edge of the 18 yard box, Atletico already reduced significantly the risk of being caught behind their back. However, they were not the first team to try this approach against Liverpool, but not many managed to concede so little chances and get a win like they did.
Forcing wide play and setting up traps
With their very compact defensive shape, Atletico prevented any chances of playing through or inside their block, therefore forcing Liverpool to use the wide areas to go around it. In theory, this should not really disturb Liverpool’s game plan as they naturally use the wings in their attacking build up. This season, Arnold and Robertson are 2 of the 3 players with the most passes in the team, averaging respectively 91 and 76 passes per 90 minutes. Both play a very important role positionally too, as they often take high and wide positions to stretch the opposition’s defensive line, opening spaces in the channels for the wingers of the wide centre midfielders.
To prevent being manipulated by Liverpool in the wide areas to open space, centrally, Atletico relied mainly on 2 principles: aggressive press on the ball and pressing traps in wide areas.
It’s important not to confuse deep and passive defending. The defensive height of a block only determines how far from its goal a team is willing to start pressing the opposition. However, it doesn’t mean that a team defending deep is simply sitting there waiting for the ball. The risk by being too passive is to be played around too easily, which can lead to dangerous crosses or cut backs for example, or giving wide players too much space to run at pace with the ball and increase their chances to win 1v1 situations against defenders.
To force Liverpool to play wide, the centre forwards were crucial as first line of defense to break the relationship between the back line and the centre midfielders. Because of their front 2, Liverpool would typically build up with a back 3 to maintain numerical advantage. Correa and Morata then mainly had 2 situations to deal with: either Fabihno dropping between Van Dijk and Gomez, or one of Henderson or Wijnaldum dropping respectively on the right or the left.
By blocking passes in the central channel, the rest of the team could adjust its positioning and anticipate wide passes to trigger their pressing. In few situations, the centre forwards failed to block a pass into the central channel, in which case the centre midfielders, Thomas and Saul, were responsible for closing down the receiver and block him from playing between the lines.
Liverpool would typically try to build up short from the back. Atletico would not typically press the first pass. Instead, they would try to invite a further pass to a higher player on the touchline. From there, the fullback and the wide midfielder would team up to press the ball. Because the central midfielders would block any pass towards the central channel, the receiving player would generally have 2 choices: take a touch forward to try to dribble down the line, or pass the ball back. In the first scenario, Atletico would create a 2v1 situation in which they would almost always win the ball. In the second scenario, the wide midfielder would initiate a collective press on the back pass, allowing the block to step up and forcing either a further back pass, or a forward pass in the central channel where they had the density and the numerical advantage to regain possession. The intensity of the press would be maximal, with the ball carrier being hounded until he releases the ball.
Atletico were mainly able to press as quick as they did because their wide midfielders were never pinned into their starting position, allowing them to press without having a difficult decision, and because of a recurring defensive overload in favor of the Spaniards.
An option for Liverpool would have been to overload the wide areas to have more chances to disorganize Atletico’s shape, and create spaces to penetrate.
With this positioning, Lemar is pinned by Firmino and Liverpool are in a 4v2 situation. Saul has to cover his zone because of Fabinho unless he gets closer support from Thomas. To defend in this situation, Atletico would need to shift across the pitch to even the numbers in the wide area, but exposing themselves to a switch of play.
Defensive balance to prevent switches
When they face a deep defensive block, one of Liverpool’s response is to proceed with quick switches of play to use the space available on the ball-far side. With Van Dijk’s long passing quality and the pace of their pairs on the wings (Robertson/Mane and Arnold/Salah), they can move the ball quickly enough to unbalance the opposition’s defensive organisation.
Typically, teams are vulnerable to switches of play because they try to be very compact on the near-ball side, and to overload the team in possession, but they fail to restrain the ball in this strong zone. In most cases, the team in possession will try to play back to a player in support if the pressure is too intense. When this player has then more time and space on the ball, he might have the opportunity to switch the play.
Atletico’s response to that was to always have the ball-far wide midfielder covering the width rather than tucking in to support his central midfielder and half the pitch, as we would often see.
