At the end of last season, Juventus decided to take a new direction in terms of playing style. With this in mind, they replaced Massimiliano Allegri with a fellow Italian coach seen by many as his total opposite, Maurizio Sarri. In a previous article at the beginning of the season, I already discussed some of the main differences between the 2 coaches’ styles and organisations (https://tacticandtechnique.com/a-first-assessment-of-sarris-juventus/).
Under Sarri, Juventus have won their 9th consecutive league title this season. However, they have lost in the Coppa Italia final against Napoli, in the Supercoppa Italiana final against Lazio, and got knocked out the Champions League in the round of 16 by Lyon. Independently from the team’s results, Sarri was appointed to initiate a “revolution” in terms of playing style, but it never seemed like it really clicked with the players. As a result, he was relieved of his duties the day after the elimination against Lyon and replaced by the novice Andrea Pirlo ahead of the new season.
So what exactly didn’t work as expected this season for Sarri and Juve? In this 1st part of the analysis, I will focus mainly on the possession phase.
N.B. Data to support this analysis have been collected via various providers: StatsBomb (via Fbref), Whoscored, Transfermarkt and Understat.
THE SQUAD
First and foremost, let’s have a look at the players at Sarri’s disposal. The season started with a group of 25 players, although the new head coach rapidly made it clear that he wouldn’t count on Mario Mandzukic. When the Champion’s League squad was due to be announced, Emre Can was more surprisingly excluded. These 2 players ended up leaving the club with none to very few appearances.
Looking at the rest of the squad, there is a clear lack of depth in terms of wide players. With only 3 full-backs (Sandro, Danilo, De Sciglio) and 4 wingers (Ronaldo, Costa, Bernardeschi, Cuadrado), it was clear that there would be times when playing in certain systems would be challenging, especially taking into account Costa’s and De Sciglio’s tendency to get injured (which was confirmed again this season). To compensate the lack of full-backs, Cuadrado has played in this position most of the season. It wasn’t entirely new to him as he had played right-back before under Allegri, although only on rare occasions.
The midfield raised questions as well, with 6 players available after Can’s departure, and including the regularly injured Khedira and Ramsey. After half a season without a single first team match with PSG, Rabiot was also expected to need some time to get back in good form. Expectations were met as the Frenchman only started to be in physically good condition after the lock-down break.
THE LINE-UPS
14 players shared more than 40% of game time this season, from Bonucci with 4,192 minutes played (approx. 47 matches) to Bernardeschi with 1,999 (approx. 22 games).
The trend compared to last season is that Sarri has rotated his squad slightly less than Allegri. Ronaldo and Bonucci both played about 10% more than last season, while 10 players have played a minimum of 60% of all the minutes. Under Allegri, only 7 players had reached this mark.
THE FORMATIONS
Sarri primarily used 2 starting formations this season: 4-3-3 and 4-3-1-2. He would typically use a same shape over a series of game over a certain period of time rather than changing more often. 4-3-3 was used at the start of the season for the first 5 games (4 Serie A games and 1 UCL). 4-3-2-1 was then introduced and installed until the end of January, with 3 exceptions where 4-3-3 was used again. After that, it was 4-3-3 to the end of the season. Although we obviously can’t know for sure what were Sarri’s intentions with his game management, we can extrapolate that 1) he wanted to give the players some sort of continuity to facilitate the implementation of his principles of play and 2) he would rarely adapt his system based on the opponent. As to why he decided to come back to the 4-3-3 at the end of January, we can imagine that he wanted more wide players on the pitch for when the team was in possession.
That said though, it’s important to understand that starting formations are mostly given as an indication and vary during a match depending on the moment of the game (in/out possession), the players on the pitch, the principles of play of the team, the reaction of the opponent,… Therefore, in this section I will only highlight some key features and characteristics of the different formations used by Sarri.
- Independently of the shape, Sarri started the season with Bonucci as the right centre-back and De Ligt as the left one. It is probably simply because the Dutchman came off the bench in the first game to replace an injured Chiellini in the left CB position. However, after the team’s first defeat of the season in December against Lazio, during which De Ligt picked up a shoulder injury, Sarri started Demiral as the right CB for the next 6 games, moving Bonucci in the left CB spot. Demiral in his turn got injured early in a game against Roma, and De Ligt came in at the same position, which he then kept until the end of the season. Again, it’s impossible to know why Sarri made this change. Was it linked to the defeat against Lazio? Was Demiral not capable of playing on the left of the defence? Did he think Bonucci could be more beneficial to the team on the left?