Atletico’s positioning had 2 possible effects on Liverpool:
Firstly, it dissuaded the ball carrier to switch the play as the wide midfielder would often be in a position to intercept a long ball (Saul in the above picture) and would the have space to initiate a counter-attack.
Secondly, even if the wide midfielder was not really in a position to intercept a long pass, his positioning would give him quick access to press the receiver (Lemar in the second picture). He would then need to react to simple triggers to anticipate a pass: the ball carrier’s body position, and the level of pressure on the ball.
Both of these are essential to avoid being exposed to switch of plays, and the result was that Liverpool were either reluctant to do so, keeping possession in an area where Atletico were dominant, or passing the ball backwards in which case Atletico would press as mentioned previously. When Liverpool chose to switch anyway, Atletico were able to close down the receiver quick enough to not concede any space and were therefore rarely exposed.
10 days after this game, Watford used a similar defensive approach in a Premier League game they won 3-0, for Liverpool’s first league loss this season.
Cautious possession
Atletico seemed to have a clear plan in possession, with one key idea in mind: do not give Liverpool any opportunity to counter. We could observe that intent from the first minutes, on the corner kick leading to their goal in the 4th minute.
In the same way they tried to minimize the Reds’ strengths in possession, Atletico were well conscious of the threat when they were themselves in possession. Liverpool thrive in situations when they can counter-attack, using the pace of Mane and Salah to exploit spaces. They are also well known for their counter-pressing in the seconds after losing the ball.
Atletico therefore based their attacking transitions and possession phases on 2 principles: first, secure possession, then attack the depth behind the defensive line.
Despite their deep defensive line, Atletico were rather patient when they would regain possession, even though we could think that the plan would be to proceed with quick counter-attacks like many teams would do in this set up. However, Atletico might lack of some pace to really be efficient on counters from a deep block, whereas their 4 midfielders are good technicians and are able to keep the ball even against an aggressive pressing.
To secure possession, they could then rely on their individual technique, but also on their defensive compactness, which allow them to always have support in the area where the ball was won to make a first safe pass away from the pressure.
Once they had managed to play out of the counter-pressing zone, they would intend to take advantage of Liverpool’s high defensive line, and exploit the space behind their back 4. We can then identify 2 main situations.
The first one is when they were attacking down one wing. The opposite side’s wide midfielder would be tucking into the central channel, either in a central midfield position if Thomas and Saul drifted wide to support on the ball side, or in a centre forward position alongside Morata and Correa to form a narrow front 3 if the centre midfield area was occupied. Maintaining cover in the centre midfield was essential to prevent counter-attacks from Liverpool, and was therefore the priority. Only once the positional cover was in place the wide midfielders would join the attacking line, often creating a 3v3 against Liverpool’s back line.
The second main attacking situation would be when Atletico could initiate their attack from a central position. Koke would typically again be the third centre forward, but the fullbacks would also push up to stretch Liverpool’s block and be available to attack the depth. Lodi would play an important role in Atletico’s possession phase, finishing the match with the highest number of touches in his team.
Patience – they are not scared to play back from the edge of the box
Width – from the fullbacks
Pressure on the back line – 6v4 when Thomas makes his forward pass
In both situations, Atletico’s priority seems to have been to play forward passes in areas which would not represent a threat should they lose the ball. Therefore, most of their forward passes in the final third would be through balls over the defensive line, or passes to their widest player. In some occasions, when they had to play from a deeper positions, they would also try to use Morata’s height and play long balls for a deviation. They would follow the same principle on set pieces, with most of their indirect free kicks being played over Liverpool’s block. As a result, Atletico ended up with 5 offsides against them, and only 1 against Liverpool.
Liverpool’s adjustment in the second leg
In the second leg at Anfield, it’s fair to say that Liverpool created more chances to score, tallying 2.8 xG and scoring 2 goals in 120 minutes. Although it wasn’t enough to beat a very effective Atletico side, it evidenced that Klopp and his staff made relevant changes after struggling offensively in Madrid.
There were 2 changes in the Liverpool starting eleven from the fist leg: Adrian in goal in place of the injured Alisson, and Henderson sliding into the central midfielder position, Oxlade-Chamberlain replacing him as the right centre midfield, and Fabinho starting as a sub. Both new starters had a direct impact on the game, with mixed success. We will focus on the midfielder’s contribution and how Liverpool’s right side was adjusted in this leg.
Oxlade-Chamberlain’s direct impact
As a versatile player alternating between central and wide positions, Oxlade-Chamberlain offers different options than Henderson in this right centre midfield position. Naturally more attracted by the wing than the Liverpool captain, and more willing to make forward runs behind the defensive line, he solved some of the problems the English side had in the first leg.
Right: Henderson’s
The former had more activity in both the wing and the inner channel between the D and the edge of the box.
As discussed previously, one of the key in Atletico’s pressing success was that they could direct Liverpool in areas of the pitch where they wanted to be, and they had numerical advantages to press the ball without conceding space. With Oxlade-Chamberlain, Liverpool now had a player who could drift wide and dribble down the wing with pace, and who was eager to attack the space in the centre-back/fullback channel when in a more central position. On the left side, Wijnaldum would also make this type of runs in the first leg. However, Atletico could contain him because Liverpool could not use the spaces these runs open, which they did better in the 2nd leg.
The forward runs in the CB/FB channel are more difficult to defend because they create a confusion as to who should mark the runner between the central midfielder, the fullback and the centre-back.
How did Arnold and Salah adjust?
At Anfield, Liverpool could find Salah more often, the Egyptian finishing the game 111 touches against 36 in Madrid. Although he only played 72 minutes in the first leg and 120 in the second one, his ratio touch per minute more than doubled, from 0.40 to 0.93. His passing also improved, from 70% to 84% completed passes, despite increasing his forward pass ratio from 33% to 59%.
Arnold also got more involved and had more impact on the game. He delivered 7 key passes against 2 in the first game, and his crossing accuracy increased from 13% for 16 crosses to 20% for 25.
With Oxlade-Chamberlain, they would in most situations build a triangle to occupy and secure 3 key zones:
- The CB/FB channel, to pin the wide midfielder and prevent him from stepping out quickly to press on a pass, and to attack the space behind the defensive line to either receive in depth, or create space for a teammate between the defense and midfield lines
- The width, to stretch the defensive block and either exploit space around it, or create space inside it to penetrate
- The depth, to either attract pressure and open space between and/or behind the lines, or, if not pressed, being able to drive into space, or cross from a deep position
In zone 1, we would usually see Oxlade-Chamberlain, in zone 2 Salah, and in zone 3 Arnold. However, the shape was flexible, and players would rotate as they see fit (Cf. above picture). The first goal was a great example of this build-up.
Liverpool created more chances in second half through similar movements, although they were not able to score to avoid a fatal extra-time.
Conclusion
Atletico controlled the first leg, with an impressive defensive organization to which Liverpool couldn’t adjust in-game to score a precious away goal. The Spaniards were also the most dangerous team offensively, making very good use of their 28% possession to create goal scoring situations. Simeone’s plan to protect his team against Liverpool’s strengths was well thought, and his defensive principles are clearly very well integrated by his players.
3 weeks later in Liverpool though, the same game plan didn’t deliver the same outcome, and Atletico conceded much more chances. However, the English side wasted too many opportunities, whereas the Spaniards were incredibly efficient with a 30% conversion rate. Klopp’s tactical changes seemed to be relevant though, and his team didn’t look as helpless in the final third as they did in Madrid. Ultimately, individual performances decided of the result.
After the elimination, Klopp regretted Atletico’s very defensive approach despite the quality of the players they’ve got. From a purely strategic and tactical perspective though, Atletico’s performance was remarkable. Many teams have tried this approach against Liverpool this season, but not many have got a result out of it.
Even though they conceded 3 goals at home, the first leg in Madrid seems like the real failure. From a tactical point of view, Klopp and his staff didn’t react to adapt to Atletico’s game plan. Maybe they were satisfied with a 1-0 loss away, and thought that they would make the difference in the second leg. However, the home game showed that they had the resources to be more dangerous in the final third, and that they could have made some adjustments to get an away goal. From a players’ performance point of view, some key players didn’t seem at their best level, and the goal Atletico scored could have definitely been avoided. Defending 11v4 on a corner, it’s hard to imagine Liverpool conceding a goal.