- In defensive phases, the 4-3-3 would become a flat 4-4-2 while the 4-3-1-2 would remain in a similar shape with a compact diamond midfield.
- In attacking phases, the team’s positional deployment would very much change in function of the players’ profiles and particularly the most attacking players. Below are some examples of the players’ most common movements when the team is in possession. We will see later how this influence the team’s attacking plays.
PLAYING STYLE
As with Napoli and Chelsea previously, Sarri aims for the control of the possession to open spaces in the opponents’ defensive structures and create goal-scoring opportunities. Out of possession, the team is defending in a ball oriented zonal-marking system, both in open plays and on set pieces. Although the intention is to defend on the front-foot and be pro-active, the zonal-marking system implies to be patient and can sometimes lead to longer defensive phases. The transitions are very much dictated by the way the team wants to play in and out of possession. In order to be able to control the possession, the team must be able to secure the ball as soon as it is regained. The defending system should in theory create many opportunities to counter-attack. When possession is lost, the team needs to react very quickly to avoid being caught in the depth because during long possession spells, most of the team should be positioned in the opposition’s half.
That said, Juventus didn’t always dominate their opponents as expected. Throughout the season, they appeared to struggle to develop effective possession phases and showed unusual defensive weaknesses.
ISSUES TO PLAY THROUGH THE THIRDS
When in possession of the ball, the team looks to build the attack by travelling with the ball through the thirds. The transition from the defensive to the midfield third can be more or less difficult depending on the opponent’s intentions. Some teams opt for a conservative approach with a medium/low defensive block, in which case progressing to the midfield third is somewhat easy. Other teams are more ambitious and decide to press high to disrupt the build-up play and try to regain possession closer to the opponent’s goal.
BREAKING THROUGH A HIGH PRESS
In Serie A, the quality of the Juventus’ squad compared to majority of the other teams is so that they face low blocks more often. However, when facing a high press, they demonstrated some difficulties to play out efficiently.
Juventus would always use the same structure against any pressing system and shape. Whether the opponent is pressing with a front 3 or 2, or whether it is organised in a zonal or man-marking system, Juventus would always set up with a back 4 and deep full-backs. Deep means that they would typically be positioned in front of the first line of pressure rather than behind. In midfield, the deep-lying playmaker (generally Pjanic) would roam in front of the defence to support the player on the ball, trying to get into positions to receive the ball behind the first line of pressure. As Jorginho at Napoli and Chelsea under Sarri, Pjanic was expected to play a key role and be at the centre of all the attacks. The other 2 centre-midfielders would be operating in slightly higher positions, split either side of Pjanic to create a triangle shape to offer different lines of pass. The forwards position would then depend on the line-ups though. When lining up with a front 3, they would get into a classic high and wide positioning to occupy the width of the pitch, although Ronaldo likes to be slightly more inside the pitch. Similar with Dybala if he plays on the wing. Costa and Bernardeschi would be more like traditional wingers in very wide positions. When lining up with an attacking midfield and 2 centre-forwards though, there would be 2 options:
- Higuain would always stay in a more central position and very rarely go wide to the right channel. Ronaldo would still occupy the left side of the pitch
- Dybala would get into wider positions and free up the central channel for the attacking midfielder to push up and make a front 3. In a game against SPAL in September, Ronaldo, Ramsey and Dybala displayed a good performance in this set up
ISSUES
What are the main reasons why Juventus have sometimes been vulnerable against high pressing teams?
When playing with Higuain and Ronaldo up front, there was a serious lack of width. As just mentioned, Higuain would almost always stay in a central position, leading to a totally abandoned right wing, and therefore a more predictable play for the opponent. The fact that the full-backs are also both in deep positions means that no Juventus player was able to occupy the right wing in the early build up. The below heatmaps are an example of the different areas of the pitch that are mostly covered whether Dybala or Higuain is associated to Ronaldo.
Match against SPAL (September) 
Match against Sassuolo (December)
The role of the forward players is also essential to buildup against a high press. Because the weakness of a team pressing is the depth behind its defensive line, it’s crucial that forward players represent a threat to force the defender to stay in a deep position, what is called pinning the defensive line. By holding them in a deeper position, they create space for their teammates in their own half to circulate the ball and progress up the pitch. Higuain would usually be good at holding a high position and not dropping deep to much. He would as a matter of fact be useful because of his quality at playing back to the the opposition’s goal, making him a good target to receive long passes on the ground. He could then hold up, or lay-off a midfielder to play forward in an up-back-through combination. Ronaldo and Dybala however, have a strong tendency to drop to receive in deeper positions. While it can in certain situation really help the team escaping the pressure, dropping deep can also allow a defender to step out of the defensive line to press, and reduce the threat of a pass behind the defensive line. This is especially observable when the opponent is man-marking. In some phases, we could even see Juventus with the whole 11 players in their own half, making it an 11v10 on half a pitch, which becomes very difficult to escape.
“I would like to see Pjanic touch 150 balls per game, but we have to train the ability of the other players to always give him the ball” 1
Maurizio Sarri
As mentioned earlier, Pjanic was expected to hold a key role in Juventus’ attacking organisation. Maurizio Sarri himself explained his plan for him during a press conference following his appointment. In some games, this message sounded like an invitation for the opponent to focus on marking the Bosnian. Atalanta and Hellas Verona for example defended with an aggressive man-marking system against Juventus, restraining Pjanic to a minimal amount of passes received (see chart below).
Although it is certainly collective failure when a team’s playmaker can’t find himself on the ball as often as he should, Pjanic’s movements didn’t always seemed very efficient and he could have probably done better to get into receiving positions. His main issue was to constantly follow the ball and mirror its movements as well as often coming too close to the ball carrier. This sometimes created problems for himself and the team in general:
- It makes it easier for the defending players to press the ball: in this type of situation, a player would typically try to achieve 2 actions at the same time: pressing the ball and screening a passing line. If the players off the ball follow the movements of the ball, he will always be easier to screen by the defender, and will therefore have more issues to create a passing line
- It makes it easier for a player marking him to stay close: as mentioned before, more teams are now man-marking opponents in the opposition’s half to disrupt the build-up. Pjanic would obviously be a prime target. To lose a marker though, one needs to deceive him with his movements and/or take advantage of his inattention. When always following the ball’s movements, one already can’t deceive his marker since his movements are very predictable. By following the ball, one would also always remain in the defender’s eyesight who is then able to see both the ball and the player without having to scan around him.
- It gets him in non-ideal positions to receive the ball and prepare his next pass: as he follows the ball, Pjanic would then often be facing it. Meanings that when he receives the ball, he would face the side of the pitch where the ball was already in play, which is typically the most congested area since the opposition would try to close it down. It would then reduce his passing options and make it very difficult to switch the play or play forward. As a result, his options would often then be to bounce back to the original passer who might end up under high pressure, or play inside the traffic where it is easier for the opposition to close down spaces and win the ball.
- It attracts opponents towards the ball and puts even more pressure on the ball carrier: as Pjanic would very often move towards the ball carrier, sometimes way too close, he would also attract opposition’s player(s) with him. As a result, the area around the ball carrier would get even more congested, reducing the chances to play forward in good conditions and increasing the pressure.
- It can close other passing options: as mentioned before, Pjanic would never drop between and/or behind the centre-backs in the build-up. He would therefore always be in front of them. By following the ball and attracting more pressure with him, he can also in some situations close down the space in front of the ball carrier and actually other passing options that his teammates would have created. It is even more true when he is man-marked. Again, his movements would just make the defenders’ life easier by achieving 2 defensive actions by simply following him.
I have highlighted the forward players’ and Pjanic’s role in the build-up, and their responsibilities in the issues the team has sometimes faced. However, there could have been a collective solution that Juventus didn’t manage to really implement: positional rotations. When a forward player drops in midfield, it could be a good opportunity for a midfielder to swap position and attack the space vacated by this teammate. Even though Matuidi would sometimes make a run to exploit the space freed up by Ronaldo, it didn’t seem like the rest of the team could really notice this movement and interpret the triggers to play a longer pass. I’ve also already mentioned that no midfield player would ever join the back-line to change the shape of the team, and the full-backs would always play in deep positions, making the structure quite rigid and predictable for the opponent. In midfield, we could sometimes see a pattern where Pjanic would move up centrally to reverse the triangle with the 2 other midfielders, and become the tip of the shape. We could also start to see a pattern involving Pjanic, Rabiot and Dybala after the restart, where the Frenchman would drop into a space vacated by Pjanic, while Dybala would drop in midfield in Rabiot’s position. It worked well against Torino in July, although it was made easier by Torino’s poor pressing coordination. In the end, it often looked like Juventus’ players were moving with little collective purpose.
As a result of the disorganised movements from a collective point of view, Juventus were too rarely able to combine to escape the pressure. A classic pattern of play from Sarri from his days at Napoli was an up-back-through combination, starting from one of the centre-backs playing a long ground pass to an advanced player (typically Higuain or then Mertens) who could then lay-off one of the 3 midfielders facing the opposition’s goal to either play out wide in space, or carry into space himself. With the Juventus players being most of the time unable to manipulate the opponents by their movements, it was difficult, if not impossible, to execute this kind of combination. As explained about Pjanic’s movements and the forward players dropping deep too often, the central channel seemed so congested at times that no centre-back would have been able to play through that much traffic. Even when they were, it didn’t look like the midfielders were ready for it, and they would therefore not be in position to receive a lay-off.
Lastly, Szczesny seemed to have been underused in those phases, although his passing skills are decent. For a team aiming to attract the pressure with its possession, it is quite surprising to use the goalkeeper so few. As the only player on the pitch who is never marked, the keeper can be vital to create numerical superiority and beat a high press. Recently, Manchester City (vs Real Madrid) and PSG (vs Atalanta) have demonstrated how useful the goalkeeper could be to play out from the back, Ederson and Navas playing as a third centre-back to create overloads against the first line of pressure. The below chart show how little Szczesny have been used by his teammates compared to other teams across Europe (Top 4 of the 4 best leagues according to UEFA ratings).
Below are 2 clips to illustrate Juventus’ issues against high press, where the reasons explained above can be observed.
BREAKING UP A LOW BLOCK
When Juventus were not able to quickly break through their opponent from their build-up, they would very often then face a low block in which the whole team would be behind the ball to defend any entries in their box. These situations are regularly problematic or the teams in possession as it can be difficult to unlock the situation and score. In the meantime, it can be relatively easy to get sucked in the defensive structure and commit too many players, with the risk of conceding dangerous counter-attacks.
When the opponent holds a deep position, Juventus would typically always have one central forward, generally Higuain or Dybala. Ronaldo would have some freedom, roaming across the left wing and the centre, occasionally even drifting to the right wing. If they play with a right winger, he would occupy this side of the pitch. If they play with a central attacking midfield, he would either drift wide or stay central and try to find space between the lines. The 3 central midfielder typically keep their triangle shape with the deep-lying playmaker in a deeper position. One of the full-backs would generally also say at the back to maintain a back 3 with the 2 centre-backs, keeping a 3-1 shape with the deep-lying midfielder. Only once The full-back would typically get higher on the pitch once possession is progressing, but in a more central position, leaving the wide area to the winger or a central midfielder. The decision as to which full-back should drop into this position is driven by the position of the ball. If the left centre-back is on the ball, then the right full-back drops, and vice versa.
Generally speaking, to break down a low block, a team needs to:
- Stretch the opponent’s block to progress (through positioning and movements)
- Control the tempo of play
- Be patient to find a break to play in the box
- Be efficient at crossing in the box
- Have players able to beat opponents in 1v1 situations
Juventus are relatively effective in 1v1 situations in the attacking third, with the likes of Ronaldo, Dybala or Costa. As a matter of fact, individual brilliance rather than collective efforts have in many occasions unlocked situations.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
The main objective for a team defending deep is to protect the central channel, and therefore the access to its goal, by holding a very compact shape and force the opponent to play wide where it can be pressed with more chances of success. The challenge for the team in possession is then to get closer to the goal, either by finding space between the lines and progress towards the goal, or by crossing into the box to create chances. Either ways, the key is to manipulate the opponent to disorganise its block and penetrate its penalty area. In various recent analysis, it’s been observed at the top level that at least 80% of goals were scored from inside the penalty area, and that in 80% of the cases, the scorer takes fewer than 3 touches (example below with the World Cup 2018 stats)
Juventus had some difficulties to enter their opponents’ penalty area though. As a result, there one of the top teams in Europe with the highest ratio of shots from outside the box:
It is also one of the team with the lowest ratio of touches taken inside the opponent’s penalty area:
ISSUES TO PENETRATE INSIDE THE BOX
For this section, I will highlight some of the main issues faced by Juventus in different clips. All these clips are from different games, but the same issues can be observed, as they were in other games as well.
0:00 – Positioning & movements: It might not be necessary to have 5 players in front of the lone centre-forward to initiate this attack, knowing that he is very unlikely to press with intensity. Starting the phase with that many players in front of the first line of pressure just delays the team’s positional deployment in the other half. We can also note the lack of pressure on the back line. As Napoli’s defence is still reasonably high, Juventus could at least threat the back 4 with a long through ball in the depth, especially since De Ligt on the ball is not pressed and could have time to adjust an accurate pass
0:10 – Using the wide areas: No particular reasons for Cuadrado to switch the play here. He is under no pressure, and Juventus have no positional or numerical advantage they can exploit on the other wing. They are actually in a decent situation on the right wing, with both Dybala and Bentancur playing 1 on 1 with their marker, and Pjanic in a pocket of space between 3 players. Besides, Costa is now in Insigne’s blindside. Cuadrado could have therefore carry the ball into space to attract pressure, play a split pass for Costa between Zielinski and Insigne, initiate a 3rd man combination through Pjanic to then reach Costa or Bentancur,…
0:12 to 0:16 – Positioning: As the ball travels from Bonucci to Ronaldo, Matuidi moves into Callejon’s shadow, which makes him an unreachable passing option for the Portuguese.
0:17 – Using wide areas: Here again, we can wonder whether it is necessary to switch the play back to the right wing. Ronaldo, Sandro and Matuidi are potentially playing 3v3 against Maksimovic, Di Lorenzo and Callejon on the left wing, whereas in the centre Pjanic is isolated in the middle of 3 players. We can also note that Matuidi has dragged out Maksimovic out of the defenisve line, which creates a gap that Dybala could exploit.
0:22 – Movements: Ronaldo attempts the first run behind Napoli’s defensive line. However, Napoli are now too deep to really be able to exploit the depth. His run creates a pocket for Dybala though, but Cuadrado can’t play into him directly, and Bentancur’s body shape doesn’t allow him to lay him off for a 3rd man combination.
0:04 – Positioning: As against Napoli, there is no real threat on Milan’s defensive line. Players don’t necessarily need to be anchored on the same line as the defence. However, here, all Juventus players are in front of Milan’s midfield line, which facilitates their press as they don’t need to mind the space behind them. This can obviously be done purposely though, and the rest of the sequence shows how perhaps it was actually a move to prepare a cross.
0:06 to 0:14 – Tempo of play & attacking the box: This time, the switch seems to be a good decision as Costa is unmarked on the left wing, and it could have been a good crossing situation. An issue here is Juventus’ speed of ball circulation. It’s been 8 seconds between Dybala’s pass to Pjanic and Costa’s first touch on the wing, giving enough time to Milan’s block to shift across the pitch. Players in the penalty area are also too static. Switches of play to prepare a cross can be very efficient. As the ball travels to the other wing, the opponents are typically turning their bodies to follow the ball, placing some of the attacking team’s players in their blindside, and therefore in a good position to make runs into the box without being marked. In this sequence, Dybala and Bentancur are in ideal positions to make a timed run in the penalty area and attack a cross. However, as the switch is taking too long to be completed, they are already too close to the goal when Costa can finally cross.
0:10 to 0:14 – Positioning & movements: Rabiot makes a good forward run as Bonucci progresses up the pitch to open space for him. However, he remains in Tousart’s shadow and allows the Lyon player to step up and press Bonucci while screening the passing line towards Rabiot.
0:16 to 0:31 – Movements & speed of play: This sequence again highlights the absence of runs behind the defensive line. This type of runs can be used as a passing options or a dummy to open space for a teammate. By not making any of these runs, Juventus make the play predictable to the opponent and miss chances to open space between the lines. At 0:25, we can also see the 4 central players all following the ball and facing the opposite touchline. As I mentioned for Pjanic, it dramatically reduces their vision of the pitch, and should they receive the ball, they would most likely only be able to play towards the same direction as where the ball was already travelling to. Alex Sandro decision to try an impossible pass to Ronaldo through 5 players is obviously very questionable.
0:42 – Movements: A good run forward from Ronaldo to open space for Bentancur. A movement that would have been very useful in more occasions.
0:49 to 0:53 – Movements: Dybala is getting sucked into Cuadrado’s space by the ball. At 0:46, the diamond shape they were in was probably good to circulate the ball and escape the pressure. However, Dybala closes down all space by coming too close and reducing the angle with both Cuadrado and Bentancur.
CONCLUSION
It’s fair to say that Maurizio Sarri’s footprint on Juventus’ attacking play was hardly visible this season, and some of the critics he received at Chelsea were heard again: mainly, a slow-paced and predictable possession.
The quality of the squad was also questioned, as some players didn’t seem to either be able to play this type of football and/or were not at the level expected from them. There can be endless discussions as to whether the players or the coach were at fault here. In reality, it’s probably a mix of Sarri and his staff being unable to truly convince the players with their playing style, an the squad not being totally adapted to the coach’s demands. Sarri could have perhaps had saved his head by adjusting to the players at his disposal, and wait the next transfers window to get the personnel he wanted, but he can’t be blamed for sticking to his philosophy.
A critic we can make though is his tactical rigidity and the impression given that he was never able to anticipate, or answer, in-game tactical problems.
In a second part, I’ll discuss the defensive organisation, and why Juventus have conceded a (negative) record 43 goals in Serie A.
